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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of transnational regulatory cooperation between public and 
private actors. It inquires why a private regulator and an international organisation may enter into 
a cooperation agreement in order to regulate particular issues, and what this tells us about the 
relationship between ‘expertise,’ ‘authority’ and ‘legitimacy’ in particular domains of global 
governance. The argument put forward in the thesis is that different types of regulators cooperate 
because, in an unsettled global space with no hierarchical framework, it is necessary for them to 
acquire sufficient authority to secure compliance with their regulatory agenda. In order to acquire 
and maintain such authority, regulators must be perceived as legitimate and their regulation as 
effective. Cooperation can open venues for participation and deliberation and for the exchange of 
necessary competences (particularly expertise); and thus ultimately can help regulators establish 
and strengthen their authority. 
 
Another important finding of this research is that cooperation can develop into more long-lasting 
network structures. These networks are often of a multi-level nature. As such, they traverse local, 
national, and international spaces. The thesis then develops the idea of ‘networks of 
constitutionalization’ to describe the observation that bilateral arrangements as examined here 
generate ordering effects which extend beyond the two parties. Consequently they become the 
basis for norm creation and adoption for different types of actors located in the networks formed 
around the issue area. Thus, even in pluralistic structures, eventually a certain kind of 
constitutionalization can emerge putting into question sharp divisions between ‘pluralist’ and 
‘constitutionalist’ interpretations of a developing global (legal) order. 
 
This work also encompasses two case studies: the ISO 26000 process, whereby the ‘private’ 
technical standard setter ISO concluded separate cooperation agreements with the ILO, the 
OECD and the UN Global Compact; and a case study on ‘Sport and Environment’ that focuses 
on the long-standing cooperation between the IOC and the UN Environmental Programme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This work examines formal forms of cooperation between public international organisations and 
‘private regulators’. The emergence of cooperation between international organisations and 
private regulators through agreements has to be analysed in the context of at least two decades of 
considerable economic, social and cultural globalisation.1 The interconnection between markets 
and societies, the spread and expansion of businesses and trade around the globe, as well as the 
functional differentiation of society has presented traditional regulators with challenges that are 
impossible to address by acting alone. 2 To elaborate, on the one hand we have witnessed the rise 
of different public actors exercising governance activities with global, regional or cross-border 
effects.3 On the other hand there has been a noticeable rise in private regulation made and 
adopted by both commercial entities and civil society actors.4 We are now faced with a 
pluralistic landscape made up of different types of regulators performing a variety of activities in 
different geographical and thematic areas.5 Much has been written regarding these developments 
and there is also a significant body of literature on the transformation of law and the global legal 
order more generally.6 One can also find some work, predominantly in political science, dealing 
with forms of transnational cooperation between different types of actors, such as international 
organisations and private actors.7 However, what is missing is an analysis which links the 
transformations in the global sphere with a phenomenon such as regulatory cooperation, and 
                                                          
1  B de Sousa Santos, ‘The Processes of Globalization’, in Eurozine 2002, 2 ff. 
2  P F Kjaer, ‘Post-Hegelian Networks, Comments on the Chapter by Simon Deaking’, in: M Amstutz & G 
Teubner, Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-Operation (Hart Publishing, 2009) 75 ff. 
3  See for instance B Kingsbury, N Krisch & R B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 
68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) 15, at 20. 
4  R B Hall & T J Biersteker, ‘The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System’, in R B Hall 
& T J Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (CUP, 2002) 3, and the different 
contributions therein; F Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’, 38 Journal of Law and 
Society (2011) 20 ff. 
5  See, eg P S Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 80 Southern California Law Review (2007) 1155 ff.  
6  See for more on this topic Chapter 2.  
7  For examples of legal literature on public private partnerships see K Abbott, ‘Public Private Partnerships’, 
in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2008), available at: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014); and D Azis, ‘Global Public-Private 
Partnerships in International Law’ 2 Asian Journal of International Law (2012) 9 ff. 
 2 
 
which ask why regulatory cooperation emerges. This thesis proposes that regulatory cooperation 
can be seen as an illustration of something more – namely as a change in the way (political) 
authority is devolved from the traditional centres of power to a more heterogeneous set of actors 
(including formal private entities). The main argument will be that authority is not equally 
distributed between the different types of actors in the global realm. This is true for functionally 
specified entities (such as public international organisations and private regulators) and also for 
states. Moreover this devolution of authority is unstable and an actor considered authoritative 
today may see this authority challenged tomorrow. In this context, cooperation functions as a 
means to gain access to the authority necessary to achieve regulatory goals. Furthermore, it can 
also function as a venue to stabilise authority and make it more robust against challenges from 
internal or external challenges.  
 
Very much related to the issue of stabilisation, the second research question seeks to examine 
how regulatory cooperation is framed and to assess the structures within which it develops. It is 
argued that regulatory cooperation can lead to more integrated network structures. Such 
structures are interesting from a legal perspective for a variety of reasons. In particular, from a 
legal theoretical point of view, networks raise questions as to how to understand the global legal 
order. In general terms, some commentators have argued there exist factors which point towards 
the development of a more integrated global legal order, framed by a number of universal 
principles such as human rights (including constitutionalists and universalists). Others deny this 
development and see instead a fragmentation of society into different functionally separated units 
(pluralists). The thesis argues that a network approach can add to an understanding of a political 
and legal order beyond the dichotomy between pluralism and universalism. Networks are spaces 
in which different independent regimes achieve a certain level of stability and uniformity in 
terms of normative values and structure – a development which in this thesis is termed 
constitutionalisation effects. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
As such, the thesis takes as its starting point the interface between legal and political theory. The 
main method is conceptual analysis with the goal of providing a better account of aspects of 
 3 
 
regulation in a globalized context. This analysis is driven by several qualitative empirical case 
studies. The objective of the case studies is to first point out the shortcomings of conventional 
understandings of law and regulation beyond the nation state, for which they were constructed. 
Subsequently the case studies aim to explain and map different, novel transnational forms of 
regulation such as cooperative approaches and multilevel regulatory networks. The findings of 
this exercise in turn help reconstruct a more adequate conception of regulation in a transnational 
context. For the case studies the thesis relies on organisational documents and interviews which 
were conducted with representatives of the respective public and private organisations. The 
thesis then analyses the organisational documents in an attempt to better understand the 
structures of cooperation and draws upon the interviews in seeking to understand what motivates 
organisations to engage into cooperation vis-à-vis taking a conflicting or autonomous position.  
 
3. STRUCTURE 
 
The thesis consists of a theoretical and an empirical part and is divided into five chapters. The 
first chapter provides context and preliminary clarifications of the main concepts. The following 
two chapters lay out the theoretical argument and the two final chapters each contain a case 
study. 
 
Chapter 1 first depicts changes in the general global framework which have led to the 
emergence of public private cooperation. Chapter 1 looks at literature on globalisation and the 
transformation of the nation state. The second part of the Chapter I presents some of the 
commonly used terms such as cooperation and distinctions such as public/private, transnational 
regulation/governance. Rather than providing fixed definitions this chapter aims to set out the 
context in which these terms emerged and are applied. Chapter 1 then offers a set of preliminary 
clarifications which will facilitate the subsequent analysis in the following chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 then deals with the ‘why’ question put forward above. Thus, Chapter 2 poses the 
question of why cooperation takes place and why it emerges between formally distinct actors. 
The main claim made in this Chapter is that different types of organisations cooperate because in 
the fragmented, pluralistic context of the global legal order, transnational regulators convey over 
 4 
 
incomplete authority. Cooperation becomes necessary for individual regulators in order to gain 
the authority necessary to effectively regulate. In addition to giving a general account of 
authority in the transnational context, Chapter 2 looks in particular at different regulatory 
competences which actors exchange in the course of the cooperative processes. This is termed 
‘regulatory commodity exchange’. Chapter 2 also focuses on different understandings of 
legitimacy and how they play out between different types of actors in a transnational context. It 
is argued that in particular origin and tradition based rationales and considerations play an 
important role for considering transnational actors and their regulation as legitimate. For this 
reason states and international organisations, which are supported by states and have their own 
established traditions, have an advantage. Chapter 2 also looks at epistemic authority and how 
the increase in expertise-driven governance makes private actors important partners in regulatory 
cooperation.  
 
The Third Chapter focuses on the structure of public private regulatory cooperation. It is argued 
that regulatory cooperation can develop into network structures, which are in general terms more 
integrated forms of cooperation. Networks are often discussed in relation to two other forms of 
organisation: market and hierarchy. A market structure is characterised by individual transactions 
governed by contracts without any further relationship existing between the participants. In the 
hierarchical model all transactions take place under the umbrella of one entity (the firm) which is 
characterised by central organisation.8 Transposed to the political and legal sphere networks 
constitute more consolidated structures which nevertheless do not fit into traditional hierarchical 
models. 
 
However, as indicated above, this chapter seeks to go beyond regulatory networks and asks a 
broader question, namely what the development of regulatory networks tells us about our 
understanding of the global legal order. Chapter 3 does not simply take regulatory networks as 
evidence for a network structure in the global legal realm. Rather, it engages in a translation 
exercise. First it is shown how cooperative networks create spaces wherein independent regimes 
are stabilised. This is combined with the harmonisation of certain normative values and structural 
                                                          
8  See W W Powell, ‘Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’, 12 Research in 
Organizational Behavior, (1990) 295 ff. and O E Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press, 
1985). 
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settings. This is termed constitutionalisation effects. Transposed into the general debate on the 
global legal order the thesis joins the chorus of those arguing for a third way beyond a rather far-
reaching conception of pluralism and all-embracing universalism. A network approach, it is 
argued, allows for a general pluralist understanding of the global realm but at the same time pays 
attention to the connections between the different independent orders and spaces of 
harmonisation and integration.   
 
Chapter 4 contains the first case study of the thesis. Chapter 4 examines the cooperation 
between three international organisations – the ILO, UN, and OECD – and ISO in the ISO 26000 
process. ISO 26000 constitutes a so-called management standard in the area of social 
responsibility regulation. This area is highly fragmented with several dozen different initiatives 
addressing one or several sectors of social responsibility regulation. ISO originally being a 
technical, mainly industry-based, standard-setter needed the legitimacy and expertise of the 
international organisations involved, given the many public policy questions the standard had to 
deal with. Cooperation was a venue for ISO to access both. On the other side the international 
organisations saw an opportunity to benefit from the special ties ISO had with the industry in 
order to further spread both their own instruments but also the message of responsible business 
behaviour more generally. It is argued that this was intended to achieving constitutionalisation 
effects by harmonising existing regulatory frameworks and by creating a consistent message 
which could be spread to the business community. 
 
The second case study provided in Chapter 5 focuses on environmental protection in the sports 
realm. Chapter 5 concentrate specifically on the cooperation between the IOC and UNEP. The 
study however expands beyond these two organisations and looks at the broader network that 
established parts of the sports industry, including different local and transnational sports 
associations, as well as local, regional and national governments. This case study shows how the 
initial collaborative project started between the two organisations over time led to more 
stabilised structures through which environmental protection requirements where fostered. 
Particular focus in the study is put on the interplay between the transnational level and the 
regional or national one. The thesis uses social science literature on so-called ‘mega-events’ to 
depict how political and cultural transformations are inspired and accelerated by an event such as 
 6 
 
the Olympic Games. Commitments by the local organisers as formalised in host city contracts 
often require significant (legal) transformations, and investments into environmental related 
(infrastructural) projects. As such the Games can function as a catalyst for increased 
environmental protection. On the other hand transformations can also take place at the 
transnational level, inspired by the local developments. The chapter will pays significant 
attention on this interplay.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PUBLIC PRIVATE REGULATORY COOPERATION – CONTEXT AND 
PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This Chapter aims to provide a framework within which the subsequent analysis of public private 
regulatory cooperation can be carried out. As outlined above, a core inspiration for this work was 
the empirical observation that throughout the last decades there has been a significant increase in 
cooperation between international organisations and private actors. One recurring term used in 
this context is to describe these events, which could be considered as having triggered many of 
the legal developments outside traditional state borders is globalisation. Even though the term is 
not uncontroversial, it is nonetheless most commonly used when describing the changes which 
have taken place since the end of the Cold War (and to a greater or lesser extent even before). 
They include economic, cultural and social transformations, which have had (and continue to 
have) a significant impact on the regulatory state and our preconceptions of the law. The first 
part of this Chapter, therefore, engages with the extensive literature on this issue and provides a 
short summary. It then subsequently looks into the changing role of the nation state (2).  
 
The second part of the thesis tries to provide some preliminary clarifications regarding some of 
the recurring terms in this thesis and provides a demarcation between commonly used concepts. 
The thesis will focus on the distinction between public and private in section 3. This is followed 
by section 4 where a first understanding of some of the commonly used terms such as 
translational law, regulation and governance is provided. The final section of this chapter (5) 
looks at understandings of cooperation in different contexts. 
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2. THE CONTEXT – GLOBALISATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
NATION STATE  
 
Before assessing the distinction between public and private actors or giving a working definition 
of transnational regulation, it is a useful exercise to identify the actual events which have 
contributed to the difficulties now felt in establishing clear borders or providing precise 
definitions. Such events also underlie many of the issues addressed in the following chapters. As 
such, it is necessary to shed some light on the phenomenon so ambitiously coined globalisation,9 
as well as a related topic – the transformation of the nation state.  
 
2.1 Globalisation  
 
The literature on this topic is both vast and diverse, containing very different appraisals and 
predictions.10 Accordingly, globalisation is not a predominantly legal or even political event. 
Instead, it is a ‘multifaceted phenomenon containing economic, social, political, cultural, 
religious and legal dimensions’,11 which are characterized by complexity, fluidity and 
elusiveness;12 or, in other words, by a ‘time – space compression’13. 
 
In terms of the present study, it is necessary to determine those developments and effects induced 
by globalisation which have had such an impact on law and regulation in triggering public 
private cooperation. Therefore, the thesis will not provide an extensive overview over the 
different theoretical approaches and categorisations of the myriad aspects of globalisation; rather 
                                                          
9  Globalisation as elaborated in the following is what is usually referred to as ‘contemporary globalization’. 
This term includes predominantly the post-cold war period, but acknowledges that there have been different 
historical époques characterized by different waves of globalisation, see F Mégret, ‘Globalization’ in: Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2009) available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil (last 
accessed 19 December 2014), para. 3. 
10  B de Sousa Santos, ‘The Process of Globalisation’, in: Eurozine 2002, available at: 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2002-08-22-santos-en.html (last accessed 19 December 2014) at 1, lists a few 
different perspectives taken to describe enhanced global interaction, such as ‘globalisation, global formation, global 
culture, global system, global modernity, global process, globalisation cultures or global cities’. See, furthermore S 
Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilization’, 72 (3) Foreign Affairs (1993) 3-12; F Fukuyama, The End of History and 
the Last Man (The Free Press, 1992). 
11  Santos, supra note 2, at 2. 
12  W Twinning, Globalization & Legal Theory (Butterworths, 2000), at 196. 
13  See D Harvey, The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Blackwell, 1990), Chapter 17, at 284.  
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the following paragraphs will be limited to the most prominent transformations and those most 
relevant for this work.  
 
The first ones to name in this context are technical innovation and economic globalisation; in 
particular technical progress and innovation in production processes, which have led to major 
transformations of the global economy.14 Production has become globalised, being increasingly 
interlinked through transnational supply chains. International trade has expanded accompanied 
by increased and enhanced international capital flows, growing financial markets and foreign 
investment.15 Another crucial and interlinked event was the development of the internet and the 
access of broader sections of the population (at least in developing countries) to it.16 Such 
developments necessarily required regulatory structures which extend beyond national borders 
and accommodate transnational and digital activities. 
 
Apart from those technical and factual changes in economic processes globalisation is often said 
to be accompanied by a particular political agenda, the so-called Washington Consensus,17 or 
neo-liberal economic consensus.18 The term refers to the creation and proliferation of 
international economic organisations and institutions as a means to respond to the economic 
developments and the policies pursued to achieve them at least during the early post-Cold War 
period. Particularly important institutions to mention are the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and 
regional trade organisations, as well as ICSID. There has also been an increase of less formal or 
even private institutions, such as IOSCO, the Basel Committee or Credit Rating Agencies. Most 
of these institutions followed a policy that supported or demanded countries to open their 
national economies to the world market, privatisation, deregulation, strong protection of foreign 
investments, and strict fiscal policies. Little attention was said to have been awarded on the deep 
impacts those policies and developments had on social and national political realms.19  
                                                          
14  R J Gilson, C F Sabel & R E Scott, ‘Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm 
Collaboration’, 109 Columbia Law Review (2009) at 431 ff.; Mégret, supra note 1, para. 9. 
15  See Mégret, supra note 1, para. 10 
16  Ibid para 11.  
17  Referring to the support by US Politics and multilateral agencies seated in Washington such as the World 
Bank and the IMF; J Williamson, The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Institute for International Economics, 
1994) at 17; W Twinning, General Jurisprudence, Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (CUP, 2009) at 13 
and 336 ff. 
18  Sousa Santos, supra note 2, at 5. 
19  Ibid. 
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More generally and on a more theoretical level Boaventura de Sousa Santos distinguishes 
between four forms of globalisation. These are: globalised localism, localized globalism, 
cosmopolitanism, and the common inheritance of humanity.20 The first form refers to a particular 
local phenomenon which is globally adapted and successful. Examples of this include fast food 
and the English language as well as the spread of intellectual property laws. Localized globalism 
refers to the impact of global events on local structures. These are changes in local economic 
relations (‘elimination of neighbouring commerce’21) and the opening up of cultural resources to 
tourism, for example. Unsurprisingly such developments can also be observed with regard to 
regulation or law. In fact we will revisit both forms of globalisation in later chapters of this thesis 
when either local forms of regulation inspire global actors and developments, and when such 
practices are taken up by a globally operating entity which implements it locally.22 Since the 
developments just described are often accused of causing new social inequalities and an unequal 
distribution of wealth, 23 they have inspired numerous anti-globalisation and global justice 
movements (some of which will be addressed in the sports case study).  
 
The two final expressions of globalisation can therefore be seen as responses to the negative 
externalities of globalised localism and localized globalism. Cosmopolitanism stands for forms 
of organised resistance of nation states, regions and social groups against the developments 
described above. The venues used for this resistance are those created through globalisation, 
such as technology and advancements in communications. The last form of globalisation is the 
idea of a common heritage of humanity and reflects ‘transnational struggles to protect and 
decommodify resources, entities, artifacts and environments considered essential for the 
dignified survival of humanity, whose sustainability can only be guaranteed on a planetary 
scale’.24 
 
                                                          
20  Ibid at 25 ff.; B de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the 
Paradigmatic Transition (Routledge, 1995) at 262 ff.; See also W Twinning, supra note 4, at 221 ff.  
21  Sousa Santos, supra note 2, at 26. 
22  See particularly Chapter 5. 
23  Sousa Santos, supra note 2, at 5, who provides references to further studies on the topic.  
24  Ibid at 28. 
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2.2 The Changing Role of the State in a Globalised World 
 
As illustrated in the previous section, globalisation has had numerous ‘global’ effects which have 
caused significant changes to one particular construct which until relatively recently had been the 
centre of regulatory and legal supremacy – the nation state. This is most visible in the 
terminology often used in literature dealing with effects of globalisation. Expressions such as 
‘post national’,25 or ‘transnational’26 all allude to the fact that our traditional understanding of the 
nature of the nation state may need to be reconsidered.  
 
This ‘traditional’ understanding of the state, based on theories by Thomas Hobbes or Jean Bodin, 
only emerged in Europe in the 16th and 17th century.27 In accordance with this classical 
‘Westphalian’ 28 view, and in the state-centric conceptions of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the central focus was placed on the nation state. The nation state consisted of a specific 
territory, was the sole holder of authority and was the sole creator and executer of rules. Today, 
in a globalised and digitalised world territoriality is in fact often perceived as an obstacle to the 
effective exercise of those tasks.29 The question then emerges as to how to view the state in light 
of the developments described above. Did the state lose its role as ‘the sole, or in some instances 
even principal source of authority, in either the domestic arena or in the international system’;30 
                                                          
25  J Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (MIT Press, 2001). 
26  Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, 1956); or G-P Calliess & P Zumbansen, Rough 
Consensus and Running Code – A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart, 2010). 
27  See N Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority, Non-legislative Codifications in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective (OUP, 2010) at 13.  
28  The Westphalian concept refers to the international order created in the 17th century in the aftermath of the 
Thirty Year War in Osnabrück and Münster. Core of this order were territorial defined nation states, equally as 
subjects of this new order, which coordinated their interaction through a new body of law, the law of nations or 
international law. Contrasted is the horizontally aligned Westphalian concept with the hierarchical order of the 
Middle Ages that was characterized by a the ‘idea of a Christian commonwealth’ lead by universal, superior 
authority – the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire’. See, R Grote, ‘Westphalian System’, in: Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2006), available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil (last 
accessed 19 December 2014), para 4. See L Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’, 42 American Journal of 
International Law (1948) 20ff; A Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (The Macmillan Company, 
1954) Chapter V starting at 115, as well as chapter IV, starting at 61. 
29  See, e.g., P F Kjaer, Post-Hegelian Networks – Comments on the Chapter by Simon Deakin, in: M Amstutz 
& G Teubner (eds), Networks, Legal Issues of Multilateral Cooperation (Hart Publishing, 2009) 75, at 83 f. outlines 
areas, where ‘the territorially-based state experiences difficulties in providing the necessary protection, thereby 
forcing economic entities to find alternative, and largely private, modes of protection’. See furthermore, S Sassen, A 
Sociology of Globalization (W W Norton & Company, 2007) in particular Chapter 3: The State Confronts the 
Global Economy and Digital Networks, at 45 ff.  
30  RB Hall & TJ Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority (CUP, 2003) at 5.  
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or to put it in even stronger terms, has the traditional concept of the nation state become 
obsolete? Is it today just one player among many in the business of regulating the global 
economy? 
 
There are strong tendencies in the literature to interpret the role of the state as a declining one. 
As the state, under the pressure of economic globalisation, deregulates and privatises it 
contributes to its own loss of significance.31 This development, it is argued, has led to a shift in 
governance activities from public to private actors.32 Gunther Teubner for instance states that 
‘globalization of law creates a multitude of decentered law-making processes in various sectors 
of civil society, independently of nation states’.33 Thus, according to such commentators there is 
a functional differentiation taking place where new authoritative bodies are created in various 
different economic and civil society sectors – a process in which the influence of the state is non-
existent or marginal.34 
 
Others, however, argue that the processes taking place are merely a continuation of a change that 
is inherent in history but does not necessary lead to a general distortion of state primacy as 
such.35 According to this view neither empirical evidence nor theoretical considerations lead to 
the assumption that state power is reduced. Instead states are in a continuous process of 
adaptation to new (economic) circumstances, which very often actually originate from their own 
                                                          
31  See for an overview over the different positions: Sassen, supra note 21, at 47 ff. who refers to L Panitch, 
‘Rethinking the Role of the State’, in: J H Mittelman (ed), Globalization and Critical Reflections (Lynne Riener 
Publishers,1996), at 83 ff.; as well as, S Gill, ‘Globalization, Democratization, and the Politics of Indifference’, in: J 
H Mittelman (ed), Globalization and Critical Reflections (Lynne Riener Publishers, 1996) 205 ff. 
32  Hall & Bierstecker, supra note 22, at 3ff., C Cutler, V Haufler & T Porter (eds), Private Authority and 
International Affairs (State University of New York Press, 1999). 
33  See, G Teubner, ‘Foreword: Legal Regimes of Global Non-State Actors’, in: G. Teubner (ed), Global Law 
Without the State (Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) at xiii. See furthermore, A Fischer-Lescano & G Teubner, ‘Regime 
–Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’, 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (2004) 999 ff, at 1008 they state that ‘[t]he final break with such conceptions (national legal 
orders) was only signalled in the last century with the rapidly accelerating expansion of international organizations 
and regulatory regimes, which, in sharp contrast to their genesis within international treaties, established themselves 
as autonomous legal orders. The national differentiation of law is now overlain by sectoral fragmentation’.  
34  G Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in: G. Teubner (ed), Global Law 
without the State (Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) at 3. 
35  See for an overview over this position Sassen, supra note 21, at 47 who refers to M Mann, ‘Has 
Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?’ 4 Review of International Political Economy (1997) 
472 ff.; or SD Krasner, ‘Globalization, Power, and Authority’, in: E D Mansfield & R Sisson (eds), The Evolution of 
Political Knowledge, Democracy, Autonomy, and Conflict in Comparative and International Politics (Ohio State 
University, 2004) 60 ff particularly at 80.  
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incentives.36 Again others stress the dominant role that states retain in the organisation and 
administration of economic globalisation.37 At the very least they will continue to constitute an 
important actor in ‘a complex system of power from the global to the local level’.38  
 
Saskia Sassen has provided a very appealing description of the role of the state in a globalised 
context, emphasising that the state has not become obsolete. Rather, she observes it to be 
constantly adapting to changing processes and in doing so continuing to be an important player 
in the creation of global (economic) structures. These internal transformations of the state, she 
argues, become ‘the strategic site’ for the general transformations on a global scale, a 
development labelled as a ‘denationalization dynamic’39 Concretely, the argument is that even 
though the state might participate in and adapt to global processes due to outside influences; in a 
lot of other instances the ‘components of the national state and of the larger nation-state [that] are 
themselves strategic sites for the structuring of the global and in this process undergo 
foundational change’40 Hence the state cannot be perceived as passive in the face of global 
influences. On the contrary the state actively participates as the initiator and executor of 
globalisation processes. To illustrate this she uses the example of the US and the UK, countries 
which 
 
are producing the design for many of these new legalities-i.e. items derived from Anglo-
American commercial law and accounting standards-and are hence imposing these on other states 
through the interdependencies at the heart of the current phase of globalization. This creates and 
imposes a set of specific constraints on the other participating states.41 
 
                                                          
36  For a general overview see S Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages 
(Princeton University Press, 2006), at 225 
37  See Sassen, supra note 28, at 225 who refers to R Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the 
Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton University Press, 1990), and M Mann, The Sources of 
Social Power (CUP, 1993) as representatives of this position. 
38  Ibid at 225 who refers to P Hirst & G Thomson, ‘Globalization and the Future of the Nation State’, 24 
Economy and Society (1995) 408 ff., or P F Kelly, ‘The Geographies and Politics of Globalization’, 23 Progress in 
Human Geography (1999) 379ff. as representatives of this position. See furthermore Kjaer, supra note 21, at 82. 
39  Sassen, supra note 28, at 228 ff. 
40  Ibid at 229. 
41  S Sassen, ‘The Participation of States and Citizens in Global Governance’, 10 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies (2003) 5, at 14. 
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Yet, despite this rather optimistic outlook on the state’s role in a globalised world she also 
cautions that on-going changes  
 
[…] have the capacity to alter possibly crucial conditions for the liberal state and for the 
organizational architecture of international public law, its scope, and its exclusivity. In this sense 
they have the capacity to alter the scope of formal authority of states and of the interstate system, 
the crucial institutional domains through which the “rule of law” is implemented.42 
 
From this one can distil that a one dimensional focus on the ‘decline of the state’ is too 
simplistic. States have not become obsolete as a result of globalisation processes but in fact 
actively engage in them and often even are responsible for bringing them into existence. Even if 
one sees the authority of the state challenged by functional transnational legal orders, due to their 
unique character states have the ability to engage on an equal footing or even oppose entities 
which do not act in accordance with their interests. States (or at least powerful states) have a 
universal approach, and their functional discretion remains largely unfettered within their 
territory and therefore usually possess at least minimum capacities in most areas of regulatory 
importance. Even though their exclusivity is challenged they still enjoy a dominant position 
within their respective territory.  
 
3. THE PUBLIC PRIVATE DISTINCTION – DOES IT STILL HOLD? 
 
The preceding sections have described how a seemingly clearly defined entity – the nation state - 
changed in the course of globalisation; how it shaped global processes and at the same time 
adapted to them. A different, more general issue is that of the public private distinction. This 
distinction is part of the title of the thesis ‘public private cooperation’. However, against the 
backdrop described in the previous sections, the question then arises what is understood as 
public; and what constitutes a private entity. Moreover, even if there are some identifiable 
entities considered public or private, is it still possible to make such a distinction in the context 
described above? Is an actor automatically to be considered public if it is connected to the state? 
                                                          
42  Sassen, supra note 28, at 224, for more information regarding the issue of democracy and the role of the 
state, see: K-H Ladeur, ‘Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy 
Survive the End of the Nation State?’ in K-H Ladeur (ed) Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Ashgate, 
2004) 89. 
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Or need such a categorisation be based on other aspects of its origin, its member structure, or the 
function it exercises? And if an actor is public, do the activities it pursues automatically fall 
within the public sphere? The same set of questions can of course be posed regarding ‘the 
private’ and similar uncertainties arise.  
 
It is readily apparent from this set of questions that there are two levels which play a role in the 
public private distinction: The input level – whether the actors involved in a certain legislative or 
regulatory activity are of a public or private nature; and the output level – concerned with the 
results of these activities and how they can be categorised (dependent or independent of the 
former distinction). In addition, an even more fundamental question also has to be asked: can one 
actually talk of ‘the public’ or ‘the private’ in a general sense – or is such a distinction not much 
more a context depended notion, whose delineations depend on the concrete social environment. 
The next few paragraphs will approach these issues by briefly reflecting on the matter from a 
legal and political science perspective.  
 
In legal science depending on the historical context or the specific legal system one finds at least 
general theories of distinction on the ‘public or private nature’ of laws.43 Roman law for instance 
based its distinction on the so-called ‘interest theory’ whereby public law serves public interests 
whilst private law serves private interests.44 Countries influenced by the Roman legal tradition, 
such as Germany, adopted this distinction. However this distinction was adapted in later years to 
meet the particular requirements of the modern nation state with its separation of state and 
citizen. Therefore the so-called ‘subordination theory’ emerged, which refers to the relationship 
between the different actors. Hence, public law is characterised by a hierarchy between the state 
and citizens whereas private law is characterised by equality between the individuals. Public law 
works through directives and orders whereas the primary private law instrument is the contract.45 
A final theory distinguishes formally between law directed at the state (when acting in its 
                                                          
43  See H Maurer, Staatsrecht I (3rd ed, CH Beck, 2003) at 7. However, there were times and legal system such 
as the Common Law system in England where a distinct public law could be argued to not have been existent. See 
‘Common Law’ Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. (2014), available 
at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/128386/common-law/280077/Public-law?anchor=ref1023189 (last 
accessed 19 December 2014). 
44  H Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (16th ed, CH Beck, 2006) at 49, referring to the Roman jurist 
Ulpian’s famous expression: ‘Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum 
utilitatem’. 
45  Ibid. 
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sovereign capacity) and private law which in contrast is directed towards ‘everyone’ (including 
the state when acting in a ‘private capacity’).46 Public international law is traditionally concerned 
with inter-state relations and therefore states, or institutions set up by states are its habitual 
subjects. Activities carried out by states in the international context are considered public (or 
more precisely – sovereign) acts and under certain circumstances they crystallise into public 
international law.47 
 
As stated above, these distinctions only apply to certain legal systems in particular contexts, and 
even within systems which once represented rather clear examples of this distinction the borders 
are blurring. In many states, public law fields such as administrative law have been 
supplemented by an array of different instruments often inspired by or directly following private 
law examples (such as administrative contract and public private partnerships for example).48 In 
international law there has not only been an expansion of the actors who can be considered 
international subjects, the traditional subjects have also started to adopt or be subjected to private 
law instruments.49 Consequently, it is almost impossible to provide a distinction based on any of 
the above given theories alone.  
 
Political scientists and in particular international relation scholars have on the whole long 
followed the general dichotomies found in legal science. Jaqueline Best and Alexandra Gheciu 
depict different streams in global governance scholarship – private authority, public sphere and 
public goods scholarship. They detect in all of these directions a tendency towards an input 
driven, relatively static, distinction, which is to some degree comparable to the ‘subordination’ 
(and a narrower formalistic) approach found in legal scholarship. Thus, they state that: 
 
The literatures […] all exhibit certain similar weaknesses. Each tends to treat the public as a 
coherent space or site, thereby reproducing the liberal tendency to think about public/private as 
                                                          
46  Ibid at 49-50. 
47  See Article 38 (1) ICJ Statue, and for a more detailed overview M N Shaw, International Law (6th ed, CUP, 
2008) at 69ff. 
48  See examples in the new governance literature presented below, Section 4.2. 
49  See below in this Chapter, Section 4.1. 
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ontologically separate domains of social life, marked by their distinct (pre-given) logics and 
associated with specific institutional locations.50  
 
As an alternative to this Best and Gheciu suggest a ‘practice based approach’. Accordingly, 
public are ‘those goods, actors, or processes that are recognized by the community in which they 
are carried out as being of common concern.’ Public actors act ‘on behalf of the common (rather 
than a particular) interest’ And furthermore, ‘a public process is one that allows the general 
public or demos (and not a selected group) to understand and participate in debates about those 
issues that concern them’.51 Public practices are then ‘actions that involve an understanding in a 
given society at a particular moment in time that something is of common concern’52 Thus, 
rather than providing general and fixed distinctions, Best and Gheciu opt for a more flexible 
distinction which takes into consideration particular societies and specific contexts. There are a 
number of merits of this approach. As indicated above, it is very difficult to draw clear 
distinctions between public and private actors or instruments on general classifications. This 
becomes even clearer when looking at the examples which will be used in the case studies 
below. Both the IOC and the ISO are formally by membership and modes of incorporation 
private organisations. However, they could be said to perform a number of public functions. If 
one believes the IOC’s self-understanding and the relevance of sport as outlined in the Charta, it 
is contributing to a more peaceful, more environmental consciousness and more equal 
humankind.53 Similarly, the ISO fulfils a function which has a broader public value since 
standards facilitate trade and help to make products and production processes safer and more 
sustainable.54 
 
These examples show that the public private distinction is a rather context dependent notion 
which has to be established on an individual case by case basis. Nonetheless, as a working 
definition the thesis will adopt a formalist approach and make distinction between public and 
private by mode of membership (as documented in the founding treaty or other mode of 
                                                          
50  See J Best & A Gheciu, ‘Theorizing the Public as Practices: Transformations of the Public in Historical 
Contexts, in: J Best & A Gheciu, The Return of the Public in Global Governance (CUP, 2014) 15, at 25 
51  Ibid at 32. 
52  Ibid at 33. 
53  See Chapter 5. 
54  See Chapter 4. 
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incorporation or foundational document), or respectively the origin of a legislative or regulatory 
action.  
 
Yet, as stated above, this is a working definition and as such its purpose is not to directly reflect 
a formalistic standpoint. Rather the thesis adopts this definition in order to better be able to 
depict exactly the subtleties and the shifts of boundaries referred to above in the examples of ISO 
and the IOC. It is argued that there is particular value in drawing this distinction as it shows how 
conflicts and cooperation transcend old borders, and how even more traditional players need to 
arrange themselves with the multiplicity of regimes and individual regulators in the transnational 
context. Thus, by formally upholding the distinction it is easier to challenge it in its nuances. It 
also facilitates the examination of certain traditional ‘public’ or ‘private’ standards and the 
assessment of how those are safeguarded (or not) in changing environments. Therefore, in the 
following chapters, a public actor is one which is either a state, or was established by states or 
state entities acting in their official capacity; or is directly linkable to a state or state entities. A 
private actor is any individual or entity which does not fall under the former definition. In the 
present context they usually comprise transnationally operating organisations which are however 
incorporated as private associations in a particular national jurisdiction.  
 
4. TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
The following sections will attempt to provide an overview and some lines of demarcation 
between terms commonly used when talking about political practices and structures in a 
globalised context. This section first of all sets out the origin and common use of the term 
‘transnational’ and assesses the relationship between two common terms: regulation and 
governance. To properly capture these rather broad developments in short definitions is however 
a rather difficult if not impossible. Therefore, a broader, more contextual and nuanced illustration 
of the different developments within international law is provided first of all. This will then be 
followed by a short depiction of the use of the terms ‘transnational, regulation and governance’ 
in different contexts. Finally, two particular aspects often cited as examples for transnational law 
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and private regulation and governance – lex mercatoria and transnational private regulation will 
be examined. 
 
4.1 Challenges to Traditional International Law  
 
Public international law, at first glance, appears to be the ideal venue for providing a framework 
or infrastructure to organise an ever-coalescing world as described in the first section of this 
chapter. However, this is less the case than one might assume. The prevailing ‘post-
Westphalian’, and particularly 19th century, understanding of international law prescribes high 
state centricity. According to this conception, states make the rules, either through negotiations 
with each other and formalised in a treaty or through their practice and convictions which 
crystallise into customary international law. In this context non-state actors were not seen as 
subjects of international law55 and thus any actions, customs and rules stemming from them were 
not directly relevant to the international legal framework. However, this has always been an 
idealised account; in fact states were never the sole actors on the international stage. Throughout 
history different groups of greater or lesser importance shared the international space. In the 
Middle Ages states (to the regard that they could be considered as such) had a close relationship 
with another dominant actor– the Church. Moreover, economic activities, especially when taking 
place cross-border, were often organized by guilds.56 Later, powerful entities such as the British 
East India Company actively participated in colonisation and exercised at times significant state-
like power over parts of occupied territory.57 Even at the peak of the nation state, in the 19th and 
early 20th century, actors such as the free cities, the Holy See, the Sovereign Order of Malta, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and those international organisations which had 
                                                          
55  See, e.g. E Lauterpacht (ed), Hersch Lauterpacht – International Law – Collected Papers, 2. The Law of 
Peace, Part I International Law in General (CUP, 1975) at 489 and see also references in fn 1; M Wagner, ‘Non-
State Actors’, in: Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2013), available at: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
56  See, eg S Deakin, ‘The Return of the Guild? Network Relations in Historical Perspective’, in M Amstutz & 
G Teubner, Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-Operation (Hart Publishing, 2009) 53-73 and Kjaer, supra 
note 21, 77 who refers to the North European Hanseatic League, an association of guild members from different 
Northern European cities. 
57  See Wagner, supra note 47, para 8. 
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already emerged enjoyed rights and obligations under international law and were consequently 
endowed with international legal personality.58 
 
Nonetheless, international law did not immediately address the challenges of globalisation. 
Rather, even today (at least formally) international law rests very much in state-centricity.  
 
Despite or perhaps because of this background, many saw the need to expand existing 
boundaries. As early as 1956 Philip C Jessup, who later became judge at the International Court 
of Justice, coined the term ‘Transnational Law’.59 This expression was chosen as a means of 
distinguishing it from traditional international law. The transnational approach was supposed to 
also take ‘individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups’,60 which to an 
increasing degree were becoming influential on the international sphere, into account. With the 
advent of an accelerated globalisation and its impact on the nation state the tendencies outlined 
by Jessup manifested themselves to an even greater extent. Apart from additional subjects, the 
objects of international law and the modes through which it operated also expanded.61 The 
following sections will depict these changes in the three main areas. 
 
Regarding the first (the subjects of international law), the most important change was the 
growing importance of three additional categories of actors. Those were international 
organisations (IOs), individuals, and at a later stage transnational corporations (TNCs). IOs, as 
stated, emerged in the late 19th century, yet in the context of globalisation their operation 
changed from being predominantly fora for states to meet and deliberate to become independent 
actors with broad mandates. Furthermore, the number of IOs increased significantly in the late 
20th century. Both developments were often ascribed to a need for regulation which addresses the 
structures and consequences of globalisation.62 Furthermore, individuals became recognised 
subjects of international law in the aftermath of WWII, which manifested itself in several stages. 
One of the first ones was the introduction of international criminal law and the acknowledgement 
                                                          
58  See, e.g. I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, OUP, 2008) 58 ff; see also, C Walter, 
‘Subjects of International Law’, in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2007) available at: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
59  Jessup, supra note 18.  
60  Ibid at 3. 
61  See Mégret, supra note 1. 
62  See ibid para 21. 
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of international responsibility of individuals for major atrocities.63 This was complemented by 
the continuing development of human rights, with individuals as rights holders at the centre.64 A 
number of human rights conventions grant individuals access to international courts (such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights). Furthermore, 
an organisation such as the ILO, with its tripartite structure (workers, employers and 
government) both includes and also protects individuals.65 Finally, a fairly new type of actors in 
the international law arena, are transnational corporations (TNC). Until recently business 
activities were predominantly understood as interactions between free and equal private actors 
which had little or no relevance for international law. However, as early as the 1960s the ICSID 
Convention established under international law allowed TNCs to bring claims against states in an 
international forum. Later a number of environmental treaties and corporate social responsibility 
initiatives emerged, imposing duties on TNCs to either abstain from polluting the environment 
and violating human rights or to even actively contribute to an improvement of the latter.66 
Consequently even though some parts of international legal doctrine still has difficulty in 
accepting individuals as proper subjects of international law67 it is safe to say that their role both 
as rights’ holders and rights’ bearers has increased steadily.  
 
Secondly, apart from a growing number of subjects of international law, one can also observe a 
variety of additional fields or objects covered by it. Whereas originally international law was 
perceived as an area within which the parameters for war and peace were set, it has evolved into 
an area that manages all kind of human activity. In particular, regulation of the global economy 
and its externalities (such as labour and environmental issues) has become a central concern of 
                                                          
63  See for instance C Kress, ‘International Criminal Law’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law  (OUP, 2009), available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014), 
para 22 ff.  
64  See eg the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 A (III), adopted 10 December 1948; 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended); American Convention on Human Rights 1969, 1144 UNTS 123; African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58. 
65  See for an overview over the ILO: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 10 
November 2014) and below Chapter 4. 
66  See Chapter V. 
67  See eg Brownlie, supra note 50, at 65, who does not deny ‘that the individual [can] be a “subject of 
international law”’ yet he sees this categorization as ‘unhelpful’. 
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international law.68 As such, international law today to a large extent deals with issues of 
international trade and investment regulation, environmental protection, fishing or climate 
change.  
 
Third and finally, the instruments of international law have changed, or more accurately, they 
have increased in variety. Traditionally the primary sources of international law were treaties, 
custom and general principles, and these were supplemented by a limited number of secondary 
sources.69 Today, international law is complemented by a countless number of so called soft law 
instruments. Soft law has often been described as the twilight between law and politics.70 With 
regard to the characteristics of soft law it can be said that it ‘shares a certain proximity to law’ 
and has a ‘certain legal relevance’ yet it is not strictly binding as is the case with the sources 
enumerated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.71 Soft law instruments are for instance:  
 
resolutions of international organizations, […] programmes of action, the texts of treaties which 
are not yet in force or are not binding for a particular actor, interpretative declarations to 
international conventions interpretative declarations to international conventions […], non-
binding agreements ,[…] codes of conduct, recommendations, and reports adopted by 
international agencies or within international conferences.72 
 
One result of these developments it is argued is the ‘emergence of a ‘global administrative 
space’, 73 characterised as:  
 
A space in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has largely broken 
down, in which administrative functions are performed in often complex interplays between 
                                                          
68  This development is illustrated by the creation of the WTO, the ICSID, numerous environmental treaties, 
and corporate social responsibility initiatives as those presented above.  
69  See Art 38 (1) Statute of the International Court of Justice, including furthermore ‘judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists…’. 
70  D Thürer, ‘Soft Law’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2009), available at: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014). See furthermore, K W Abbott & D Snidal, 
‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54 International Organization (2000) 421 ff who describe the 
factors that determine whether hard or soft law instruments are chosen.  
71  Thürer, supra note 62. 
72  Ibid. 
73  N Krisch & B Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the 
International Legal Order’, 17 EJIL (2006) 1.  
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officials and institutions on different levels, and in which regulation may be highly effective 
despite its predominantly non-binding forms.74 
 
However, this does not come about without problems. First there are questions regarding the 
legitimacy and accountability within this space, an issue which will be addressed in greater detail 
in the next chapter. Furthermore, the increase in areas, instruments and actors has led to another 
prominent issue in this context – fragmentation and the emergence of conflicts between different 
(international) legal regimes. The matter has been addressed in significant detail by legal 
scholarship (and we will in fact return to this issue at a later stage in this thesis). 75 A short 
overview can however be provided here. The International Law Commission identified several 
types of conflicts: between general and special international law, with regard to successive 
norms, and concerning special relations (Article 103 UN Charter, obligations erga omnes and the 
concept of ius cogens).76 Whereas the debate subject of the ILC Report predominantly focuses 
on fragmentation caused by conflicts between classical international law regimes, recently other 
forms of conflicts (including the whole scope of transnational governance activities) were also 
taken into consideration.77 The motivation behind including such issues is the aforementioned 
broad approach to international law. Accordingly many scholars argue that the fragmentation 
debate as led by the ILC does not reflect the ‘full spectrum of international law making’78 The 
classical conflicts of norms debate often only captures an excerpt of the actual fragmentation and 
the divergences resulting from it, namely the post-implementation stage regarding conflicting 
treaty provisions addressed to states. Underlying political conflicts, conflicts between different 
                                                          
74  Ibid.  
75  For a few examples: International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 58th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, April 13, 
2006. See furthermore J Pauwelyn, Conflicts of Norms in Public International Law (CUP, 2013); id, ‘Bridging 
Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands’, 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (2003) 903 ff; Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 25; E Benvenisti & G W Downs, ‘The 
Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’, 60 Stanford Law Review 
(2007) 595 ff. For a case law example see, eg, the diverging definitions of effective control between the ICJ and the 
ICTY, ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para.115 ff.; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 
Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, at 49-50. 
76  International Law Commission, supra note 67. 
77  Here the term transnational is chosen in order to reflect the renunciation from classical international law 
with its actors (states and IOs) and its body of law (as defined by Article 38 of the ICJ statute) to such law regulating 
beyond national borders and involving states, IOs as much as corporations, NGOs, individuals and other groups.   
78  M A Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes in International Law (CUP, 
2011) at 17. 
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organisational practices, or conflicts regarding soft law regimes are not considered. A further 
issue is that the traditional debate focuses to a large extent on conflicts between different fields 
of international law (trade and environment), whereas today some areas of international law are 
very much fragmented in themselves, such as the area of international environmental law for 
example.79  
 
Finally, linking back to the first paragraphs of this section, with the advent of actors such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), or TNCs, epistemic communities and individuals, all 
pushing their normative agendas into in the realm of international law, an even broader 
understanding of fragmentation might become necessary. An illustrative example is the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a California non-profit corporation. 
This organisation has been vested with the authority to globally coordinate the assignment of the 
technical parameters ‘necessary for stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier 
systems’.80 Private food safety standards such as GlobalGAP have led to complaints within the 
WTO framework, as they are considered by some countries as trade barriers created with the 
intention to circumvent officially created rules on how to handle those issues internationally.81 
 
International lawyers, predominantly scholars but also practitioners, have slowly begun to better 
accommodate these developments in their debates and decision making processes; but they have 
not yet articulated a coherent plan to address these challenges of globalisation.   
 
 
 
                                                          
79  For further information see below Chapter III, V and VI. 
80  See ICANN, Strategic Plan, July 2011 – June 2014, Draft, available at: 
http://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-7-21feb11-en.htm (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
81  There have been official complaints concerning private requirement for bananas with regard to the access 
European market: Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Private Industry Standards. Communication 
from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, G/SPS/GEN/766, 28 February 2007(supported by Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, 
and Argentina); and Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Report by the Commonwealth of the 
Bahamas to the WTO-SPS Committee on Private Standards and the SPS Agreement: The Bahamas Experience, 
Communication from the Bahamas, G/SPS/GEN/764, 28 February 2007. See furthermore J Wouters, A Marx & N 
Hachez, ‘In Search of a Balanced Relationship: Public and Private Food Safety Standards and International Law’, 
Working Paper No. 29 - June 2009. 
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4.2 Transnational Law, Governance and Regulation  
 
Given the challenges classical international law faces in accommodating the different 
developments in the global realm outlined above, a number of suggestions with regard to how to 
achieve a better, or at least more nuanced, understanding of the phenomena have emerged. The 
terms introduced in the title of this subsection – transnational law, governance and regulation - 
represent some such of these suggestions. However, they are often broadly applied across 
different contexts and it is difficult to provide a conclusive understanding. Therefore, rather than 
trying to offer fixed definitions the following sections will provide a short overview of the 
different ways in which these terms are applied in different contexts.  
 
Referred to above, Philip C Jessup endeavoured to expand the borders of more traditional 
international law by introducing the term transnational law. The term has since then been used in 
many different contexts. It has become ‘a series of contemplations about the form of legal 
regulation with regard to border-crossing transactions and fact patterns transgressing 
jurisdictional boundaries that involve a mixture of public and private norms.’82 As such it also 
comprises ‘contemplations’ about activities often summarised under equally vague terms such as 
transnational regulation or governance.  
 
In political science the rise of the term ‘governance’ can ‘primarily be explained by the 
emergence of a multiplicity of phenomena of cooperation beyond traditional forms of decision-
making’.83 Traditional forms of decision-making in this context stem from national governments 
as well as international inter-state cooperation. (Global) governance embraces the plurality of 
actors engaged in decision-making processes. Private actors usually participate in the latter 
although they can also form purely private ‘transborder coalitions’ engaged in standard setting 
and other types of regulatory activities.84 The parallels with ‘transnational law’ are apparent and 
                                                          
82  See P Zumbansen, ‘Evolving Transnational Law’ in J M Smits, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(2nd ed, Edward Elgar, 2012) at 898. 
83  K-H Ladeur, ‘Theory of Governance’ in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 
2010) available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014), para 5. See also, P 
Zumbansen, ‘Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory’, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism, 
Osgoode Hall Law School Research Paper No. 21/2011, at 3 
84  Ladeur, supra note 75, para 14 and 15. 
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in fact it is very common to speak about ‘transnational governance’ when focusing on the more 
political aspects of ‘global regulation’.85  
 
‘Regulation’ can very generally be defined as ‘governing by rule’, 86 and is most commonly 
associated with the national level, with laws and rules stemming from the executive as well as 
with particular regulatory agencies, implementing and in some limited form creating rules (such 
as the postal regulatory commission, to use an example where regulation is within the name). At 
the national level significant developments in the approach to regulation have taken place over 
the last thirty years. As a result of movements advocating deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s, 
‘better regulation’ became dominant on the political agenda. In the course of this development 
different regulatory strategies were implemented which led to a variety of regulatory forms and 
practices.87 For instance, experimentalist forms of regulation set general goals but left the means 
of achieving these goals open,88 as well as market based regulatory strategies such as trade 
regimes or franchising.89 In this context regulation also went beyond the national realm in many 
cases and was carried out at the supra-national or transnational level. Walter Mattli and Ngaire 
Woods define (transnational) regulation as ‘[…] the organization and control of economic, 
political, and social activities by means of making, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing 
rules’.90 Mattli and Woods actually refer to a whole range of actors; state, non-state, public and 
private who can implement or enforce regulatory rules. This plurality leads to fragmentation of 
regulatory regimes. Consequently ‘public, private and (increasingly) hybrid organisations often 
share regulatory authority.’ As such ‘a sole focus on regulatory agencies’ is in fact ‘rather 
                                                          
85  See ibid at para 15. 
86  R Baldwin, M Cave & M Lodge, ‘Introduction: Regulation – The Field and the Developing Agenda’, in: R 
Baldwin, M Cave & M Lodge (eds) Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP, 2010) 3, at 6 ff.  
87  Ibid, who state that there was a ‘a long-standing interest in introducing ‘rational planning’ tools into 
regulatory policy-making and thereby limiting the scope for bureaucratic and political knee-jerk regulation. One key 
example of such rationalist tendencies in the practice of regulation has been the spread of ‘regulatory impact 
assessments’ and ‘cost–benefit analysis’ (at 8). 
88  C F Sabel & J Zeitlin, ‘Learning From Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in 
the EU’, in C F Sabel & J Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New 
Architecture (OUP, 2010) 1; and C F Sabel & J Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalist Governance’ in: David Levi-Faur (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance (OUP, 2012) 169. 
89  Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, supra note 78, at 8 ff. 
90  W Mattlie & N Woods, ‘In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics’, in: W Mattli 
& N Woods (eds) The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 1. 
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limited’.91 This is also where ‘regulatory’ literature links with what has been said above about 
transnational law and global governance. What all three have in common is that they stand for a 
transformation of traditional structures, outlined in the previous section. Authority once clearly 
located within the nation state now extends transnationally and spreads over a plurality of actors. 
All three terms capture this development from slightly different angles. The following sections 
will look at two phenomena often given as examples of private transnational regulation. These 
are lex mercatoria and transnational private regulation. 
 
Lex Mercatoria in the historical sense describes forms of commercial laws which were 
developed in the 11th and 12th century by European merchants. Their emergence was due ‘to the 
shortcomings of the law of the Middle Ages in protecting foreign traders’. These rules also 
‘responded to the need of merchants from different jurisdictions to rely on a neutral, stable, and 
predictable legal framework to structure their commercial relations and to resolve disputes in a 
neutral forum’.92 How independent the lex mercatoria actually was from domestic public law is 
disputed as well as the extent of its uniformity across Europe. Nevertheless the lex mercatoria as 
a distinct, even if not completely uniform, set of rules for merchants with trans-boundary reach 
was applied until the rise of nation states and the codification of private law in the 18th and 19th 
century. 93 
 
In the mid-20th century the concept was ‘rediscovered’ by scholars in their attempts to 
understand and assess established forms of self-regulation by the international business 
community. These comprised instruments such as model contracts, standard clauses and 
international arbitration as a means of dispute settlement.94 Again the actual extent and content 
                                                          
91  Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, supra note 78, at 9; referring to J Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding 
the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’, 54 Current Legal Problems (2001) at 
103 ff; and L Hancher & M Moran, ‘Organising Regulatory Space’, in: L Hancher and M Moran (eds.), Capitalism, 
Culture and Economic Regulation (OUP, 1989) 1 ff. 
92  See S W Schill, ‘Lex Mercatoria’, in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2011), 
available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014), para 6. See furthermore, H J 
Berman, ‘The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria)’ 2 Emroy Journal of International 
Dispute Resolution (1987) 235 ff. 
93  Schill, supra note 84, para 7 and 8. 
94  Ibid at 9 and 10; Schill refers to Berthold Goldmann and Clive Schmitthoff as the heads of the two 
dominant schools which advanced the concept: Dijon School (Goldmann) and in the common law context London 
(Schmitthoff). See C M Schmitthoff, ‘Das Neue Recht des Welthandels’ 28 The Rabel Journal of Comparative and 
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of this new lex mercatoria is very much disputed, with both narrow and broad readings of its 
extent espoused. The broad reading of the new lex mercatoria encompasses ‘all instruments 
governing international transactions between private parties independent of their source’, which 
also includes public law instruments such as international treaties.95 The narrower reading only 
covers rules ‘emanating from the private rule-making power and self-organization of the 
international business community in the strict sense’, thus excluding any kind of public 
participation.96 This latter interpretation is highly contested as is the position of those who argue 
for a high degree of autonomy for the lex mercatoria. Traditionalists deny the possibility of an 
autonomous legal order and stress the roots of lex mercatoria and its’ dependence on national 
legal orders for things such as contract enforcement, for example.97 In addition to this particular 
controversy many disputes over the concept have arisen regarding ‘its justification, its legal 
quality, its methodological basis, the terminology used, and its practical importance’.98 
 
However, despite these disputes the lex mercatoria remained central in private law scholarship 
and has attracted new attention in the debate on transnational law.99 Thus, ‘new new lex 
mercatoria’100 does not only describe the consolidation of the law of merchant through arbitral 
institutions and codified rules such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Law,101 but also its contribution to the general debate on transnational law and law in a 
globalised context.102 Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, who dedicate a significant 
amount of attention to the concept, stress that they are less concerned with disputes outlined in 
the previous paragraph but that they ‘find its most promising elements to be those concerned 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
International Private Law (1964) 47; and B Goldman ‘Frontières du Droit et “Lex Mercatoria”’ 9 Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit (1964) 177. 
95  Schill, supra note 84, para 17. 
96  Ibid para 18. 
97  Ibid para 29. 
98  Ibid.  
99  Teubner, supra note 26. Calliess & Zumbansen, supra note 18, at 28 ff; R Michaels, ‘The True Lex 
Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State’, 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2007) 447; referring to R Goode, 
Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law, 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1997) 1; and R Cranston, Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law, 42 Texas International Law Journal (2007) 
597. 
100  See L Y Fortier, ‘The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or, Back to the Future’, 17 Arbitration International 
(2001) 121. 
101  Ibid, as referred to by Michaels, supra note 91, at 448. 
102  Callies & Zumbansen, supra note 18, at 28 ff.  
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with lex mercatoria as a methodological problem’103. As such it is ‘asking us to reflect on the 
possibility – but also the politics – of ‘law’, which can be but need not be state-originating, 
which can be but need not be privately created or resulting from a complex interaction between 
official and un-official norm-creation.’104 Thus, what the authors are most interested in is the 
impact such norm-creation has on our (‘legal sociological, as well as political perspective’) 
conceptualisation of law-making and legal order.105 These issues are then followed by questions 
regarding the accountability, legitimacy, and democratic control of such forms of ‘private law 
making’.106  
 
Transnational Private Regulation: Lex mercatoria, developed largely by merchants to regulate 
their trans-border trade was adapted to serve the needs of a globalised economy. Nonetheless it 
remains, contested as it may be, a self-regulatory tool for the business community. Transnational 
private regulation (TPR) however, goes beyond the simple extension of established private law 
frameworks. In contrast it tries to combine two concepts, which were for a long time considered 
mutually exclusive – private and regulation. Thus, Calliess and Zumbansen portray the 
traditional public private distinction as outlined above as only having a coordinative function. 
Moreover, this distinction, at least in the legal context, accounted for law originating from the 
state (whether private or public), and did not consider ‘law’ originating from private non-state 
sources. Callies and Zumbansen then demonstrate how this distinction was never entirely clear; 
private law always contained regulatory elements and could not be reduced to merely 
coordinative functions.107 And especially since the 1980s, when new governance models were 
introduced in nation states, administrations, private actors (respectively business actors) were 
increasingly required to engage in the (self)regulation, whereas public administration started 
experimenting with private law tools (such as administrative contracts and public private 
partnerships).108 
 
                                                          
103  Ibid at 31. 
104  Ibid at 32, italics in original. 
105  Ibid at 33. 
106  Ibid. 
107  Ibid at 97 ff.  
108  See above and eg I Ayers & J Braithewaite, Responsive Regulation – Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (OUP, 1992). See furthermore Callies & Zumbansen, supra note 18, at 105.  
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On the international level, private forms of (self-)regulation have existed for a significant period 
of time, as the example of lex mercatoria provided above illustrates. As lex mercatoria, 
transnational private regulation is not based on state rule-making and not necessarily dependent 
on its enforcement, even though in many cases there are strong links between public and private 
regulation.109 Transnational private regulation, however, exceeds lex mercatoria both in quantity 
and in quality. 
 
First and foremost it exceeds traditional fields of business self-regulation and includes or 
sometimes even focuses specifically on the protection of public goods. Various fields such as 
forestry protection, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and food safety illustrate this. 
Furthermore it uses a broad definition of the private which, apart from business actors, also 
includes ‘NGO-led and multi-stakeholder organizations’.110 Most importantly however, TPR 
departs from mere self-regulation and increasingly creates third party effects.111 In summary one 
can define TPR as follows: 
 
[Coalitions of nonstate actors … [which] are transnational, rather than international, in the sense 
that their effects cross borders, but [that they] are not constituted through the cooperation of states 
as reflected in treaties (the latter being the principal territory of international law). They are 
nonstate (or private, as we prefer) in the sense that key actors in such regimes include both civil 
society or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and firms (both individually and in 
associations).112 
 
One question which quickly emerges in this context concerns the legitimacy of such private 
forms of governance.113 In particular if one adopts ‘more state-centered conceptions of 
constitutional governance’114 the link to the electorate through democratic mechanisms are of 
vital importance. However a more pluralist approach is said to ‘[have] the potential not only to 
embrace the activities of private actors, but also the instruments of private law and, in particular, 
                                                          
109  F Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’, 38 Journal of Law and Society (2011) 
20, at 21. 
110  Ibid. 
111  Ibid and at 22.  
112  C Scott, F Cafaggi, & L Senden, ‘The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private 
Regulation’, 38 Journal of Law and Society (2011) 1, at 3. 
113  Ibid. 
114  Ibid at 2. 
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the contracts upon which much of this regulatory activity is dependent for its normative 
effects.’115 That having been said, these differing approaches should not be addressed at this 
point but fall to be considered in the next section of this chapter. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
This section of Chapter 1 illustrates both developments in different areas of the law as well as 
scholarly conceptions of the law. Formerly rather distinct areas - public international and private 
commercial law - are today much more aligned than they were fifty or even twenty years ago. 
This is so in terms of the everyday reality of legal practice, where ‘hybrid-areas’ such as 
investment arbitration or international trade law have steadily gained importance; and for the 
actors driving the processes: states, NGOs and transnational corporations in particular. Not 
surprisingly this development is also reflected in legal literature, generally under the term 
‘transnational law’. Whereas public law scholars are increasingly recognising and consequently 
analysing the importance of private actors in transnational law; private law scholars have started 
to reflect on the ways in which their discipline can contribute to better regulation of the global 
economy and support cosmopolitan goals, such as the protection of public goods. 
 
5. SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS ABOUT COOPERATION 
 
The central theme of this thesis is cooperation. There are different ways to achieve a more 
profound understanding of cooperation. One is to distinguish it from other types of relationships 
such as deference or conflict. The thesis will consider these distinctions in the next chapter in the 
context of different authority relationships.116 At this stage it is necessary to present different 
ways in which the term is understood in different (legal) contexts. As such, in the following 
sections the thesis does not aim to provide a conclusive definition, particularly since much of the 
understanding adopted in this work will only be developed in the later chapters. Rather a 
preliminary working definition of cooperation will be provided first of all (5.1). The following 
section will then look into cooperation as applied in different (legal) contexts (5.2) before in the 
                                                          
115  Ibid, who refer to O Perez, ‘Using Private-Public Linkages to Regulate Environmental Conflicts: The Case 
of International Construction Contracts, 29 Journal of Law and Society (2002) 77ff.  
116  Chapter 2, at 3.1. 
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final part the type of cooperation at issue here, public private regulatory cooperation will be 
introduced and examined in greater detail (5.3). 
 
5.1 Introductory Understanding of Cooperation  
 
On a more philosophical level cooperation has been characterised as consisting of the following 
features: mutual responsiveness, commitment to a joint activity and commitment to mutual 
support.117 Concretely this means that each participant in a corporative endeavour is ‘responsive 
to the intentions and actions of the other’; both are committed to the joint activity and both 
support each other in their individual roles in this commitment.118 Translated into the realm of 
cooperation between different (political) authorities Nicole Roughan has defined cooperation as 
entailing ‘an intention held by two or more agents to work together towards common goals, 
either through the pursuit of a single shred activity or different by complementary activities that 
are part of a shared plan or ‘joint action’.119 She stresses less the aspect of ‘mutual support’ than 
the philosophical account does120 and the current thesis will also adopt the broader approach. 
Therefore in the following sections cooperation shall very roughly be understood as any joint 
activity between two or more parties, which is voluntarily and intentionally entered into, which 
has a common goal and is characterised at least by a minimum degree of mutual responsiveness 
and support. The term joint activity is thereby to be understood in a broad sense, including any 
kind of interaction whether it is a common project which is initiated and executed by the parties 
together or simply the aligning of individual projects in order to avoid conflicts and to create 
synergies.121  
 
 
                                                          
117  M E Bratman, ‘Shared Cooperative Activity’ 101 The Philosophical Review (1992) 327, at 328. 
118  Ibid at 328. 
119  N Roughan, Authorities – Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (OUP, 2013), at 51. 
120  Though in a footnote she refers to this distinction stating: ‘A more precise analysis would use Bratman’s 
distinction between ‘joint intentional action’, which is cooperative only in the sense of participants intending to act 
together and ‘mesh’ their sub-plans, and ‘shared cooperative activity’, in which participants also intend to mutually 
support one another (Ibid at 51 fn 17). 
121  Compare also the definition provided by Roughan, ibid at 51; who refers further to Bratman, supra note 
109, 327 ff.  
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5.2 Cooperation in Different Contexts: National Administrative Law and International 
Law  
 
Cooperation is an (increasingly common) instrument used in the exercise or facilitation of 
governance activities in national contexts. National administrations are not only working through 
top-down approaches but also in cooperative forms. Administrative contracts, where citizen and 
state meet on equal as opposed to on hierarchically organised terms have long been in use in 
national contexts.122 Forms of ‘new governance’ are of course much more dependent on 
cooperative or at least coordinative forms of interaction between different levels of 
administration or between administration and citizen.123  
 
In international law cooperation between states is a crucial if not central issue. Though 
international law traditionally follows an ‘individualistic approach’ (‘rules of abstentions, 
adjustment, and delimitation between different sovereignties’), it foresees cooperation in many 
areas and on many levels.124 The UN Charter for instance states as one purpose of the UN 
 
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;125 
 
More generally Rüdiger Wolfrum provides a definition of cooperation for the international 
context based on the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration. Accordingly, cooperation is  
 
‘the voluntary co-ordinated action of two or more States which takes place under a legal regime 
and serves a specific objective. To this extend it marks the effort of States to accomplish an 
objective by joint action, where the activity of a single State cannot achieve the same result.126 
                                                          
122  See A Abegg, Die Evolution des Verwaltungsvertrags zwischen Staatsverwaltung und Privaten – Der 
Kontrahierende Staat in Deutschland, Frankreich und der Schweiz seit dem 18. Jahrhundert (Stämpfli Verlag, 
2010), although sometimes such meetings do involve a certain degree of subordination. 
123  See for instance, Ayers & Braithewaite, supra note 100; Sabel & Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalist Governance’, 
supra note 80; R Baldwin & J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 
15/2007. 
124  R Wolfrum, ‘International Law of Cooperation’, in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(OUP, 2010) available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil (last accessed 19 December 2014), para 7. 
125  Article 1 (3) Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945. 
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There is some debate on whether international law provides a general obligation to cooperate, 
particularly in socio-economic maters.127 Though disputed on this more general level, certainly 
in many individual areas of international law such as international environmental law, human 
rights law or law governing common spaces interstate cooperation is foreseen and provided 
for.128  
 
In light of the debate on the fragmentation of international law one can observe an increasing 
interest in cooperation as a form of conflict prevention or solution between different types of 
international regimes. Notably Margaret Young stresses the importance of regime interaction vis-
à-vis conventional hierarchical models of conflict resolution.129 As fragmentation and conflicts 
do not only arise at the ex-post conflict resolution stage but already play an important role at the 
law making stage,130 there is significant room to look at the potential of different regimes for 
‘collaboration or cohesion’. Young’s approach shifts the focus of the debate away from pure ex-
post conflict resolution to a more flexible one, which targets different stages of the regulatory 
processes. However, her approach is limited to the interaction between different regimes (trade, 
environment, and law of the sea) but pays less attention to conflicts within one regime. It 
furthermore does not directly include private actors but stays within the more traditional 
international law framework.131  
 
This is different in literature on public private partnerships on the international level. Here, 
private actors are of course included. Although there is no fixed definition of what constitutes a 
public private partnership, they are usually applied by international organisations to ‘describe a 
wide range of interactions with business, non-governmental organizations (‘NGOs’) and other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
126  Wolfrum, supra note 116, para 2. 
127  Ibid para 9. 
128  See ibid para 7 ff regarding a general obligation; and para 26 ff regarding specific areas of international 
law. 
129  Young, supra note 70; M Young, ‘Fragmentation or Interaction: The WTO, Fisheries Subsidies, and 
International Law’, 8 World Trade Review (2009) 477. While investigating regime interactions between the WTO 
and other regimes such as FAO regarding fisheries subsidies she distinguishes between two forms of interaction: 
‘[T]he need to learn about existing regimes  […] and the need to entrench inter-regime linkages in the proposed 
disciplines’ (at 491).  
130  Young, ‘Fragmentation or Interaction’, supra note 121, 477, at 481. 
131  Though the later work edited by her gives room to various interdisciplinary approaches: See M Young (ed), 
Regime Interaction in International Law – Facing Fragmentation (CUP, 2012). 
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civil society organizations (‘CSOs’)’.132 Generally, they are extremely broadly defined. Kenneth 
Abbott for instance refers to an ECOSOC Resolution as well as a UN Secretary General Report 
wherein partnerships are described as:  
 
voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both State and non-State, in 
which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a 
specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits.133  
 
Distinctions are usually made between the functions the partnerships are supposed to fulfil. Thus, 
some partnerships are indeed intended to facilitate norm creation (soft law), whilst others are 
more concerned with the implementation of existing international law and others have more of 
an operational function, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.134 
The following section will outline the particularities of public private cooperation at the 
transnational level in more detail. It will then also look at the frameworks created to govern these 
kind of partnerships. 
  
5.3 Transnational Public Private Cooperation under Analysis 
 
The following paragraphs seek to map in a more detailed way the different forms of regulatory 
cooperation between public and private organisations. To this end this section sets out a variety 
of forms of public private cooperation which will exceed regulatory cooperation as more 
narrowly conceived. However, it will mainly rely on the organisations to be analysed in the case 
studies of this thesis, which are mostly UN-related.  
 
First of all it has to be said that regulatory cooperation agreements fall within the realm of acta 
iure imperii of international organisations. Generally, regulatory cooperation belongs to their 
                                                          
132  K W Abbott, ‘Public Private Partnerships’, in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(OUP, 2008), available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014), para 1. 
133  General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General, Enhanced Cooperation between the United Nations 
and All Relevant Partners, in Particular the Private Sector, A/58/227, 18 August 2003 para 9;quote from Abbott, 
supra note 124, para 9. See furthermore ‘Future Programme, Organization and Methods of Work of the Commission 
on Sustainable Development ECOSOC Res 2003/61, 25 July 2003. 
134  Abbott, supra note 124, para 18 ff. See furthermore D Azis, ‘Global Public-Private Partnerships in 
International Law’ 2 Asian Journal of International Law (2012) 9 ff. 
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governance functions and goes beyond simple acta iure gestionis such as buying office materials 
for example. This does not, however, mean that regulatory cooperation might not also involve 
elements which fall within the latter category.135  
 
Having clarified this issue, the next step is to look at the different instruments framing regulatory 
cooperation and to see whether it is possible to discern a pattern in their application. The UN, 
which has a general framework regarding cooperation with the business sector, distinguishes 
between the following categories: core business operation and value chain; social investment and 
philanthropy; and advocacy and policy dialogue.136 Under the first it summarises the 
mobilisation of business-specific activities for the creation of wealth and employment as well as 
for the facilitation of access to goods and services for the purpose of reducing poverty.137 Social 
investments and philanthropy refer to any kind of contributions to a particular project which 
originate from business. Those could be ‘financial support […] pro-bono goods and services, 
corporate volunteers as well as technical expertise and support’.138 Finally the Guidelines 
mention cooperation regarding advocacy and policy dialogue. This category involves all kinds of 
forms of cooperation which are related to different UN standards affecting business. It includes 
multi-stakeholder dialogues, promoting corporate responsibility either by changing internal 
business practices so that they align with UN goals or by ‘developing norms or guidelines to 
engage stakeholders in support of UN goals’.139  
 
Looking at the Guidelines one can clearly recognise that distinctions are made between the types 
of contribution the private side is intended to make. In the first case emphasis is put on regular 
business activities, thus the private party is supposed to use or adapt parts of its regular business 
practices in such a way so that they are aligned with UN goals. The second case as the term 
                                                          
135  See UNEP Programme Manual, May 2013, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/QAS/Documents/UNEP_Programme_Manual_May_2013.pdf (last accessed 19 December 
2014), which draws attention to the possibility that ‘partnership programs’ (under which regulatory agreements fall) 
may well include commercial elements in which case the general procurement procedures have to be followed. See 
at 87. 
136  UN, Guidelines on Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Business Sector, 20 November 2009, 
at 6. 
137  Note that this type of cooperation resembles most the classic public private partnership model in the 
national context, whereby the private is providing business specific capacities (e.g. the production of goods, the 
delivery of a particular service) and the public fulfils a kind of financing/oversight function.  
138  UN Guidelines, supra note 128, at 7. 
139  Ibid. 
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‘philanthropy’ indicates involves the kinds of donations that the private sector puts at the 
public’s disposal for the benefit of the public good. Finally, in the last category one finds actual 
regulatory cooperation. This is, in other words, cooperation that is not predominantly based on 
giving and receiving certain resources for special projects but on the creation and 
implementation of policies relevant to a (business) community.  
 
As stated above the categories included in the general UN Guidelines ‘are intended to serve as a 
common framework for all organizations of the UN system…’. Those organisations are however 
also ‘encouraged to develop more specific guidelines in accordance with their particular 
mandates and activities.’140 Furthermore, the Guidelines focus on cooperation with the business 
sector and they go beyond what would be defined as ‘partnership activities’ as they also involve 
donations and other short-term contributions which do not ‘draw on the core competencies of 
each party’.141 
 
A number of separate frameworks for public-private cooperation have emerged within the UN 
system. Usually, those frameworks create a clear relationship between the instrument used and 
the type of cooperation anticipated. FAO, for instance, lists Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoUs), exchange of letters, letters of agreement, formal relations, partnership agreements, 
partnership committee for review of financial and other agreements and multi-donor trust funds 
as examples of forms of public private cooperation.142 The first are used when establishing ‘a 
framework of collaboration of significant importance’;143 exchange of letters are used for 
‘collaboration […] limited to a reduced period of time, or if its scope is more limited’; letters of 
agreement are involved if money transfers from FAO, whereas partnership agreements are used 
                                                          
140  Ibid at 2. 
141  United Nations Foundation, Understanding Public-Private Partnerships (2003), available at: 
http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/unf_website/PDF/understand_public_private_partner.pdf (last 
accessed 19 December 2014), at 3. 
142  See FAO Council, Hundred and Forty-Sixth Session, FAO Strategy for Partnership with Civil Society 
Organizations, CL 146/8, February 2013, section D (hereinafter: FAO Civil Society); as well as FAO, Hundred and 
Thirteenth Session of the Programme Committee and Hundred Forty –seventh Session of the Finance Committee, 
FAO Strategy for Partnership with the Private Sector, JM 2013.1/2, March 2013, Section V (only listing MoUs, 
partnership agreements and exchange of letters) (hereinafter: FAO Private Sector). 
143  Ibid regarding the private sector MoUs are particularly used when no financial commitment is foreseen.  
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when FAO receives money from the private sector; finally FAO can engage into formal relations 
with civil society organisations, which are further specified by FAO’s Basic Texts.144 
 
UNEP uses similar categories but with slightly different meanings regarding the actual type of 
cooperation governed by those instruments. Thus it distinguishes between letters of intent, used 
for the initiation process of a partnership and there is an exchange of letters, which is said to be a 
‘[d]eclaration of interest to use as point of entry for cooperation which will lead to formal/legal 
instrument[s]’. Further there are letters of agreement, used for different types of partnership with 
other UN organisations and MoUs which are used for cooperation with non-UN partners, when 
no transfer of funds are involved. Furthermore, there are ‘Small-Scale Funding-‘, and ‘Project 
Cooperation Agreements’. The former is used if not-for-profit, non-UN organisations are 
assigned implementation activities with less than $200.000 in funding involved. Project 
Cooperation Agreements are then used when more than $ 200.000 are involved. Finally, if 
UNEP receives funds than Donation Agreements are used.145  
 
More generic are the categories that the ILO applies.146 It distinguishes between funding or 
donations, development and implementation of projects or other activities, organisation of 
meetings and other events, campaigning or advocacy, temporary placement of personnel, 
publication and research projects and exchange and pooling of knowledge and information.147 
 
As the UN Framework is general in nature there is no contradiction between the individual 
organisations’ categories and the ones provided for in the Framework. The instruments of UNEP 
or FAO mentioned above are drafted with regards to the specific needs of these organisations. 
Yet, what also becomes clear is that as such there is little uniformity between the different public 
organisations regarding their approach to cooperation with private entities. Most revealing is the 
use of three instruments: Exchange of Letters, MoUs and Letter of Agreements. Whereas the 
latter is used by the UNEP for cooperation with UN organisations, the FAO sees them as a 
‘useful administrative tool for contracting services from civil society organizations’. MoUs are 
                                                          
144  Ibid.  
145  UNEP Partnership Policy and Procedures, Policy Outline No.1/2011, 21 October 2011. 
146  Even though it appears that they are currently working on a more elaborated framework, see ILO 
Governing Body, 316 Session, Public Private Partnerships: The way forward, GB.316/POL/6, 5 October 2012, at 6. 
147  ILO, Director-General’s Announcement, IGDS Number 81, 14 July 2009 at 1.  
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also applied very differently. For UNEP they are the instrument of choice for any kind of formal 
relations with private partners, involving financial commitment. For the FAO on the other hand 
they constitute the instrument of choice for the most preliminary stage.148 
 
What this passage shows is that public private cooperation has become a common venue for 
public international organisations, not only regarding access to project funding but also regarding 
the creation and implementation of regulation. There is however no common framework under 
which cooperation takes place. Each organisation has its own rules and manuals governing 
engagement with the private sector. The following chapters will look more closely in particular 
at the regulatory cooperation between private actors and international organisations. This will be 
done from a theoretical point of view (in Chapters 2 and 3) and in two case studies (in Chapters 4 
and 5). 
                                                          
148  See FAO Civil Society, section D; as well as FAO Private Sector, Section V; UNEP Programme Manual, 
supra note 127, at 86 ff.  
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CHAPTER 2 
COOPERATION AS A MEANS TO GAIN AND SECURE REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY IN A COMPLEX TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous Chapter laid out some explanatory models on how to understand the global order 
beyond the state and an international framework dominated by nation states. That having been 
said, little attention has been paid to the micro (institutional) level. The general lack of attention 
given to the distribution of authority within different organizations and issue areas has been 
criticised by legal scholars particularly with a pluralist agenda, yet it seems that it is only 
recently that the issue has started to be taken up.1 When trying to understand the big picture, an 
analysis of how the micro level operates can be a very useful exercise. The goal of this section 
therefore is to depict how the allocation of authority in the global realm triggers cooperation 
even between different types of actors. It is then argued in the next chapter that cooperation links 
different regulatory realms and thus creates networks of constitutionalisation. 
 
The main claim made in this chapter is that in the fragmented, pluralistic context of the global 
legal order today, transnational regulators possess incomplete authority.2 We can therefore only 
understand one regulator’s authority in relation to other organisations active in the same or in 
overlapping realms.3 Individual regulators then, as indicated above, need to cooperate in order to 
convey sufficient authority to achieve compliance with their regulatory agendas, and 
consequently to prevail as a regulators.  
 
To support the argument, it is first necessary to build an account of authority in the transnational 
context. It will be shown that an institutional understanding, which puts social practices at the 
                                                          
1  See for instance N Roughan, Authorities – Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (OUP, 
2013) at 60 or I Venzke, ‘Between Power and Persuasion: On International Institutions’ Authority in Making Law’ 4 
Transnational Legal Theory (2013) 354. 
2  N Roughan, supra note 1, at 136 
3  Ibid. 
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centre of a definition, is the best fit for an analysis of transnational authority. In particular, it 
allows for the inclusion of private authority which is often not possible in many normative 
understandings. Apart from the issue of ‘private political’ authority, this chapter will also focus 
on the issue of plurality. To this end it is first necessary to distinguish between different 
regulatory realms. Those can be structured hierarchically with one organisation being the sole or 
at least dominant authority; or they can be fragmented, characterised by multiple (and possibly 
competing) authorities. It will be shown that even dominant monopolists in one area necessarily 
must interact with authorities from other related or relevant areas. Thus, transnational authority 
can only be understood in its interaction with other authorities and as such it is relative.4 
 
The second part of this chapter will look in a more detailed way at authority interactions and the 
impact cooperation has on individual regulators authority. Here the thesis will support the main 
argument outlined above in steps. This part will look at two aspects in particular – what it takes 
for a regulator to be recognised as a de facto authority and what it takes to be recognised as a 
legitimate authority. Cooperation, it will be argued, can be used to improve both levels of 
recognition.5 The picture thus presented is highly complex and it is impossible to depict authority 
interactions in all their rich nuances. Yet there are a number of recurring themes in regulatory 
cooperation which the thesis will focus on.  
 
The first concerns the relationship between power, architecture and de facto authority. I will 
show how regulatory power is particularly located in hierarchically structured environments. 
Usually, organisations being the only regulator in the realm possess strong de facto authority. 
Cooperating with these types of regulators can balance out power deficits of organisations active 
in less consolidated realms. Furthermore, through cooperation, organisations can pool capacities 
and thereby achieve better and, possibly less costly, regulation throughout the entire process 
(standard setting, monitoring and enforcement). This increase in effectiveness could provide 
competitive advantages and thus a strong motive for engaging in cooperation in a market-type 
environment.  
 
                                                          
4  Ibid. 
5  See RB Hall & TJ Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority (CUP, 2003) at 4. 
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The second issue concerns the rise of ‘epistemic authority’ or the increasing need for expert 
driven regulation on a transnational level. The thesis will show how this triggers interaction, 
particularly between public regulators and private expert organisations such as the ISO, but also 
between private organisations and public actors which have specific legal or political expertise in 
a given regulatory area.  
 
Finally, the thesis will address the issue of legitimacy and cooperation. Of all three this is 
perhaps the most complex matter dealt with. It will be shown that recognition of a regulator’s 
legitimacy depends on a variety of factors. For simplification the thesis will distinguish 
procedural and substantive legitimacy. On both levels there is, however, a certain tendency 
towards more traditional accounts of legitimacy. Thus, both procedurally and substantially, 
public organisations seem to be regarded as more legitimate than other types of regulators. 
Private actors seek to benefit from this through cooperative processes.  
 
However, the above tasks merely outline certain trends and do not establish universal rules. The 
main purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of authority which can explicate 
transnational cooperation and which creates awareness of the rich nuances in which this can 
occur.  
 
2. UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITY IN A FRAGMENTED TRANSNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
 
Before engaging in any discussion on how authority limitations can trigger cooperation, it is first 
useful to outline the understanding of authority adopted in the thesis. After some preliminary 
remarks (2.1) two major issues will be given particular attention. First, the possibility of ‘private 
political’ authority (2.2) and secondly, the problem of plural authority particularly in the global 
sphere (2.3).  
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2.1 Some Preliminary Remarks on Authority  
 
Three types of discussion are recurrent in the literature on political theory dealing with the issue 
of authority. Firstly authority is contrasted with power. Secondly, there is an extensive debate on 
what makes authority legitimate and thirdly the final issue concerns the distinction between 
authority in a political sense and other forms of authority, particularly epistemic authority. All 
three debates in themselves have the potential to (and actually do) create a body of literature 
which fills libraries. This section will therefore not attempt to discuss each debate definitively. 
Rather it will provide a few preliminary remarks on the general understanding of authority 
adopted in this chapter. This is intended to provide some guidance to the reader and avoid 
confusion in the argument developed below.  
 
Authority and power: One of the major themes in the discussion of authority concerns its 
relationship with power. In particular so-called practical or de facto authority seems to 
significantly overlap with power in many ways. Max Weber attempted to draw a distinction by 
introducing a voluntary element. Thus when referring to authority (or domination, as he calls it) 
he states that ‘every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, 
that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience’.6 According to 
this definition there is at least initially a voluntary element inherent in authority (a ‘pro attitude 
toward the agent on part of the subject’7) which does not solely work through power, narrowly 
defined ‘as direct coercion by means of force’.8 However, this element must not be confused 
with genuine consent to the concrete command. In fact ‘authority always demands obedience’ 
and is thus ‘incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a 
process of argumentation’.9 Authority takes place within a hierarchical framework and cannot be 
based on egalitarian grounds. Cutler therefore states that: 
 
                                                          
6  M Weber, Economy and Society - An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California Press, 
1978) at 214. 
7  T Christiano, ‘Authority’ in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (revised version, 2012), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/ (last accessed 21 October 2014) at 3.  
8  Venzke, supra note 1, at 358. 
9  H Arendt, Between Past and Future (Penguin Books, 1977) at 93. 
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[as Lincoln notes] “force is always implicit in authority” It is implicit in the asymmetry in power 
relations between the “ruler and ruled, officer and private, teacher and student, parent and child” 
Liberalism obscures this asymmetry by posting a consent-based social unity which tends to 
equalize relations between members of society.10 
 
One possible way to understand practical authority would therefore be to see it as a particular 
form of exercising power. This would, however, necessitate an adapted, broader understanding 
of power. Accordingly, power must not only be understood as passing ‘through the barrel of the 
gun’ but also ‘through institutions and broader social relationships’11. For Andrei Marmor 
practical authority is a ‘normative power to impose obligations on another’. However this type of 
power, which he also calls systemic power, presupposes ‘power-conferring norms’ (that grant or 
constitute this power) these norms ‘are essentially institutional’ in that they ‘form part of some 
social practice or institution’.12  
 
Consequently the element introduced here is an overarching framework provided by institutions 
or social practices, which establishes limits to the arbitrary exercise of power. This framework is 
based on the recognition granted by others, in particular the targeted addressees (or subject, as 
they are also commonly referred to).13 The kind of power exercised in this way is much more 
complex than for instance ad hoc power or the simple use of force. The norms granting authority 
are interconnected and define the power-holder, its scope and content.14 In establishing authority 
what matters is the existence and at least theoretical ability to observe such structures. Often such 
a framework has a more consolidated character (a founding treaty or organisational statutes for 
                                                          
10  C Cutler, Private Authority and Global Authority - Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political 
Economy (CUP, 2003) at 68. Cutler refers in this quote to B Lincoln, Authority: Construction and Corrosion 
(University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 6. 
11  Venzke, supra note 1 at 357 and 358.  
12  A Marmor, ‘An Institutional Conception of Authority’, 39 Philosophy & Public Affairs (2011) 238, at 240 
and 241. 
13  See D D Avant, M Finnemore, & S K Sell, ‘Who Governs the Globe?’ in: D D Avant, M Finnemore & S K 
Sell (eds), Who Governs the Globe? (CUP, 2010) 1 at 9f stating that: ‘We define authority as the ability to induce 
deference in others. Authority is th.us a social relationship, not a commodity; it does not exist in a vacuum. 
Authority is created by the recognition, even if only tacit or informal, of others. Recognizing an authority does not 
mean one always agrees with or likes the authority. It does mean, though, that one defers to the authority. Such 
deference confers power. Having a set of constituents that have signified their acceptance of an authority allows that 
authority to exert greater influence than would be the case if she did not have their deference’. 
14  Marmor, supra note 12, at 243 
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instance),15 but can also take the form of simple general consent by the concerned addressees. 
This distinction is important as many decisions of transnational regulatory regimes do not only 
extend to their members but often also to third party addressees. Thus, for instance the ISO 
26000 standard is designed to affect workers by improving their working conditions. Workers 
are, however, not members of ISO or its sub-organisations, even though the employers of these 
workers may be (as they could be members of national technical standard setters). Thus, 
although the industry involved falls under the official ‘authority framework’ of ISO, workers do 
not. Authority over them has to be gained through a different (or enlarged) authority framework, 
which is not covered by the statutes applicable to the members. It will be shown that cooperation 
can be a useful path in this regard.  
 
To summarise, the thesis will use a notion of practical authority defined as a normative power 
received through norms stemming from institutions or social practices. As the thesis will show 
below, practical authority is of great explanatory force in understanding both - private authority 
as well as authority in a pluralistic transnational context.  
 
De facto authority vs legitimate authority: Linked to the issue of authority and power just 
discussed is the question regarding the relationship between authority and legitimacy. Generally 
two issues are of importance here. The first concerns the general relationship between authority 
and legitimacy. Is authority intrinsically legitimate or do the two concepts need to be separated? 
The second commonly addressed issue concerns the question of what it is that makes authority 
legitimate (or what kind of prerequisites legitimate authority entails). This later point will be 
addressed in some more detail below, even though the answer to the first question already pre-
empts it to some degree.  
 
                                                          
15  Compare also M Zürn who in this context would rather speak of a ‘rule’. For him ‘[a]uthority becomes rule 
if it governs a social relationship as a whole including the interaction between specific authorities … Only once such 
meta-authorities are formed, which decide in cases of collision between various political authorities, and once these 
meta-authorities can use force of whatever sort to implement their positions if necessary, we can speak of rule’(in 
‘How Solid is Liquid Authority? Towards a Reflexive Concept of Authority’ (draft paper on file with the author) at 
2). This can be observed among many transnational regulators, at least within their functional realm.  
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The link between legitimacy and authority has been regularly addressed by political theorists16 
and many have argued that legitimacy is a necessary prerequisite of authority. Legitimacy is said 
to be the decisive criteria in distinguishing authority from the exercise of power.17 Others, 
however, have argued for a separation of both concepts.  Marmor states in this context that:  
 
To determine whether an authority is legitimate or not, we need a normative account for sure, but 
not about authorities in general; we need a normative theory about legitimacy of social practices 
and institutions, what makes them good and just and worthy of our support. 18 
 
Disentangling legitimacy from authority and evaluating both concepts in separate steps does not 
imply that authority is independent of legitimacy. Legitimacy is simply not an automatic 
precondition for an institution to have authority, yet legitimacy does influence it and is often of 
crucial importance. Thus, similar to Michael Zürn et al. I will opt for an understanding according 
to which authority consists of two layers of recognition. In the first layer – ‘an authority is 
considered per se functionally necessary in order to achieve certain common goods’; ‘institutions 
have authority when the addressees of their policies recognize that these institutions can make 
competent judgments and binding decisions’.19 This is the practical or de facto authority 
addressed in the previous section. The second layer then encompasses the recognition that the 
exercise of authority is legitimate.20 What this recognition is based upon may vary greatly, 
depending on the social environment or institution it is exercised in.21 The approach taken here is 
therefore not an abstract one which tries to determine what requirements an authority should 
meet, in order to be legitimate. Rather, as shall be shown below, normative concepts will be of 
secondary importance and the thesis will first of all focus on what the relevant social 
environment regards as the legitimate practice of authority. 22 
 
                                                          
16  Christiano, ‘Authority’, supra note 7, at 11. 
17  See generally for an overview over the different strands in literature: Ibid, at 2; Cutler, supra note 10, at 66, 
and Hall & Biersteker, supra note 5, at 4.  
18  Marmor, supra note 12, at 238; as well as M Zürn, M Binder & M Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘International Authority 
and Its Politicization’, 4 International Theory (2012) 69, at83. 
19  See Zürn, Binder & Ecker-Erhardt, supra note 18, at 83. 
20  Ibid. 
21  A Marmor, supra note 12, at 238ff.  
22  See also ibid at 246. 
 48 
 
Political vs epistemic authority: Finally, political authority is often distinguished from 
epistemic authority. The later refers to an authority ‘in some area of intellectual inquiry […] that 
is an expert in that area’.23 Epistemic authority is thus based ‘on expert knowledge and moral 
integrity’.24 It does not require to ‘convince people factually and in detail’ but relies on the 
overall ‘reputation’.25 This is said to stand in contrast to political authority with its power 
component as outlined above. Epistemic authority is said to extend over ‘an empirical subject’ 
whereas political authority extends over ‘individuals as subjects’.26 In the following sections the 
thesis will however make the argument that given the developments depicted in the previous 
chapter the differences between the two types of authority are increasingly less pronounced. 
After all, there is a ‘power component’ involved in epistemic authority, namely an imbalance in 
distribution of knowledge, which puts the epistemic authority in a more dominant position. 
Moreover, giving technical developments and the inter-linkages of national economies many 
epistemic authorities are much less apolitical than one might suppose. In fact they have a great 
impact in shaping the global political economy.27 Even when an expertise based authority only 
formally gives advice28 this advice might ultimately be so compelling that one cannot ignore it 
but must follow it in order to ‘stay in the game’.  
 
Further, even though transnational governance activities are often not directly backed by the 
ability to resort to force, they are part of complex structures where at one point the threat of the 
stick can be realised. Moreover, as new governance literature shows us state regulation is also far 
from being able or willing to always govern through straight forward commands backed by 
strong enforcement tools as advocates of ‘solid authority’ would have us believe.29 In nation 
states too, compliance with regulation is achieved through a variety of measures, where often 
                                                          
23  See Christiano, ‘Authority’ supra note 7, at 3. 
24  Zürn, supra note 15, at 7. 
25  Ibid. 
26  See Roughan, supra note 1, at 20.  
27  See T Büthe & W Mattli, The New Global Rulers – The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy 
(Princeton University Press, 2011) at 2 ff; and below Chapter 4 on ISO. 
28  Chrisiano, ‘Authority’, supra note 7, at 3.  
29  See I Ayers & J Braithewaite, Responsive Regulation – Transcending the Deregulation Debate (OUP, 
1992); C F Sabel & J Zeitlin, ‘Learning From Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in 
the EU’, in: C F Sabel & J Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New 
Architecture (OUP, 2010) 1; and C F Sabel & J Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalist Governance’ in: D Levi-Faur (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance (OUP, 2012) 169; or R Baldwin & J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’, LSE 
Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15/2007. 
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only at the very end one finds ‘enforcement’ in the strict sense. The rise of ‘epistemic authority’ 
is therefore an important phenomenon particularly in the context of an examination of public 
private cooperation of transnational regulators. It signals particular and shifting requirements for 
those governing and steering global processes; requirements which traditional political 
authorities may not automatically fulfil.30  
 
To summarise this and the foregoing sections, the concept of authority adopted here is an 
institutional one, one that seeks authority in social practices and institutions rather than using a 
fixed normative understanding of what it takes to be a legitimate authority in a universal context. 
Legitimacy will become important in a second step of the analysis, namely in the assessment of 
why a given community wants to support this authority and why it is considered legitimate. 
Finally, the thesis adopts a notion of authority that is based on a less clear distinction between 
political and epistemic authority. As will be depicted in more detail below and in the following 
chapters, technical innovations and the increase of global trade have blurred the boundaries 
between these types of authority and to a significant extent political authority is dependent on 
epistemic authority. 
 
2.2 The Issue of State Centricity and Private Authority  
 
After the initial clarifications on the general understanding of authority adopted here, this section 
will focus on one of the more specific issues regarding an understanding of authority in a 
transnational context. As already outlined in the previous chapter the transnational sphere lacks 
an overarching framework. There is no world government. Most regulators are founded by and 
relate back either to a treaty (in the case of international organisations), to private contracts or to 
some kind of even less formal understanding. Furthermore, organisations, public or private, are 
usually active in a particular issue area, but they do not possess authority over a territorial 
domain. This development, often described as functional differentiation into different social and 
legal systems,31 also impacts on the ways in which authority is distributed. Against this 
                                                          
30  This issue will however be addressed further below in section 3.2.1. 
31  Cf N Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (Columbia University Press, 1982); see also A Fischer-
Lescano & G Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmenation of Global Law’, 
 50 
 
background the common practice of seeing authority as being synonymous with state-based 
authority has proven to be problematic. Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker show how 
Weber’s understanding of the essence of the state as having ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory’32 has led many international relation scholars to argue 
that the international space, lacking these characteristics, is of an anarchic nature. States in this 
context ‘are both the source, and the exclusive location, of legitimate, public authority’.33 
Moreover, the dominant factor shaping the international realm is the power relations between 
states.34  
 
This state-centric view has however been challenged at various stages and authority is no longer 
exclusively conceptualised as an extension of state authority. It is also more commonly accepted 
that other actors, such as international organisations can exercise authority.35 Ingo Venzke, for 
instance, provides an account of how to understand the authority of international institutions 
which are engaging in rulemaking. Unlike more traditional understandings which would only 
link authority back to state consent, he searches for additional constraint which goes beyond 
simple persuasion and which he then finds in the actual exercise of authority following initial 
state consent itself. Such constraint he claims is first and foremost a discursive construction: 
‘[O]ne may […] think of authority as the ability to establish content-laden reference points in 
discourse that are difficult to avoid because participants are expected, and in turn forced, to relate 
to them.’36 Thus, after initial delegation international organisations create discourses on certain 
matters. The content they put forward therein gradually becomes authoritative and thus actors 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004) 999 ff.; G Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the 
World Society’, in: G. Teubner (ed), Global Law without the State (Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) 3. 
32  M Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in: H H Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948) 77. Quote taken from Hall and Biersteker, supra note 5, at 3. 
33  Hall & Biersteker, supra note 5, at 3. 
34  I am referring here mainly to the realist account whereby international law was regarded as reflecting 
powerful state’s interests to some degree or another. Starting with Morgenthau and later K N Walz, Theory of 
International Politics (Mcgraw-Hill, 1979) and J L Goldsmith & E A Posner, The Limits of International Law 
(OUP, 2005) just to name a few. For an overview the discussion on power and international law, see R H Steinberg 
& J M Zasloff, ‘Power and International Law’, 100 AJIL (2006) 64. 
35  A von Bogdandy, P Dann & M Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: 
Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities’, 9 German Journal of International Law (2008) 
1375; I Venzke, ‘International Bureaucracies from a Political Science Perspective – Agency, Authority and 
International Institutional Law’, 9 German Journal of International Law (2008) 1401. Zürn, Binder & Ecker-
Ehrhardt, supra note 18, at 69 ff.  
36  Venzke, supra note 1, quote at372. 
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planning to disagree with it face an increasing uphill battle in justifying their position which will 
‘incur costs or forgo benefits’.37 
 
As much as this may constitute a plausible narrative for the emergence and preservation of 
authority of international organizations, Venzke leaves the question of private authority open. In 
fact, the debate regarding authority in political and legal theory has long been dominated by 
rather fierce public private divide usually based on a formal distinction. Liberalism, dominant 
both in national and international political theory causes a dichotomy whereby the private is said 
to represent the individual, free markets and economic exchange and the public side consists of 
‘state authority and legitimate compulsion’.38 Yet, as Cutler correctly points out, the private 
sphere is not ‘a consensual realm of civic and economic freedoms’ which is ‘distinct from the 
political and (at least ultimately) coercive realm of the state’.39 In particular in a globalised 
context, boundaries between public and private are constantly shifting. States pursue political 
programs which transfer powers to private actors as much as they transfer them to international 
organisations. Changes in communication methods and market structures have led to an 
explosion of new forms of private interaction and caused non-state actors to acquire ‘power in 
the international political economy’.40 In fact, ‘global private rule-making is an important 
complement to, or even substitute for, formal legal collaboration through international treaties 
among governments’.41 
 
Here an institutional or social practice-based understanding of authority proves to be useful. This 
is first and foremost because it does not per se discriminate between public and private 
institutions having de facto authority. An understanding that determines (political) authority by 
abstract moral characteristics is more likely to limit and possibly exclude forms of private 
exercise of normative power (such as for instance on its lack of venues for democratic 
participation). The institutional concept applied here is more open to different kinds of authority 
                                                          
37  Ibid at 368. 
38  Cutler, supra note 10, at 66 ff. See also Chapter 1 at section 3.  
39  Ibid, at 68; see furthermore, Hall & Biersteker, supra note 5, at 5. 
40  See above Chapter 1 and see furthermore Hall & Biersteker, supra note 5, at 6, making reference to S 
Strange, ‘Territory, State, Authority, and Economy: A New Realist Ontology of Global Political Economy’, in: R W 
Cox (ed) The New Realisms: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Trade Order (UN University Press, 1997) 
9; and I Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, 53 International Organization (1999) 381. 
41  Büthe & Mattli, supra note 27, at 16. 
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and distinguishes between actual social practices and forms of legitimate authority on a 
normative level. Thus, it leaves the question of what kind of exercise of authority is preferable 
open to a second level - the level of evaluation.  
 
2.3 Plurality, Fluidity and Inter-Relations of Transnational Authority 
 
2.3.1 The Architecture of Transnational Authority 
 
The previous section hinted at another important issue regarding authority in a transnational 
context – namely the issues of plurality and fluidity. Venzke’s account of international 
organisations’ authority, for instance, tries to accommodate the particularities of authority 
outside the context of the nation state. This is a context where there are neither clear 
relationships of authority from the outset, nor security that international organisations are the 
only actors claiming authority. As stated in the previous chapter, the transnational space is 
characterised by a general fragmentation into functionally distinct issue areas (alongside the 
continuing traditional separation into territorial realms in case of the nation state).42 Importantly, 
these issue areas are not consolidated under an overarching framework - there is no universal 
global hierarchy. Organisations therefore act in one or several distinct regulatory fields, subject 
to (sometimes constant) change. Authority in this global, non-hierarchical context is not derived 
in a top-down manner.  
 
Within the different issue areas a distinction can be found between market-based and non-
market-based, or centralised and decentralised structures. The former are characterised by 
internal fragmentation, the latter by internal hierarchy and integration.43 A market or 
decentralised scenario occurs when a multitude of public or private standard-setters are engaged 
in the area and have developed instruments fully or partly independent (non-integrated or 
                                                          
42  For more information see Chapter 1. See furthermore, Hall & Biersteker, supra note 5, at 4. Others have 
called it ‘domains’ cf N Roughan, supra note 1, at 45 ff. 
43  Büthe & Mattli (supra note 27, at 18 ff) introduce this distinction in order to conceptualize rule-making in 
global markets. A similar distinction is the one of K W Abbott & D Snidal (‘Strengthening International Regulation 
through Transnational New Governance’, 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2009) 501) who talk of 
centralized and decentralized governance. They, however, ascribe centralized governance to ‘old’ state based 
governance, in contrast to ‘new’ transnational decentralized governance. The description is fairly accurate when, as 
done by Abbott and Snidal, describing the transnational realm as a whole. Yet, in different issue areas strong 
centralization can be found. 
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disjunctive)44 of each other. This may be followed by a competitive ‘selection process through 
which one set of rules achieves market dominance and thus becomes the single global standard 
follows the rule-making’.45 In the non-market-based or centralised scenario ‘a single institution 
is already internationally recognized as the predominant forum for writing rules in the issue area, 
any particular standard that it develops becomes the global standard not through market selection 
but by virtue of having been promulgated by this focal institution.’46  
 
How does this picture influence the authority of transnational regulators? In the first case, any 
actor engaging in transnational rule making does not prima facie possess the necessary authority. 
As Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli state, whether a certain set of rules will prevail depends on 
market selection, or put differently, depends on the up-take by the targeted addressees. This 
again depends on the actor’s ability to build and maintain a bigger market share, which 
necessitates ‘a mix of political and commercial strategies’.47 Regulators in this context first and 
foremost provide regulatory options, which their addressees can opt for or not. Thus regulators 
need to take measures to increase their market share and to make sound strategic decisions.  
 
The situation is different in the non-market scenario. Here one regulator dominates the particular 
issue area. Authority is integrated, which means that ‘authorities are arranged or organized by 
common rules and principles applying to their relationship’, such as different branches of 
government or different units in an organisation.48 The Olympic Movement which will be 
presented in one of the case studies below constitutes a good example of an integrated authority. 
Both, the different branches of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), as well as the 
International Sports Federations and the National Olympic Committees have clearly defined 
areas of competences. Ultimate ‘authority and leadership’ however lies with the IOC.49 Any 
rules created by it will in most cases automatically be considered as the ‘global [or regional] 
standard’ for the issue area. This does not mean that regulators in a non-market scenario possess 
automatic, unlimited and unquestioned authority. Problems can arise for instance when 
                                                          
44  Cf Roughan, supra note 1, at 47 ff. 
45  Büthe & Mattli, supra note 27, 18 ff. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid at 37. 
48  Roughan, supra note 1, at 47 
49  See below Chapter 5. 
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regulation brings along distributional inequalities among addressees. Conflict can also emerge if 
there is the sensation that the regulator is no longer adequately addressing the crucial concerns in 
the issue area. Furthermore, conflicts may arise within an organisation between different 
stakeholder groups.50 These problems will be dealt with in more detail below in Section 3. 
Lastly, one outstanding issue that must be mentioned is that due to the complexity outlined above 
regulators can be active in a hierarchical and a fragmented realm at the same time. As such, their 
authority may be integrated regarding one aspect and disjointed regarding another.51  
 
2.3.2 A Relative (or Relational) Account of Transnational Authority  
 
Given the plurality of authority in the transnational context, one cannot conceive of an actor’s 
authority as absolute or independent52 as it is often perceived within the state context. Rather one 
needs a concept that accommodates plurality and overlap as well as the incompleteness of 
individual actors’ authority. Both de facto existence as well as legitimacy highly depends on the 
relationship an individual authority finds itself in with others. What has therefore been suggested 
is to adopt an understanding of authority which takes into account those relational factors. Nicole 
Roughan introduces the concept of relative authority. She argues that ‘whenever authority is 
shared or overlapping as a result of these subject’s characteristics [meaning addresses shared by 
two or more authorities], that authority is not independent and its legitimacy cannot be assessed 
as if it is. Instead authority is relative.’53 Furthermore she notes that ‘in circumstances of 
plurality of prima facie authorities, the justification of authority depends upon a justified inter-
authority relationship.’54 As such, there are two issues at stake in this regard.  
 
First of all the mere existence of an authority (de facto authority) can only be established in 
relative terms. Until which point an actor’s authority extends and in how far subjects recognise it 
as such depends on the other authorities operating in the same or overlapping realms. On a 
second level, authorities can only be justified in relative terms. Thus, legitimacy of authorities 
depends on the relationship this authority has again with other authorities active in the same or 
                                                          
50  Büthe & Mattli, supra note 27, at 35. 
51  Roughan, supra note 1, at 47 f.  
52  Ibid at 138. 
53  Ibid at 138. 
54  Ibid italics in original. 
 55 
 
overlapping realms. Legitimacy can be relative in a substantive or procedural sense.55 In the first 
case there is the ability of authorities to achieve certain desired outcomes (‘subjects conformity 
with reason/values’).56 In a procedural sense relativity might stem from the procedure which 
requires consideration of an overlapping authority. Secondly, effects on third parties may make 
an authority relative and require managing the relationship with those authorities where overlaps 
are created. Finally there may be governance reasons, where certain forms of interaction may 
provide certain benefits (Roughan mentions ‘checks and balances’ for instance).57 The 
distinction between substantive and procedural legitimacy considerations and their relativity will 
be elaborated in more detail in the second part in this chapter. What is important to take from this 
section is the notion of relativity which characterises authority transnationally. On a global scale 
authorities are usually not independent and self-sufficient entities. Rather they are dependent on 
others in their respective environments. Individual authority is therefore almost never complete 
and need to be understood in relative terms.   
 
2.4 Summary: The Challenges of Authority in a Transnational Context 
 
To summarize the general notion of authority adopted here, the following paragraphs will 
reiterate several issues of particular importance. First, as outlined above, in order to distinguish 
authority from power and persuasion it is necessary to have some kind of framework of 
conventions or norms within which it is exercised. This framework is established by institutional 
or social practices. As depicted in the first chapter, the thesis generally assumes a pluralistic 
context in the global realm with functionally differentiated regulatory systems. The thesis 
generally agrees with the notion of a functional separation of society in the global context. In 
contrast to Gunther Teubner and ultimately Niklas Luhman who assume more or less closed 
(autopoietic) systems58 it is argued here that, even though functionally distinct, regulators are 
                                                          
55  Both concepts will be outlined in more detail below in section 3.2.2. 
56  Roughan, supra note 1, at 139.  
57  Ibid at 140 ff.  
58  See N Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 1997) at 133; as well as id., supra note 31, 
particularly 229 ff. Furthermore, Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 31, at 1006, who, based on Luhmann, 
state: ‘Through their own operative closure, global functional regimes create a sphere for themselves in which they 
are free to intensify their own rationality without regard to other social systems or, indeed, regard for their natural or 
human environment.’ 
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interdependent.59 This again creates a high level of complexity regarding the exercise of 
authority in the global space. Authority is not only dependent on the regulator-addressee 
relationship but also on the interdependence of regulators. The notion of ‘relative authority’, 
which the thesis took from Roughan captures this problem.60 The authority of one actor is 
relative towards other actors on an overlapping subject matter and vis-à-vis the same set of 
addressees. Yet, authority is not only relative in space it is also unstable over time. Authority, 
particularly in non-hierarchical transnational context can more easily be challenged and is thus at 
a permanent risk of vanishing. It is simply less consolidated as authority within fixed and long 
established frameworks in some nation state contexts for instance is. Addressees have easier 
ways of ‘de-submitting’ themselves and therefore authority is less guaranteed.   
 
The approach adopted here furthermore abstains from differentiating between private and public 
origins of authority. Whether a certain regulator is based on a founding document originating 
from a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ source does not make a particular difference at this level. In 
addition it is argued that developments to be observed in the context of private standard setting 
depict a blurring of epistemic and political authority on the one side and simultaneously the rise 
of ‘private political’ authority. The ‘liberal mythology’ which understands the private sphere as 
‘[operating] neutrally and consensually as a domain of freedom’61 is thus abandoned here. In the 
present approach private actors exercise authority that at least has a similar shape and similar 
effects as more traditional public political authority. This however, does not mean that on a 
normative level (as well as on a de facto level) the exercise of making a distinction between 
public and private is entirely obsolete. Particularly, regarding cognitive perceptions towards 
authority and for the normative expectations which addressees have regarding a particular 
regulator it might be of great relevance to look at both types of actors separately. This will be 
addressed in more detail below when looking at the legitimacy of regulatory authority in the 
transnational context. 
 
To summarise the present approach towards authority in the transnational realm the following 
elements crystallise: authority is functionally divided among different interdependent regulatory 
                                                          
59  See particularly also Roughan, supra note 1, at 136 ff. 
60  See ibid, at 136 particularly. 
61  Cutler, supra note 10, at 69. 
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(systems). Each of these systems has a framework in place through which addressees of the 
regulation have submitted themselves to this authority. Often these frameworks are rather 
consolidated in their centre (with written documents fixing degree and extension of the authority) 
and possibly less concentrated at the peripheries. Moreover, there are in many cases multiple 
regulators active in overlapping issue areas. Both circumstances lead to the fact that authority in 
the transnational realm is unstable and relative.  
 
3. COOPERATION AS A MEANS TO OVERCOME AUTHORITY DEFICITS 
 
Above the thesis has outlined how (particularly in a transnational context) within the same issue 
area authority is often held by a plurality of actors. There is furthermore a tendency towards 
instability through which authority can shift between different authority holders. This relativity 
then triggers authority interactions, either in the form of conflict or in the form of cooperation 
and coordination, which will be described in greater detail in the next section. (3.1) This will 
then be turned upside down. Consequently, instead of looking at how relativity of authority leads 
to authority interactions, the thesis will focus on the commutative aspects (the exchange 
components)62 - namely transnational regulatory cooperation. (3.2) 
 
3.1 Authority Interactions 
 
The relativity of transnational authority leads to complex venues of inter-relations between 
different regulators. These can be confrontational or non-confrontational in nature. In an attempt 
to provide a typology of forms of ‘inter-authority-relationships’ Roughan distinguishes between 
five different types, namely deference and toleration, cooperation and coordination and finally 
conflicts.63 Deference and toleration describe relationships where regulation (either located in 
one issue area or in distinct areas) although overlapping do not create contradictory obligations 
for the addressees. The authorities are compatible. This is the case if they are ‘identical or non-
                                                          
62  The term ‘commutative’ is chosen here loosely linked to the philosophical concept (commutative justice) to 
refer to the transactional aspects of regulatory cooperation. At the core is the exchange of ‘regulatory commodities’ 
governed by the cooperative relationship between two (or several) regulators. See furthermore, Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (translated by R C Bartlett & Susan D Collins, University of Chicago Press, 2011) Book V 
section 4 who speaks of rectificatory justice in contrast to distributive justice; as well as P Koslowski, Principles of 
Ethical Economy (Springer, 2001), Chapter 8, at 183. 
63  Roughan, supra note 1, at 48 ff.  
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contradictory’ but they ‘are not intentionally working together’, either because they are 
coincidentally compatible or because it is only one authority which is aligning itself to another 
(through deference or toleration).64  
 
There are certainly many such ‘low profile’ authority relationships; Roughan herself lists a few 
examples such as deference in integrated state constitutional systems, or the toleration of specific 
legal frameworks applied by minorities within another authority’s realm. However, I would 
argue that, at least for the present case they are of little relevance for the following reasons. First, 
the focus here is on cooperation and as such only relationships which could trigger cooperation 
are of importance. Cases where authorities can operate in an uncoordinated way independently of 
each other thus fall outside the relevant framework. Furthermore, the thesis assumes that de facto 
there are not many cases where two authorities can pursue activities in overlapping areas without 
either having to engage in some form of coordination or create conflict at a certain point of their 
relationship. Therefore the focus here is on the two remaining forms of authority relations – 
conflict and cooperation.   
 
Roughan provides a definition of conflict which focuses on the addressees of authoritative acts 
and their inability to comply with the contradicting obligations originating from two authorities. 
She distinguishes between the cases where, in a single issue area, two authorities create 
conflicting obligations for the same addressees and where interactions between authorities of 
different but overlapping issue areas cause conflicts between the respective addressees 
interacting with each other.65 In contrast to Roughan, the present study distinguishes between 
three possible scenarios of conflicting authority relationships. As such, the following pattern 
emerges: 
 
1. Regulator 1 (R1) and Regulator 2 (R 2) which are both in the same issue area set out 
diverging obligations on the same Addressee (A1). 
                                                          
64  Ibid at 49. 
65  Ibid at 56.  
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2. R1 and R2 come from different issue areas (for instance trade and environment) and set 
out diverging obligations on the same Addressee (A1) such as a company who has to 
simultaneously fulfil trade and environmental requirements.  
3. R1 and R2 come from different issue areas (again trade and environment). R1 puts 
obligations on A1, whilst R2 puts obligations on A2. Both A1 and A2 can fulfil their 
obligations individually, yet they face problems in interacting with each other (for 
example A2’s environmentally friendly produced supplies do not comply with A1s 
production lines which are aligned with certain trade regulations) 
 
Apart from these interactions Roughan abstained from including ‘outward manifestations of 
hostility or even competition’ between the regulators in her definition of conflicts.66 Here it is 
argued, however, that open conflict and competition are important for authority relationships as 
they can have a particularly ‘undermining effect’ (such as the race to the bottom dynamic). There 
are also many other shapes and degrees of conflicts that can be imagined. As stated in the 
previous section transnational authority is characterised by its multiplicity and the very different 
shapes it can take. This also has impacts on the types of conflicts which can emerge. 
 
Cooperation, as the second and for our purposes most important form of interaction has been 
defined as any joint activity between two or more parties which is voluntary and intentionally 
entered into and which has a common goal. In this thesis joint activity is understood broadly 
including different types of interaction such as common projects, initiated and executed together, 
as well as individual projects which are aligned in order to avoid conflicts and to create 
synergies.67 A reminder of this broad definition is important as it allows the inclusion of 
coordination in the framework of cooperation. Roughan defines coordination as ‘a link between 
authorities, which either places them within hierarchical networks or engages them in dialogical 
processes that incrementally bring them into alignment’.68 Consequently, it contains the element 
                                                          
66  Ibid. 
67  For a more detailed definition see Chapter 1 at section 5, Cf also the definition provided by Roughan, supra 
note 1, at 51; who refers further to M E Bratman, ‘Shared Cooperative Activity’ 101 The Philosophical Review 
(1992) 327 ff.  
68  Roughan, supra note 1, at 53. 
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of a ‘joint activity’ even though this activity is predominantly of a discursive nature and the goals 
of both (or several) actors are not necessarily one and the same but ‘compatible’.69 
 
Finally, what must be borne in mind when talking about authority relationships in general is their 
complexity and their fluid character, already mentioned above.70 The multiplicity of 
transnational authority leads to manifold permutations of authority relationships, which are 
furthermore not static but of a fluid character. As such, authority is not settled in the global 
context but a regulator may enjoy authority in a particular issue area for some time, although 
they maybe also quickly lose this authority.71 This has led some authors to use a ‘network 
approach’ when analysing global authority.72 The paragraphs above have depicted the different 
forms of interaction in a predominantly binary manner. Authority 1 and 2 interact in a certain 
way and stand in a particular relationship towards each other. In reality, however, these 
relationships are many times more complex and easily extend over a variety of actors.73 
Relationships are dependent on the particular subject matter and issue area; there can be 
cooperation regarding one type of regulation and conflict regarding another.  
 
3.2 The Commutative Part of Transnational Regulatory Cooperation 
 
Cooperation is often explicated as a means of conflict prevention.74 However, this is only one 
aspect of a more rich narrative. It is argued here that what actually makes actors cooperate in a 
global environment is their need to overcome authority deficits and to stabilise and strengthen 
authority vis-à-vis their subjects. This approach requires looking at the actual authority exchange 
taking place. What is it that actors actually seek to acquire by cooperation? Following the social 
science approach outlined above, the present study does not provide criteria which establish a 
                                                          
69  Ibid at 51 
70  See also N Krisch, ‘Liquid Authority in Global Governance: An Anatomy’ (draft paper on file with the 
author). 
71  Krisch, supra note 70. 
72  See D Avant, ‘Liquid Authorities, Liquid Authority and Networks’ (draft paper on file with the author) 
who refers to older literature on the relational relationship of power. 
73  See also the general description of authority within the global realm as provided in the first section of this 
Chapter. 
74  See, eg, M A Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law, Facing Fragmentation (CUP, 2012); M 
A Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish, The Interaction between Regimes in International Law (CUP, 2011); R 
Wolfrum & N Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer, 2003). 
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universally valid account of de facto authority and legitimacy. This depends on many specific 
circumstances of an institution or a social practice. It is, however, possible to depict some 
tendencies in conditions which have an impact on authority, and which will allow for a more 
complex understanding of authority interactions. The following sections will address how 
cooperation can work on different levels. First, the question of how de facto authority can be 
affected by cooperation will be addressed (3.2.1) before secondly the issue of how legitimacy 
can be managed through cooperation is examined. (3.2.2) 
 
3.2.1 De Facto Authority and Cooperation  
 
As outlined above, de facto authority is understood here as authority which is ‘functionally 
necessary’. This comprises first and foremost the ability to effectively regulate a certain issue. 
Effectiveness is simply understood as ‘the degree to which something is successful in producing 
a desired result’.75 Yet, de facto authority here goes beyond simple effectiveness. What matters is 
that an authority is recognised as being functionally necessary – as having the ability to 
effectively regulate. Thus ‘institutions have de facto authority when the addressees of their 
policies recognize that these institutions can make competent judgments and binding 
decisions’.76 De facto authority is therefore given ‘when a person is quite capable of eliciting a 
distinctive kind of obedience, allegiance, or belief, involving […] deference or respect or trust’.77 
Thus, an authority has to be recognised as the right kind of institution dealing with a certain 
matter. Recognition, however also means that there is room for contestation. Whilst at the 
national level contestation is less common and mainly originates from radical (for instance 
anarchist) movements, at the transnational level contestation of de facto authority is more likely. 
Zürn et al mention for instance nationalist movements against EU institutions as an example.78  
 
How then can de facto authority be determined and what are its elements? Additionally, how can 
cooperation between regulators affect it? De facto authority from a sociological point of view is 
                                                          
75  Oxford Dictionaries, available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/ (last accessed 21 October 2014). 
76  See Zürn, Binder & Ecker-Erhardt, supra note 18, at 83. 
77  R B Friedman, ‘On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy’, in: J Raz (ed), Authority (Basil 
Blackwell, 1990) 61. 
78  Zürn, Binder & Ecker-Erhardt, supra note 18, at 84. Similar movements can probably found vis-à-vis 
international economic organizations such as the WTO; or private entities, see for instance Chapter 5 on Sports and 
the Environment. 
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determined in a social context and depends on the expectations of the constituencies represented 
therein. There are, however some factors which are considered of importance for transnational 
actors’ de facto authority. These concern mainly regulatory functions necessary in the different 
steps of the regulatory processes. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, for instance, look at the 
interaction between different regulatory actors (states and IOs, NGOs and firms) and assess the 
relationship between the competences required in the regulatory process and the existence of 
those competences with the different actor groups. They build on a five-step regulatory process: 
agenda setting, negotiation, implementation, monitoring and enforcement. Different steps require 
different capacities of the regulators. In their analysis they distil the following competencies as 
crucial throughout the regulatory process: expertise, independence, representativeness, and 
operational capacity.79 These competences must not be understood in the abstract but have 
several real attributes. Expertise for example is said to be comprised of normative, business, 
political and auditing expertise. As such expertise can be relevant at each step of the regulatory 
process. How independence is established also depends on the concrete context in which it is 
relevant. One reading of it can be neutrality, in particular with regard to those who are regulated, 
but also from other stakeholder groups with particular interests such as lobbyists. Independence 
is said to be of particular relevance in the agenda setting, the monitoring and the enforcement 
stage. Representativeness mainly refers to the representation of different stakeholder groups 
within a regulatory institution. There are several ways by which this can be ensured. One is to 
give different groups an effective voice within the organisation. Another is to implement 
procedures which assure participation and accountability vis-à-vis relevant stakeholders. 
Representativeness is required at the agenda setting, the negotiation, as well as at the 
enforcement stages. The final competence is operational capacity. It includes legal and 
managerial authority which is necessary, for example to be granted access to relevant sites and 
information. This capacity is of particular importance in the implementation phase and during 
monitoring and enforcement.80 As a disclaimer it must be said that some of the capacities 
significantly overlap with legitimacy requirements and in practice it may be very difficult to 
disentangle the two levels of recognition. Representation for instance certainly has high 
                                                          
79  See K W Abbott & D Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow 
of the State’, in: W Mattli & N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 
44, at 64. 
80  Ibid.  
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importance at the level of recognising de facto authority. For instance, an individual claiming to 
be in charge of a country would hardly be recognised as authoritative, particularly in the de facto 
sense, unless it had gained support by major groups of that society (such the army, political 
parties, unions and so on). On the other hand representation also allows for participation and the 
ability to consent to a certain authority, an element which is regarded as important when 
establishing legitimacy.81  
 
Abbott and Snidal argue that all capacities are required within the regulatory process. Only a 
regulator which possessed all four capacities could truly administer the entire regulatory process. 
The following sections will focus on two aspects relevant for de facto authority. First, (a) 
expertise and the rise of epistemic authority which has already been addressed above; whilst (b) 
the second section is linked to the architecture of the transnational space with the issue of 
operational capacities and power discussed above. 
 
3.2.1.1 Expertise and the Need for Epistemic Authority  
 
Previous sections have depicted the increasing demand for ‘epistemic authority’. To be precise, 
expert knowledge has always played a role in law making and regulatory activities even in the 
heyday of the nation state.82 However, technical advancement and complex cross boarder 
economic interaction require specific rules which regulate these processes. In many cases it is 
only specialists who have sufficient expertise to be able to draft (and implement) rules that 
properly address the relevant technical details. However, despite its increasing importance 
epistemic authority is not simply replacing political authority. Rather, political and epistemic 
authorities are becoming more and more intertwined. This happens in two particular ways. 
 
First of all, as outlined above, the necessity of technical know-how gives those who possess it a 
significant amount of power. However, expertise does not reflect the one and only truth, and 
‘global regulatory processes [here specifically technical standard setting] are not apolitical’; 
                                                          
81  See below, section 3.2.2 
82  See for instance N Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority – Non-Legislative Codifications in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective (OUP, 2010), who examines legal authority deriving from sources other than ‘legally 
recognized bodies such as courts or legislators. He particularly focuses on academic codifications and their 
application as authoritative sources. 
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indeed there are disputes by domestic stakeholders over the preferred technology as a decision 
towards one end or the other implies significant switching costs for the defeated party.83 This 
means that these standards do not only reflect the state of the art in a particular technical area, 
they also include political decisions with possibly significant economic consequences. 
 
Secondly, expertise can be obtained in many different areas and is not limited to technical 
knowledge. Accordingly, Abbott and Snidal mention ‘normative, business, political and auditing 
expertise’, which are all relevant for the regulatory process.84 As such, an actor with crucial 
technical expertise might be able to develop rules which cover certain technical processes, 
however it may lack knowledge of how to implement this in a legally sound and politically 
feasible way (think of GMO regulation for instance).  
 
Both scenarios can make cooperation necessary. Authorities can exchange their specific kinds of 
expertise and thus present themselves as more sound and effective towards their addressees. 
Particularly, when the lines between political and epistemic authority are blurred it may be 
necessary to have actors from both ‘sectors’ involved. And indeed when this happens actors 
often seek outside expertise. A good example in this regard is the case study on ISO 26000. Here 
the technical standard setter ISO engaged in regulation that concerned domains such as labour 
and environmental law. It decided to cooperate with the relevant public and private institutions 
which already possess longstanding experience and solid expertise in these areas. Finally, it 
should be emphasised that technical expertise is not necessarily only found in the private sector. 
As the case study on sports and environment shows, private actors can also be in need of external 
expertise. Thus, in this example the Olympic Movement possessed very limited expertise in the 
environmental sector (at least in the beginning). The IOC very much stressed that it needed 
UNEP’s expertise in order to build up its own environmental protection framework.  
 
In summary, gaining access to expertise can thus necessitate or at least be a reason for authorities 
to engage into cooperation.  
 
                                                          
83  See Büthe & Mattli, supra note 27, at 11-12 (quote at 11) 
84  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 79, at 64.  
 65 
 
3.2.1.2 Power and Operational Capacities as Commodities of Exchange  
 
The question of whether cooperation is chosen in order to benefit from power asymmetries 
becomes of interest when one looks into the architecture of the transnational regulatory 
landscape. Power as shown above is an essential feature of authority. Power used in the context 
of authoritative actions has been defined above as a ‘normative power to impose obligations on 
another’.85 Depending on the architecture of the realm regulators may have a regulatory 
monopoly (in the case of a centralised issue area) or they may have to compete (or at least 
arrange themselves) with other regulators in a fragmented context.86 In the first case the 
monopolist most likely possesses of a high degree of normative power, as those who are 
regulated have little choice (if any at all) apart from a potential ‘take it or leave it’ option. One 
possibility which regulatory cooperation could thus open is to link less powerful regulators from 
weaker and fragmented areas to strong monopolists. The case study on sports and environment 
illustrates this with UNEP as an organisation active in a highly fragmented issue area (the 
environment) which regularly partners with different organisations from different regulatory 
realms. The sports sector is only one example, but it is one which is characteristic for a 
hierarchical and centrist realm. 
 
Beyond the architecture of the individual regulatory realms, the normative power of a regulator 
also depends on its operational capacities. A regulator must have the ‘practical abilities [and] 
resources to perform the necessary tasks’.87 As set out above, operational capacities are 
distributed unequally among different types of regulators and at different stages of the regulatory 
process different capacities are necessary.88 As such, for instance when it comes to the ability to 
implement certain standards within a certain realm, an outside regulator either needs to have the 
normative power to enforce implementation, or it must cooperate with an actor who is able to do 
so. As a result, one can again use the case of sports and environment as an illustration. UNEP, as 
will be shown in more detail below, lacked the ability to implement and enforce environmental 
regulation within the sports sector (even individual states lacked the ability - as the case of the 
                                                          
85  See also Marmor, supra note 12, at 240 and 241. 
86  See above at section 2.3.1.  
87  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 79, at 66. 
88  Ibid at 69. 
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Albertville games illustrates), yet the IOC was able to do so. With the help of UNEP’s expertise 
it drafted environmental standards which became mandatory for the entire Olympic Movement, 
extending even to local municipalities and states, which apply to host the Olympic Games.  
 
3.2.2 Legitimacy – Tendencies towards Traditional Justifications 
 
3.2.2.1 Some General Remarks on Legitimacy of Authorities in a Transnational Context 
 
Assessing legitimacy in a transnational context is a rather complex task. There is not a general 
definition or method for evaluating legitimacy throughout various fields. In fact, the way 
legitimacy is perceived depends, in line with what was said above, very much on the individual 
regime and its specific social practices. The increase in governance activities at the transnational 
level has also caused a shift in the legitimacy debate in this direction. Whereas traditional 
international law was debated under a normative notion of legitimacy, sociological conceptions 
of legitimacy have gained more attention when assessing other forms of governance. Thus, Julia 
Black argues that ‘[w]here regulatory regimes are largely non-legal and where, as in 
transnational regimes, infusing them with law is problematic, using only a legal concept of 
legitimacy will lead us to a dead end …’.89  
 
To bring some conceptual clarity it is necessary to first specify the analytical framework adopted 
here. Generally, ‘legitimacy rests on the acceptability and credibility of the organization to those 
it seeks to govern’,90 or in other words – the recognition of an authority as legitimate.91 Mark C 
Suchman distinguishes between pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy claims which can all 
be managed by the organisation. Pragmatic legitimacy is based on the interests of an 
organisation’s most immediate audience, moral legitimacy on normative approval, and finally 
cognitive legitimacy is based on comprehensibility and ‘taken-for-grantedness’. In this scenario 
legitimacy evolves out of ‘mere acceptance of the organization as necessary or inevitable based 
                                                          
89 J Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’, 
2 Regulation & Governance (2008) 137, at 145. 
90  Ibid.  
91  Zürn, Binder & Ecker-Ehrhardt, supra note 18, at 83. 
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on some taken-for-granted cultural account’.92 There is a particular distinction between 
normative, as well as cognitive legitimacy, and pragmatic legitimacy. Julia Black defines it as 
the difference between ‘when an organization should be regarded as legitimate, rather than […] 
whether it is regarded as legitimate’93 Normative approaches usually lead to different types of 
claims. Those are particularly constitutional claims, which ‘emphasize conformance with written 
norms’; justice claims, which refer to the values or goals pursued by the regulator; performance 
claims deal with the outcomes of regulation; and finally democratic claims deal with the ‘extent 
to which the organization or regime is congruent with a particular model of democratic 
governance …’.94 As already mentioned above, the thesis makes a general distinction between 
input or procedural legitimacy (which would for the most part cover constitutional and 
democratic claims) and output or substantive claims. These would include justice and 
performance claims. However, the thesis does not use the set of normative claims as an absolute 
when establishing legitimacy. Many other considerations (particularly pragmatic ones) play a 
role as well. Moreover, each normative category is in itself characterised by manifold nuances. 
Thus, what the thesis does in the following sections is to show how different normative claims 
can be translated into practice and can affect cooperation between different types of transnational 
regulators.  
 
Important in this regard is, as already mentioned, the fact that organisations have the ability to 
manage the different kinds of legitimacy claims. Thus, legitimacy can be gained, maintained and 
repaired.95 To do so, three different strategies can be applied. First an organisation can conform 
to legitimacy claims, it can secondly select the environments that confer legitimacy on it, and 
finally it can manipulate legitimacy claims that are made upon it.96 In practice this means that for 
instance an organisation defines its goals, produces certain desired outcomes or positions itself in 
a particular institutional regime in order to gain moral legitimacy. When legitimacy has been 
contested, due to a scandal for example, an institution can excuse or justify its behaviour. It has 
furthermore the opportunity to disassociate itself from the actors or the behaviour that led to the 
                                                          
92  M C Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, 20 The Academy of 
Management Review (1995) 571, at 578 ff; quote at 582.  
93  Black, supra note 89, at 145, italics in original. 
94  Ibid at 145 f. 
95   See Suchman, supra note 92, in particular at 600, where he provides a table with different approaches in 
each field of legitimacy.  
96  See ibid, at 587 ff; see also Black, supra note 89, at 146 ff. 
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legitimacy problem.97 A final important aspect to be considered is that modern global 
governance institutions are often faced with ‘multiple legitimacy claims’ from different 
stakeholders inside or outside their regulatory regime.98 In this context the task of managing will 
be highly complex and requires ensuring compatibility and avoiding conflicts.99  
 
Cooperation can be employed as a tool to manage legitimacy. There are various options through 
which an organisation can increase its legitimacy by ‘linking’ itself to another organisation.100 
This process of ‘interlinking’ can even go so far as organisations creating ‘systems of mutual 
legitimacy enhancement’ and ‘legitimacy networks’101 Organisations can use cooperation in all 
three steps – gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy. In particular in the ‘gaining’ phase, 
where organisations are said to choose their environments or to conform to a particular 
environment, cooperation can be a step in this elective procedure. Furthermore, when an 
organisation decides to increase its regulatory scope, cooperation with organisations that already 
hold a high degree of legitimacy in the specific area could assist in ‘gaining’ the necessary 
legitimacy.102 Cooperation can also be used to ‘maintain’ or ‘repair’ legitimacy. For an 
organisation to maintain its legitimacy, it needs the ability to perceive change and to protect its 
accomplishments.103 A way of doing this is to link with other legitimacy holders or to create 
networks that help to foster existing legitimacy.104 Finally, once legitimacy has been lost it can 
be helpful for an organisation to cooperate with an institution that still maintains a high degree of 
legitimacy in order to rebuild its own one. These are of course just examples of how cooperation 
can have an impact on an individual authority’s legitimacy. Especially, regarding the different 
legitimacy claims numerous ways of cooperation by which legitimacy is positively influenced 
are imaginable, some of which will be addressed in more detail in the case studies.  
                                                          
97  Suchman, supra note 92, at 585 ff. 
98  Black, supra note 89, in particular at 152 ff. 
99  Ibid at 153. 
100  See ibid at 147. 
101  Ibid, she mentions in this regard the International Social and Economic Accreditation League (ISEAL) that 
sets standards for standard setters in the social and environmental realm. 
102  See, eg, the Environment and Sports Program of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), or 
ISO 26000 where ISO, as a technical standard setter, stepped into the terrain of social, labour and environmental 
standards. More detailed information can be found in Chapters 5 and 4 respectively. 
103  Suchman, supra note 92, at 593 ff. 
104  See, eg, the example of ISEAL, a meta-regulator which provides good practice certification for the private 
sustainability standard setting bodies. Thereby it wants to improve particularly the credibility and effectiveness of its 
members standards (see ISEAL Alliance, ‘What We Do’ and ‘Our Mission’, available at: 
http://www.isealalliance.org/about-us (last accessed 22 October 2014)). 
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3.2.2.2 Cooperation as a Means to Overcome Procedural and Substantive Legitimacy Deficits  
 
Cooperation between public and private organisations in particular can provide a venue to 
‘outweigh’ the specific legitimacy deficits that different actor groups are facing.105 It is claimed 
that given the complexity of legitimacy claims in the transnational realm, actors orient 
themselves towards more traditional venues of justification. Thus, public organisations are often 
favoured partners for cooperation as their public nature seems to stand for legitimacy under both 
procedural and substantive legitimacy considerations. The following sections will look at two 
recurring aspects in particular. One concerns the issue of voluntariness and consent as features 
which are said to make an institution legitimate. Here it will be argued that cooperation can open 
many useful venues to improve participation, yet traditional forms of participation maintain a 
special place. The second part will then look at more substantive criteria of authority and the role 
cooperation can play there. 
 
Origin-based and Procedural Legitimacy: Consent, Participation and Tradition: 
Voluntariness as expressed in consent or in forms of participation plays an important role in 
legitimising institutions. Many normative accounts of legitimate authority use consent as the 
main or at least as a necessary form of justification.106 
 
In practise consent, is relevant for many entities (particularly in a transnational context) which 
are (at least in their initial self-understanding) of a voluntary nature and only as such considered 
legitimate by their addressees.107 To what extent this consent stretches in individual 
circumstances and where its limits are is complex and varies from institution to institution and 
                                                          
105  See A Peters, T Förster & L Koechlin, ‘Towards Non-State Actors as Effective, Legitimate, and 
Accountable Standard Setters’, in: A Peters et al (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (CUP, 2009) 492, at 
523.  
106  I do not want to replicate the nuances of the philosophical debate on the legitimacy of public authority here. 
I am referring here particularly to classical consent theories such as J Locke’s but also consensus positions under 
which members of a society agree to structures and institutions which fulfil also particular substantive requirements 
(justice), see for instance J Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) at 3 ff. A different 
example is D Estlund’s normative consent theory, which requires only hypothetical consent (see Democratic 
Authority (Princeton University Press, 2008), Chapter VII in particular, at 117). For an overview over the different 
positions using a consent, or partially consent-based approach see Christiano, supra note 7; a very nice summary can 
furthermore be found in Roughan, supra note 1, at 31 ff.  
107  See also, Marmor, supra note 12, at 251. 
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from case to case.108 Often it will not go beyond certain participatory rights enshrined in the 
procedures of these institutions. Generally it can be assumed that ‘the more participation in a 
given practice is voluntary […] the more it is the case that justifying one’s subjection to the rules 
or conventions of the practice is based on consent’109 
 
With regard to procedural legitimacy and public private cooperation under analysis here, there 
are several aspects to be considered. Under traditional international law legitimacy was for a 
long time regarded as a matter of consent – and more specifically state consent. As such the 
origin of any new international rule was regarded as being within the democratically legitimised 
state system (at least as long as the consenting state was democratic itself). Additional 
‘international legitimacy’ was deemed unnecessary.110 However, basing the legitimacy of 
international law purely on state consent or within the state sphere raised several problems. First 
of all, not every state is democratic; some are even violent, repressive regimes with little 
legitimacy themselves. Furthermore, even if one deems it sufficient that democratic states have 
consented, the question of voluntariness cannot be ignored. Many international regimes only 
offer the option to ‘take it or leave it’, whereby ‘leave it’ comprises severe negative 
consequences of an economic or political nature. As a result, and particularly for small countries, 
the voluntariness was from the outset questionable and basing legitimacy of international law 
only on state consent problematic.111  
 
With the increase in transnational governance conducted by IOs and other public actors such as 
networks, the legitimacy of international organisations and particularly questions of participation 
and consent surfaced once more.112 As formal international law became ‘sidelined’ by other 
‘institutional normative orders’ this has resulted also in the ‘decaying role…of [state] consent’ in 
                                                          
108  See also ibid. 
109  Ibid at 250. 
110  See for an overview over the development R Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal 
Perspective – Some Introductory Considerations’, in: R Wolfrum & V Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law 
(Springer, 2008) 1, at 6; M Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis’, 15 EJIL (2004) 907 ff; A Buchanan & R O Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions’, 20 Ethics and International Affairs (2006) 405, at 412; D Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International 
Governance’, 93 AJIL (1999) 596 ff. 
111  See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 110, at 413 – 414. 
112  See on this development particularly N Krisch, ‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of 
Global Public Goods’, 108 AJIL (2014) 1. 
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the global realm.113 Some authors have therefore argued for an enhancement of democratic 
legitimacy in the global sphere. This is said to be necessary because changed circumstances 
require remodelling global structures, in particular global institutions, in the hope of giving the 
task of supplementing or even substitution national structures.114 The problem with this approach 
is that a global demos which could confer democratic legitimacy simply does not exist. 
Furthermore, there is no structure which could ensure democratic participation on the global 
level.115 Therefore, enhanced global democracy does not serve as an answer to pending 
legitimacy questions. Instead, other procedural and particularly participatory aspects have 
become increasingly important.116  
 
Another prominent suggestion in this regard is the Global Administrative Law (GAL) project 
where certain principles, resembling national administrative law prerequisites, were transposed 
to the international realm. Consequently, Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart 
list (apart from substantive standards) reasoned decisions, procedural participation, transparency, 
and review in particular as elements of an emerging global administrative law.117 These elements 
place importance on individual participation at the decision making level.  
 
Other authors have set similar yet broader consent and participation-based criteria for the 
legitimacy of global governance institutions.118 Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane for instance 
list on-going consent of democratic states, as well as accountability and transparency 
mechanisms.119 According to these principles global governance institutions should be open to 
an ‘ongoing, informed, principled contestation of their goals and terms of accountability’.120 
                                                          
113  Ibid at 36; italics in original. 
114  R Falk & A Strauss, ‘On the Creation of a Global People’s Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of 
Popular Sovereignty’, 36 Stanford Journal of International Law (2000) 191. See generally Wolfrum, supra note 
110, at 3 ff. 
115  See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 110, at 416 – 417. 
116  See, eg T M Franck, ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age 
of Power Disequilibrium’, 100 AJIL (2006) 88, at 93; Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 110, 416 - 417; B 
Kingsbury, N Krisch & R B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 68 Law and Contemporary 
Problems (2005) 15 ff. R Wolfrum, supra note 110, at 5; Id. ‘Kontrolle Auswärtiger Gewalt‘, 56 Veröffentlichungen 
der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (1997) 38. 
117  Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 116, at 37. 
118  Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 110, at 417ff.  
119  Ibid at 417 ff. 
120  A Buchanan & R O Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in: A Buchanan (ed), 
Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force (OUP, 2010) 105, at 126. 
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Furthermore, Matthias Kumm’s constitutionalist framework equally emphasises procedural 
issues which include adequate participation and transparent procedures to enable participation 
and accountability.121 The list is not definitive but it illustrates well the relevance of participation 
and, to a certain degree, consent for legitimising transnational governance activities exercised by 
public organisations.  
 
Private regulators, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, face these issues to an even greater extent. 
Since they cannot easily rely on laws or a wider administrative apparatus to enforce or otherwise 
ensure compliance with their regulatory regime, many private actors depend to a larger degree on 
voluntary participation, which often presupposes that those who are regulated perceive the 
organisation as legitimate.122 This voluntariness has often served as a first justification to regard 
private regulation as legitimate. However, there are also many instances of private regulation 
where voluntariness can only provide limited reasons for legitimacy.123 First, many regimes may 
only appear voluntary in formal terms (actors have the option to take it or leave it) but are de 
facto mandatory (such as, for instance, through market pressure). Furthermore, a number of 
stakeholders such as beneficiaries and other third parties may be strongly affected by regulation 
but have no option to support or participate in the organisation or regime.124 As such, basing the 
legitimacy of a private organisation on the voluntary engagement of its members alone is 
insufficient. Similar arguments have therefore been made to those regarding more traditional 
public transnational actors. As such, private entities should also aim to involve all relevant 
stakeholders, through better deliberative processes (an open exchange of arguments between 
actors concerned) higher transparency, and participation. 125 In order to be inclusive they are to 
be applied at different stages of the regulatory process or chain.126 
 
                                                          
121  Kumm, supra note 110, at 924 ff. 
122  Black, supra note 89, at 148; S Wheatley, ‘Democratic Governance Beyond the State’, in: A Peters et al 
(eds), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (CUP, 2009) 215, at 223.  
123  F Cafaggi, A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Private Regulation: Legitimacy, Quality, 
Effectiveness and Enforcement, draft version, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-
agenda/files/discussions/HIIL%20Comparative%20Report_final%20june.pdf (last accessed 23 October 2014) at 
para 156 ff. 
124  Ibid. 
125  See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 116, 14 ff; see furthermore Peters, Förster & Koechlin, supra 
note 105, at 513 ff. 
126  Cafaggi, supra note 123, at para 161 ff. 
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With all these attempts at creating more inclusive participation procedures on the transnational 
level, there is one particular practical problem – namely the complexity of governance so 
common in the transnational realm, with ‘authorities […] entwined by their procedural 
justifications’.127 Thus it is difficult to establish which actors must be involved and which can be 
excluded. In a functionally divided yet highly interlinked context, these questions become 
extraordinarily difficult to answer. One of the case studies (on the ISO 26000 process) depicts 
this issue well. Particularly when engaging in regulation which extends to broader public policy 
areas, which as suggested above are often affected even by so-called ‘merely technical standard-
setting’, inclusiveness becomes almost impossible. One means of overcoming this obstacle for 
private actors in particular, but also more generally, could be cooperation. Generally, actors can 
cooperate with other regulators active in the area affected by their intended regulation. Thus, ISO 
26000, which among other issues covered the area of labour regulation, cooperated with the 
relevant labour organisations (such as the ILO, as well as trade unions amongst others). 
Similarly, the IOC, when engaging in environmental regulation cooperated with environmental 
organisations, UNEP being the most prominent one but also many others).  
 
Private regulators specifically seem to aim at opening up participation and thus more easily bring 
about legitimisation by cooperation with a public organisation. Even though the thesis has 
stressed that state participation is not an exclusive (and often not even a very useful) criterion for 
a transnational actor to be considered legitimate, many states do possess a democratic 
infrastructure which allows public institutions to more easily link back to this kind of legitimacy. 
For private regulators this infrastructure is less easily accessible. Through cooperation they can 
link themselves (admittedly indirectly and definitely often far down the legitimation chain) to 
this form of legitimisation. As much as the link between consent by democratic states and 
international organisations’ administrative actions is farfetched (it would probably not withstand 
scrutiny under many normative consent-based positions) the case studies seem to indicate that 
public participation is often considered to be of great relevance or even indispensable by private 
actors at least as soon as public policy issues are involved. Though procedural legitimacy can be 
achieved in many different forms, given the complexity of the transnational realm and the 
challenges many actors face in including the variety of affected stakeholders, established models 
                                                          
127  Roughan, supra note 1, at 140. 
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(such as traditional state based legitimacy), as many obstacles as they may face, are of great 
force. 
 
Substantive Legitimacy: Output, Reason and Justice: Origin and process as the only 
requirements for legitimate authority have been challenged on various accounts.128 Authority has 
been considered legitimate not (only) based on the consent of people(s) or participation but also 
based on the actual outputs it produces. Raz as one of the most prominent proponent of an 
‘output-based’ theory of legitimacy advocates the so-called ‘normal justification thesis’. 
Accordingly, 
 
the normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to have authority 
over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with 
reasons which apply to him […] if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which 
apply to him directly.129 
 
Accordingly authority is legitimate if it serves to encourage people to act in conformity with 
reason. Others have set different requirements as to the outcomes of authority as a condition for 
their legitimacy such as Finnis’ ‘objective good’.130 Under the sociological account of legitimacy 
adopted here it is not possible to simply integrate normative notions as a way of explaining why 
authorities are considered legitimate. Neither do they explicate why cooperation is engaged to 
overcome (perceived) legitimacy deficits – however, they are indicative. As a matter of fact 
consent is often not given in practice and institutions are only voluntary to a limited extent. As 
we have seen in the previous section, both international organisations as well as private 
regulators, even though their membership is formally based on a voluntary act (such as signing a 
treaty, becoming associate of a private organization) de facto require participation and the 
submission under the rules and decisions of this institution. States for instance have to join 
because the political consequences would be too severe; private actors have no other option than 
submitting themselves to the rules of private association if they want to exercise their 
                                                          
128  For an overview see Christiano, supra note 7, at section 4. 
129  J Raz, ‘Authority and Justification’, in: J Raz (ed), Authority (Basil Blackwell, 1990) 115, at 129 (original 
is in italics). 
130  Roughan, supra note 1, at 36. J M Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd ed, OUP, 2011) 
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professional or economic activity. What defines whether authority is considered legitimate in 
these circumstances depends on whether there are ‘good reasons’ to have the particular practice 
or institution in which the authority operates.131 An assessment of this legitimacy rests on 
complex factors to be determined in each context individually but there is certainly room for 
cooperation between different actors if it leads to better outputs.  
 
The case studies will show how private actors in particular place significant importance on the 
participation of public actors. Above the thesis argued that this can partly be explicated by their 
particular link back to the state and possible legitimation chains which can be created in this 
manner. However, substantive legitimacy considerations hint at another reason which cannot be 
taken aside. Thus, many international organisations such as the ILO for instance have a long-
standing reputation in their issue area. They are regarded as producing good and valuable 
regulation.132 It can be very beneficial to link to an authority which is considered to produce 
regulation which has a particular value. Cooperation then almost functions as a ‘certification’, at 
least regarding the regulation produced in this partnership, and possibly also extending to the 
regulator who functioned as a partner.  
 
4. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
 
This Chapter focused on the ‘commutative’ aspects of transnational regulatory cooperation. 
Cooperation is engaged into in order to build and maintain regulatory authority. First this chapter 
provided a definition of authority in the transnational context. Accordingly, authority of 
individual regulators was shown to be relative as a consequence of the pluralist landscape of the 
global realm characterised by the lack of an overarching hierarchical framework. The relativity 
of authority requires regulators to engage into different types of relationships with each other – 
they can be cooperative or uncooperative. Cooperation, however, is not only a consequence of 
overlaps in authority, in fact it often becomes necessary for regulators to possess sufficient 
authority in the first place. Authority generally depends on the recognition by those subject 
designed to be governed. The necessity of recognition, however, also opens channels to 
                                                          
131  Marmor, supra note 12, at 239. 
132  See Chapter 4. 
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challenge it. As such, recognition of de facto authority can be denied. Here cooperation can help 
to gain fundamental capacities to signal the ability to effectively regulate – may they be expertise 
or power or another capacity. Regarding the second level of recognition – whether authority is 
legitimate – cooperation can be used as a means to overcome procedural or substantive 
legitimacy deficits. However, a short disclaimer should be made at this final stage. This chapter 
has only focused on the benefits of regulatory cooperation for different groups of actors. It 
should be emphasised that cooperation also has its downsides. Abbott and Snidal mention a 
number of these when depicting the regulatory ‘bargaining game’.133 Thus, as much as 
cooperation can improve authority it can also negatively affect it. Legitimacy can be damaged if 
one cooperates with the wrong partner, such as an NGO engaging with a company whose 
practices it has been monitoring and criticising for example.134 Regulatory processes can become 
highly complex due to the comprehensive involvement of different stakeholders concerned. Ten 
years of standard setting as in the example of ISO 26000 might not be exactly what one 
associates with an efficient private regulator. Cooperation can furthermore lead to ‘regulatory 
cartels’ boosting efficiency (possibly) but taking away voluntariness for the addressees. All these 
and many more risks exist when engaging into regulatory cooperation.  
 
In the next chapter we shall look at how the commutative level impacts the political and legal 
structure of the global realm, or more modestly whether cooperation has any additional effect 
beyond the exchange of regulatory capacities. The following chapter will also address certain 
safeguards which particularly international organisations put into place in order to prevent the 
aforementioned negative effects of cooperation. 
                                                          
133  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 79, at 70 ff. 
134  Ibid at 71. 
 77 
 
CHAPTER 3 
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS, REGULATORY NETWORKS, AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISATION EFFECTS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter examined the distribution of authority in the global realm. It was shown 
how authority is dispersed among different types of actors and how this necessitates cooperation. 
Thereby regulators exchange capacities necessary to be recognised as being authoritative. As 
such, cooperation can be seen as a prerequisite for effective and legitimate transnational 
regulation.  
 
This chapter will leave the commutative level of regulatory commodity exchange and will focus 
on the more wide-ranging effects of this cooperation. It will be argued that regulatory 
cooperation can develop into network structures if certain prerequisites are fulfilled. These 
regulatory networks first and foremost constitute more integrated forms of regulatory 
cooperation. A link will be drawn to political science literature dealing with so-called Global 
Public Policy Networks, which very much overlap (if not actually concur) with the regulatory 
networks analysed here.  
 
Secondly this chapter focuses on the broader picture – the global order. Though it is not the goal 
to devise a conclusive depiction of a political and legal meta-structure in a globalised context, 
this chapter strives to show how transnational regulatory cooperation can add to an 
understanding of a political and legal order beyond the dichotomy between pluralism and 
universalism. As a result of the fact that (due to their lack of sufficient authority) transnational 
regulators are required to engage into cooperation, they are also often forced to negotiate the 
terms of their interactions and thus, to some degree, the terms of the transnational space itself. 
Cooperation then creates networks or spaces in which different independent regimes achieve 
some stability and unity with regard to normative values and structural settings.  
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As will be shown below, for contract lawyers such as Günther Teubner networks have the ability 
to unite two conflicting objectives: ‘the imperatives of both co-operation and competition’.1 
Furthermore, ‘each operation within the hybrid must simultaneously meet both the normative 
demands that stem from bilateral relations between individual actors, and those that stem from 
the network as a whole’.2 Here the opposites to be united through a network concept are 
hierarchy as inherent in constitutionalisation (or universalism) and fragmentation (as inherent in 
pluralism) or, as others have put it ‘a pubic law and a private law framework’.3 As such an 
approach is suggested which also assumes that ‘an adequate theory of law needs a dialectical 
synthesis of both approaches [‘private and public law’] that lives up to its tension and 
contradictions’.4 A network approach, it will be argued, will provide an account which can unite 
both a general and genuinely functional separation in the global realm and at the same time 
emerging patterns and dispersion of elements of constitutionalisation. As such, networks are not 
something entirely new or distinct from either the nation state or more traditional understandings 
of a global legal order but rather represent a continuum which unites traditional public qualities 
as expressed in the nation state model with new forms of private law (in a conceptual sense) 
emerging at the global level. 
 
This argument will be developed below in more detail. To this end the thesis will first look into 
different strands of network scholarship in social and legal sciences and look into how global 
regulatory networks fit within these frameworks. The goal of this section is to provide an 
understanding of regulatory network that can then serve as a basis for the second part of this 
chapter (2). In this part it will be shown how a network approach can provide a more nuanced 
assessment of the global legal order, uniting, as already outlined in the last paragraph, public and 
private elements in a dialectic approach (3). 
 
                                                          
1  G Teubner, ‘Coincidentia Oppositorum: Hybrid Networks Beyond Contract and Organization’, in: M 
Amstutz & G Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-Operation (Hart Publishing, 2009) 3, at 24. 
2  Ibid at 19. 
3  See for instance C Möllers, ‘Transnational Governance without a Public Law’, in: C Joerges, I-J Sand & G 
Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and Constiutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004) 329 ff; See also B 
Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law’, 20 EJIL (2009) 23, at 31 particularly. 
4  Möllers, supra note 3, at 337. 
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2. THE NETWORK LEVEL OF REGULATORY COOPERATION IN THE GLOBAL 
CONTEXT  
 
As stated in the introduction this chapter is interested in looking at the network component of 
global regulatory cooperation. When do ordinary (bilateral) forms of cooperation shift into 
broader network structures? And further, what does that change with regard to our understanding 
of the type of cooperation exercised within these structures; and possibly the regulatory 
outcomes achieved by such means. The following sections will therefore look at two elements 
which can be found in network literature from different academic backgrounds. 
 
First, we turn our attention to the particular location of networks between ‘market’ (flexibility 
and autonomy) and ‘hierarchy’ (integration). Here it will be argued that the networks between 
transnational regulators allow for both – the preservation of a general plural structure with 
independent regulators organising their functional realm, and at the same time more integrated 
forms of cooperation for certain issues. The second aspect to be addressed here concerns the 
integrative function regulatory networks have with regard to the multitude of different types of 
regulators, whether they are private or public, territorially or regionally bound, or transnationally 
active. Here it will be shown how integration becomes necessary given the regulatory challenges 
and the heterachical dispersion of regulatory competences among actors of very different 
backgrounds. 
 
2.1 An Introduction to ‘Network Scholarship’ 
 
Scholarship on networks entered the social and legal sciences through research on economic 
organisation.5 In such research networks are discussed in relation to two other forms of 
organisation: market and hierarchy. In very simple terms a market structure is characterised by 
individual transactions governed by contracts without any further relationships among its 
participants. The hierarchical model is represented by the firm under whose umbrella all 
                                                          
5  See W W Powell, ‘Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’, 12 Research in 
Organizational Behavior (1990) 295 ff. and O E Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press, 
1985); Id., ‘Hierarchies, Markets and Power in the Economy: An Economic Perspective’, 4 Industrial and 
Corporate Change (1995) 21 ff. 
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transactions take place and which is characterised by central organisation.6 Regarding the 
relationship between the two different approaches, some see markets and hierarchies as two ends 
of a continuum where networks are located in different variants in between.7 For others networks 
constitute an independent category of cooperation alongside markets and hierarchy.8 The details 
of this dispute are beyond the scope of the present work. What matters for our purposes is that 
networks are a hybrid ‘creature’ which contains elements of both – a fragmented side which 
characterises markets and the hierarchical one which is characteristic for firms. 
 
Not surprisingly, this debate was echoed to a large extent in private law theory, as networks pose 
an interesting challenge to the contract – association dichotomy. Consequently, Gunther Teubner 
asks whether and if so how the law should respond to the ‘network phenomena’.9 He denies the 
possibility of networks forming an independent private law concept as law cannot simply 
integrate social phenomena but must reconstruct them ‘out of its own path-dependent logic’. 
However, they can also not simply be integrated into existing understandings as they ‘traverse 
private law concepts’.10 In his exercise of sociological jurisprudence (‘a study of society 
[combined] with legal doctrinal reasoning’11) he then points to the inherent dichotomy of 
networks and also the inherent feature of networks to combine ‘the imperatives of both co-
operation and competition’.12 The ‘determinative innovation of networks is that they transform 
external contradictions into a tense, but sustainable, ‘double-orientation’ within the operational 
system’.13 Teubner points out that ‘each operation within the hybrid must simultaneously meet 
both the normative demands that stem from bilateral relations between individual actors, and 
those that stem from the network as a whole.14 Thus, it acknowledges both the market 
(competition) as well as the ‘corporate’ aspects of networks. These are the most crucial 
                                                          
6  Williamson, ‘Hierarchies’, supra note 5, at 41 ff. 
7  Ibid; P Kenis & V Schneider, ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis – Scrutinizing a New Analytical 
Toolbox’, in: B Marin & R Mayntz (eds), Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations 
(Westview, 1991) 25, at 26 ff. 
8  Powell, supra note 5, at 295 ff.  
9  Teubner, supra note 1, at 4. 
10  Ibid at 14. 
11  H Collins, ‘Introduction to Networks as Connected Contracts’, in: G Teubner (ed), Networks as Connected 
Contracts (OUP, 2011) 1 at 18. 
12  Ibid at 24. 
13  G Teubner, supra note 1, at 18. 
14  Ibid at 19. 
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characteristics of networks and we will return to this issue once more in due course when 
discussing the role of networks in the global legal order. 
 
The concept of network is not only used with regards to markets and corporations or in private 
law scholarship. It is also utilised in international law and relations literature and in this context 
it also shifts into focus. Rather than being concerned with market transaction and economic 
organisation, IR scholars focus on networks concerned with global governance. In this 
scholarship the term ‘network’ is however also applied to depict ‘a third way of interaction 
between the market hierarchy antipodes’,15 and emphasises forms of cooperation beyond 
classical interstate cooperation in international law.  
 
Prominently, Anne Marie Slaughter has advocated trans-governmental networks as the operation 
modes of a new world order. In her work Slaughter adopts a very broad understanding of the 
term network as ‘a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units 
working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the 
‘domestic’ from the ‘international’ sphere.’16 As such, rather than states interacting with other 
states on the international level, the ‘component institutions’ of the latter interact and shape 
global governance.17 These components are national public regulators (as well as legislators and 
judges) which stem from the disaggregated state and which cooperate in an informal way in the 
specific area of their expertise.18 For instance, financial market regulators and banking 
supervisors meet in the Basel Committee19 or IOSCO20, as would environmental regulatory 
agencies, anti-crime and drug agencies in the European Network of the Heads of Environment 
Protection Agencies or Interpol.21 In her work Slaughter also discusses more general changes in 
                                                          
15  See for instance S Waddell & S Khagram, ‘Multi-Stakeholder Global Networks: Emerging Systems for the 
Global Common Good’, in: P Glasbergen, F Biermann & APJ Mol (eds), Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable 
Development: Reflection on Theory and Practice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007) 261, at 270 – 272. 
16  A-M Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004), at 14. 
17  Ibid at 18. 
18  See also D Zaring, ‘International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations’, 33 Texas International Law Journal (1998) 281, at 301 ff.  
19  See ‘About the Basel Committee’, available at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last accessed 27 
October 2014). 
20  See ‘The International Organization of Securities Commission’, information available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last accessed 27 October 2014). 
21  Information about the European Network of the Heads of Environment Protection Agencies, available at: 
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the global legal order, aspects which will also be addressed in more detail below. Thus, she tries 
to show that the government networks ‘form the foundation of a full-scale disaggregated world 
order’.22 However, in her work private actors play a secondary role and private authority receives 
almost no attention. As such her ‘world order’ is still a predominantly state-centric one. 
 
This is very different in a strand of political science scholarship on so-called Global Public 
Policy Networks.23 The innovative character of these networks is their multi-stakeholder 
composition, linking different societal sectors (civil society and business) with public 
(governmental) actors.24 Apart from their pluralistic membership, a number of additional 
characteristics have been attributed to them, most notably flexible and open structures. Unlike 
international organisations which are usually limited to a significant degree by their founding 
treaty, these networks can adapt quickly to changing environments by either admitting new 
actors or by adjusting their policy making processes.25 Due to those structures they are said to be 
able to accumulate knowledge from different sources, to profit in particular from modern 
technology in the management of their informal and fluid structures,26 and consequently to 
address arising regulatory issues quickly and effectively.27 Steve Waddell and Sanjeev Khagram 
who analysed nineteen Global Public Policy Networks furthermore discerned the following 
features. First of all, these networks are global in the sense that they include representatives from 
all or at least almost all continents. Secondly, they usually focus on a specific public good issue – 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://epanet.ew.eea.europa.eu/ (last accessed 27 October 2014); and information regarding Interpol available at 
http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Overview (last accessed 27 October 2014). See also Slaughter, supra 
note 16, at 50 ff.  
22  Slaughter, supra note 16, at 132. 
23  These networks have received several designations, among them Global Action Networks (GANs), see S 
Waddell, Global Action Networks: Creating Our Future Together (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Waddell & 
Khagram, supra note 15, 261; Global Issues Networks, see J F Rischard, High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years 
to Solve Them (Basic Books, 2002), at 171 ff, and finally the term Global Public Policy Networks (GPPN) is used by 
W H Reinicke & F Deng, Critical Choices – The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance 
(International Development Research Centre, 2000).  
24  See, Reinicke & Deng, supra note 23, at 28; C Streck, ‘Global Public Policy Networks as Coalitions for 
Change’, in: D C Esty & M H Ivanova, Global Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities (Yale 
School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 2002) 1, at 3. It is however difficult to strictly comply with this 
composition characteristics, Wadell & Khagram, supra note 15, at 264 ff. examine a number of networks among 
which some are actually privately incorporated organisations, which consider themselves as NGOs and which have 
only little indirect public involvement (such as the Forest Stewardship Council follows a tri-partite structure (social, 
environmental and industry) in which governments are usually only involved in their role as participants in the 
forestry industry). 
25  Streck, supra note 24, at 4 ff.  
26  Reinicke & Deng, supra note 23, at 29ff.  
27  Ibid at 4 ff. 
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as opposed to being run by individuals, Global Public Policy Networks are mainly run by other 
organisations, (NGO, IGO or business-based). Another important feature, which will be dealt 
with in much more detail below, is that they are systemic change agents. This implicates that 
they can trigger change in the governance systems in the area on which they focus on.28  
 
The time period for which these networks are established differs and depends on the regulatory 
project pursued. Most are established for long-term cooperative engagement.29 However, some 
are also set out for a limited time frame, such as the World Commission on Dams, which was 
given a two-year mandate to establish standards regarding the construction of dams.30 There is 
significant overlap between these Global Public Policy Networks and the forms of cooperation 
analysed here. In recent times, Gráinne de Búrca, Robert Keohane and Charles Sabel have 
written on global experimentalist governance. This is defined as an ‘institutionalized 
transnational process of participatory multi-level problem solving’.31 Though not explicitly using 
the term, their understanding of experimentalist governance has many attributes of the multi-
level networks examined here. It is, as already pointed out, transnational as well as multi-level 
and pluralistic. Furthermore, processes often receive some degree of institutionalisation and they 
often involve public actors or are linked to public (state) regulation.32 
 
2.2 Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Agreements and Network Structures 
 
In light of the overview of different strands of network scholarship in social, legal and political 
science given above, this section looks again at transnational regulatory cooperation to assess 
when it shifts from an exchange based (commutative) level into a more integrated network 
structure. To this end, the chapter will first outline some characteristics of network structures and 
then subsequently look at how these structures emerge in transnational regulatory cooperation. 
                                                          
28  See Waddell & Khagram, supra note 15, at 265 ff. See furthermore, Waddell, supra note 23, at 9ff. 
29  For an overview over different GPNs see Waddell & Khagram, supra note 15, at 264ff; and furthermore, 
Reinicke & Deng, supra note 23, at 36ff., who mention among others the Apparel Industry Partnership or the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. 
30  For more information on the World Commission on Dams, see http://www.unep.org/dams/WCD/ (last 
accessed 27 October 2014). 
31  See G de Búrca, R O Keohane & C F Sabel, ‘ Experimentalist Governance’ , 44 British Journal of Political 
Science (2014) 477. 
32  Ibid. 
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First of all, regulatory networks are defined as multi-party arrangements between different 
regulatory actors within one or across different but related issue areas. 
 
This definition is a very general account which needs to be complemented by further elements 
characteristic of transnational regulatory networks. This is best achieved by returning to some of 
the definitions provided in the short literature overview in the last section. Thus, for Slaughter 
networks are characterised by ‘regular and purposive relations’ between units of disaggregated 
states.33 The literature on Global Public Politics Networks also provides a number of substantive, 
governance specific and formal features of those kinds of networks.  
 
For the moment, however, the substantive features of specific networks will be left aside and 
attention turned to the more formal and more general aspects of networks, found in economic 
organisation literature. Walter Powell provides a table where he compares the three types of 
economic organisations which he distinguishes along the line of certain key features.34 Those are 
contracts in a market context and employment (or maybe better put organisational form) in an 
integrated hierarchical structure. Networks are then the third category which is said to have 
‘complementary strengths’ to the other two.35 Networks stand between the very flexible end 
found in a market scenario and the integrated hierarchical structure of the firm. This is true with 
regard to the means of communications used, the methods of conflict resolution, the degree and 
flexibility of the relationships between the members of the network and the overall general 
commitment.36 Hugh Collins has provided an even more detailed description. Accordingly, 
networks are multi-party arrangements which are of a long term stable character, characterised 
by intensive cooperation and a high level of trust as well as by the fact that all actors keep their 
autonomy and remain separate legal entities.37  
 
Regulatory networks are similarly located between the two poles outlined in the economic 
organisation and private law literature. On the one hand they leave each organisation and unit 
autonomous. Thus, they do not formally integrate different regulators under one organisational 
                                                          
33  Slaughter, supra note 16, at 14 
34  Powell, supra note 5, at 300. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid.  
37  See Collins, supra note 11, at 11.  
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umbrella. In fact regulators might still compete on various other levels and regulatory issue 
areas. The commutative level depicted in the last chapter also falls within this side of the 
network hybrid. Thus, similar to a market environment, different actors exchange goods (in this 
case regulatory commodities) which allow them to better perform individually in their respective 
areas (such as sports regulation). On the other hand regulatory networks also achieve certain 
integration and the creation of stable relationships between members in relation to the common 
project. This requires structures and governance mechanisms through which the network is 
managed.38 In both case studies which are presented in the next chapters examples of such 
structures can be observed. Shaped through bilateral contracts, the involved organisations build 
venues through which their common projects can be conducted and which allow for more 
integration to the degree necessary for the regulatory goals (such as the Sports and Environment 
Commission, or comment procedures for international organisations in the ISO 26000 process 
for example).  
 
Apart from these more formal, general features there are also a number of substantive aspects 
which address the nature of the cooperation and which have already been addressed in the 
section above. Thus, crucially important in networks, the different participating actors share a 
common set of goals which they wish to maximise. In the long run they see their individual 
success depending on common achievement.39 This is true for business networks as well as for 
regulatory networks. Thus, Waddell and Khagram write that Global Policy Networks help 
participants to achieve both their own individual goals as well as collective ‘system-organizing 
goal’.40 Translated in terms of regulatory networks the goal is defined by the regulatory agenda 
for which the network was set up. Thus, in the sports and environment case studies it was the 
promotion of environmental protection and sustainability considerations within the realm of 
sports and beyond in related areas. Here individual organisations such as the IOC wanted to 
achieve their own goals (green games which would not provoke protests from environmental 
groups) by engaging and indeed structuring a broader framework of environmental protection in 
sport. Similarly, the international organisations engaged in the ISO 26000 process at least partly 
                                                          
38  Ibid.  
39  Ibid.  
40  Waddell & Khagram, supra note 15, at 270-272. 
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wanted to construct a coherent framework for transnational social responsibility regulation, one 
in which their own instruments would also have an adequate place.  
 
In summary, regulatory networks, as with other types of networks, fulfil a dual role. They allow 
the different units of the networks to be autonomous and generally pursue their own regulatory 
interests. At times this can even involve regulatory competition. However, with regard to the 
defined common purpose pursued in the network, a higher degree of integration and 
harmonisation takes place. Ultimately the idea is that a common approach will in the long time 
benefit both the individual units as well as the overall regulatory aim.  
 
3. NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER AND CONSTITUTIONALISATION 
EFFECTS 
 
Regulatory networks are by themselves an interesting phenomenon for legal and political 
scholarship. However, there is a broader dimension. Whenever one discusses the exercise of 
authority, and in particular its meta-structuring and framing, one says a lot about the general 
political and legal order as well. Nicole Roughan depicts this well when she states that ‘within all 
these distinctions [in scholarship on constitutionalism and pluralism in the global realm] lies a 
sub-text of plurality of authority’.41 Thus, the issue is whether and how the authority exercised in 
the global realm should be framed and tamed. To turn to the current debate, a discussion about 
regulatory cooperation and networks quickly becomes a more general debate on the structure and 
frame of the global legal order.  
 
At this stage it is prudent to engage in this discussion and provide some (admittedly very 
preliminary) suggestions on how regulatory cooperation and the network structures just set out 
can be used to achieve a better understanding of the global legal order. For this purpose it is 
necessary to first provide a very rough overview of the on-going debate regarding the state of the 
global legal and political order. Subsequently, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter, a 
new approach will be proposed which provides a more nuanced dialectic understanding. The 
network and cooperative structures characterised above provide a venue to unite a generally 
                                                          
41  N Roughan, Authorities – Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (OUP, 2013), at 64. 
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fragmented and functionally separated understanding of the global legal order with elements of 
partial hierarchy and stabilisation. This order is one which is characterised by the emergence of 
constitutionalisation effects within these more consolidated areas. 
 
3.1 Constitutionalism vs Pluralism? Theorising the Global Legal Order 
 
This section will assess the theoretical conceptions developed to better understand the global 
political and legal order and more importantly the role law plays within it. On a very general 
level, two different but closely intertwined strands have developed which aim at providing 
explanatory models. The first one is constitutionalism whilst the second is legal pluralism. Very 
roughly summarised, the former aims to provide some form of overarching framework 
(constitution), which applies at the global scale and at least partially regulates global 
(governance) activities. The latter concept, legal pluralism, denies the existence or possibility for 
such a framework. Social (and legal) regimes are fragmented or functionally differentiated.  
 
In both approaches one finds numerous sub-categories and nuances and as such it is often very 
difficult to draw clear borders between the two concepts. In particular at the moderate ends of 
both constitutionalism and pluralism one can discern a great deal of overlap, so that in many 
ways both models complement each other. Therefore the following section will provide a very 
preliminary suggestion for a slightly different understanding from the general dichotomy. This 
will be done by synthesising the different approaches in light of the present examination of 
cooperative agreements and a moderate pluralist approach which takes into account the on-going 
bargaining process that characterises the transnational sphere will be advocated. These 
bargaining processes can create networks generating room for constitutionalisation effects.  
 
3.1.1 Constitutionalism and Universalism 
 
The state centric, Westphalian model, as outlined above, reached its limits when global 
interaction and interdependence on different levels and in different fields augmented and the role 
of the state in return changed and even declined.42 This led to many new challenges, among them 
                                                          
42  See Chapter 1, section 2.  
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the question of whether it would be possible to transpose certain concepts or achievements 
developed in the nation state realm to the global level. Anne Peters summed up the problem in 
the following way: 
 
[S]tate constitutions can no longer regulate the totality of governance in a comprehensive way. 
Thereby, the original claim of state constitutions to form a complete basic order is defeated. 
National constitutions are, so to speak, hollowed out; traditional constitutional principles become 
dysfunctional or empty. This affects not only the constitutional principle of democracy, but also 
the rule of law, the principle of social security, and the organization of territory. 43  
 
A rather consequential way to solve this difficulty seems to ‘ask for compensatory 
constitutionalization on the international plane’.44 In other words, since the distinction between 
‘national’ and ‘international’ is blurring, concepts such as constitutionalism should be applied to 
both levels as well. However, how such a transposition would concretely look is highly debated. 
 
Constitutions have the function of legally taming and framing the exercise of political power 
within a particular territorial space.45 In their modern understanding constitutions therefore play 
a double role: they establish political power, and they limit it (pouvoir constiutant and pouvoir 
constitué). The first refers to the foundational element of a constitution. All power is grounded 
on this set of laws which emanates from the people and is thus legitimised in the same way.46 
The second element goes hand in hand with the first: the same rules which establish power 
ultimately also set its limits. Thus, modern constitutions constrain the exercise of power by 
constituting a higher law which has primacy over all acts of a government. As such 
constitutionalism ‘rules out any absolute or arbitrary power of men over men’.47 
 
As will be outlined below in greater detail, in the transnational context it seems particularly 
difficult to reach the foundational ideal. Therefore one finds few structural constitutionalists who 
                                                          
43  A Peters, ‘Conclusions’, in: J Klabbers, A Peters & G Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of 
International Law (OUP 2011) 342, at 347. 
44  Ibid. 
45  See for instance D Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung (Suhrkamp, 1994), at 14. 
46  See D Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its Prospects in a Changed World’ in: P Dobner 
& M Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP, 2010) 3, at 9; N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism - 
The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP, 2010), at 38 ff.  
47  See Grimm, supra note 46, at 9, quote at 10. 
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base their version on the idea of a ‘pouvoir constituant’ and seek an overarching architecture 
which could provide a genuine global order.48 Instead, what can be found are advocates for less 
wide-ranging forms of ‘constitution’ which focus on its limiting functions. Often advocates 
presuppose universal values which are considered to be enshrined in human rights or ius cogens 
norms and which also limit the exercise of governance at the global level.49  
 
The Global Administrative Law project moves in a similar direction.50 Here, however the 
emphasis is not on a universal set of values (strictu sensu) but on procedural and normative 
standards of publicness (with parallels to national administrative laws) regulating the exercise of 
global governance.51 This position has also been termed the ‘public law’ approach.52 This 
obviously not understood in doctrinal but in conceptual terms as ‘ways of conceiving law, for 
understandings that are at least implicit to the academic analysis of the internationalization of the 
legal orders’.53 
 
3.1.2 The Pluralist Critique 
 
The underlying assumptions, the shape, as well as the ambition of the more universalist 
constitutionalism have been criticised on manifold occasions, as will be illustrated in due course. 
One major point of doubt is whether one can consider the catalogue of liberal human rights 
standards as universal as is assumed, or whether it is not more of a Western (European) notion 
which does not take account of cultural pluralism.54 Therefore others see the constitutionalist 
                                                          
48  See for instance B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community’ 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998) 529. 
49  E de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2006) 51; P-M Dupuy, ‘L’Unité de l’Ordre Juridique International’ 297 Recueil des Cours (2002) 9 ff. 
50  B Kingsbury, N Krisch, R B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2005) 15 ff.  
51  See also Kingsbury, supra note 3, at 31 ff. 
52  See ibid, and regarding the terminology, N Walker, ‘The Post-National Horizon of Constitutionalism and 
Public Law: Paradigm Extension or Paradigm Exhaustion’, in: C Mac Amhlaigh, C Michelon & N Walker (eds), 
After Public Law (OUP, 2013) 241 ff; and Möllers, supra note 3, at 329 ff. 
53  Möllers, supra note 3, at 330. 
54  See J Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, in: J Klabbers, A Peters & G Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization 
of International Law (OUP, 2009) 1, at 26; and Peters, supra note 39, at 346. 
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agenda as having imperialistic connotations.55 Constitutionalism as designed at the moment gives 
preferences to Western concepts of government and governance, and implements these 
globally.56  
 
Another prominent argument against the universalist approach is that the concept of 
constitutionalism is bound up with the idea of the (nation) state and in particular to its 
achievements regarding democracy. However, outside the framework of the nation state major 
prerequisites for constitutionalism are lacking, among them most prominently a global demos, or 
a ‘we the people’ spirit.57 Of course one could apply a weaker notion of constitutionalism, such 
as the notion outlined above. However, it can be anticipated that if one were to do so, critics 
would retort that such an understanding would take most of the original meaning of the concept– 
it would be ‘too thin to redeem the full promise of the domestic constitutionalist tradition […].’58 
Globalisation presented new challenges which are not adequately addressed by constitutionalism 
but require new theoretical legal concepts.59 
 
There are several ways of addressing this critique. Some have opted for an entirely new 
paradigm upon which a (post national) constitution will be based. Instead of a statist vision, 
which ultimately causes the problems just outlined, the authority of a constitution is said to rest 
‘on its authorization by formal, jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive principles of 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism’.60  
 
                                                          
55  J Tully, ‘The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy’, in: M Loughlin & N Walker (eds) The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism (OUP 2007) 315, at 334; See furthermore, J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (CUP, 1995). 
56  Tully, ‘The Imperialism’, supra note 55. 
57  From different positions, see for instance Grimm, supra note 46, at 21; see K-H Ladeur, ‘Globalization and 
the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?’, in: 
K-H Ladeur, Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Ashgate, 2004) 89, at 101; as well as J H H Weiler, 
‘Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism – Some Doubts’, in: G de Búrca & J H H Weiler (eds), The 
Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP, 2011) 8, and particularly at 12. 
58  Krisch, supra note 46, at 67.  
59  Ibid; and in a very detailed and nuanced way also G Teubner, Constitutional Fragments, Societal 
Constitutionalism and Globalization (OUP, 2012). 
60  See M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism In and Beyond the State’, in: J L Dunoff & J P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP, 2009) 258, at 268. 
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The majority of ‘constitution-critical’ authors however have adopted a pluralistic approach.61 
Krisch for instance claims that the post national polycentric context is characterized by different 
‘layers of law and politics’. There is a ‘heterarchical interplay between these layers according to 
rules ultimately set by each layer for itself’ without any common point of reference – resulting in 
pluralism.62 He then introduces a vision of pluralism which in his view also has normative appeal 
as it has a number of virtues. For instance, it allows for better adaptation to new circumstances, 
as it is less formalised and therefore comes with a different dynamic.63 Furthermore, it leaves 
more room for contestation. Whereas constitutional frameworks are often ‘elite products, 
expression of power and social hegemony’ pluralism opens more possibilities for contestation for 
weaker actors.64 Finally pluralism also provides for checks and balances as the different 
fragments provide constant potential for mutual challenges.65  
 
Teubner presents an even more radical depiction of the global realm. Globalisation leads to a 
development, where constitutionalisation can only be found in fragments.66 Fragmentation 
thereby has to be understood as ‘fundamental, multidimensional fragmentation of global society 
itself’.67 ‘Private’ regimes participate in this fragmented law production as equal participants and 
they produce ‘proper law’.68 Consequently, global law will continue to be highly fragmented and 
at best may be able to create some fragile compatibility, if conflicts are able to ‘establish a 
specific network logic, which can affect a loose coupling of colliding units’.69  
 
In the context of globalisation the ‘comprehensive claim’ of political constitutions cannot be 
maintained. There is no all-embracing global constitution but only fragments which developed in 
particular areas, such as the UN.70 On the other hand societal units (subsystems) start to ‘develop 
their own constitutional legal norms – the self-constitutionalization of global orders without a 
                                                          
61  Krisch, supra note 46, 69  
62  Ibid at 69 
63  Ibid at 78 ff.  
64  Ibid at 81. 
65  Ibid at 85  
66  Teubner, supra note 59. 
67  See A Fischer-Lescano & G Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004) 999, 1004. 
68  See Teubner, supra note 59, at 42 ff. 
69  A Fischer-Lescano & G Teubner, supra note 67, at 1004 
70  Teubner, supra note 59, at 52 
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state.’71 These sectorial constitutions have a constitutive element which is aimed at securing their 
autonomy on the global scale.72 Autonomy accomplishes the breakdown of ‘the close structural 
couplings between the function systems and the nation-state politics and law, and to enable 
function specific communications to become globally interconnected’. Furthermore, 
‘[c]onstitutive constitutional norms of this kind serve to release the intrinsic dynamics of 
business corporations at the global level.’73 This triggers resistance and therefore in subsequently 
‘limitative constitutional norms are needed’,74 although they are only of limited reach. Similarly, 
Poul F Kjaer argues that globalisation has led to the breakdown of the ‘constitutional 
configurations’ of the nation state, which lead to a ‘fracturing of the equilibrium between 
different social spheres’.75 On the global level, this has created ‘new types of constitutional 
ordering’ and ‘the gradual emergence of a new type of sectorial constitutions.76 Kjaer also 
stresses that these constitutions predominantly take an ‘economic focus’ such as the World Bank 
or other types of organisations related with the Washington Consensus. Similar to Teubner he 
observes that this one sided focus leads to criticism and counter-movements (which again rely on 
‘constitutional conceptuality).77 
 
The question then arises as to how the interrelation of the different fragments is shaped. 
Particular inter-regime conflicts (legal or cultural) pose a complex set of problems in a context 
characterised by heterarchy and decentrality. Teubner introduces ‘guiding principles’ to deal 
with different constitutional conflicts. They consist of two approaches: ‘internalizing disputes 
into the decisions of the conflicting regimes themselves, or externalizing them to inter-regime 
negotiations’.78 In both cases a common law approach is to be adopted, one which is guided by 
the principle of ‘sustainability’.79 Sustainability ‘requires that regimes limit their options in such 
a way that they prevent destructive tendencies and avoid the environmental damage they cause 
(limitative function). Yet, preferable sustainability would also be understood in a supportive 
                                                          
71  Ibid at 53 (italics in original). See also previous work on societal constitutionalism by D Sciulli, Theory of 
Societal Constitutionalism – Foundations of a Non-Marxist Critical Theory (CUP, 1992) 
72  Teubner, supra note 59, at 75. 
73  Ibid at 75 and 78. 
74  Ibid at 78. 
75  P F Kjaer, Constitutionalism in the Global Realm – A Sociological Approach (Routledge, 2014), at 118. 
76  Ibid at 122.  
77  Ibid. 
78  Teubner, supra note 59, at 152, quote at 153 
79  Ibid at 172.  
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function, where ‘regimes actively promote[..] their respective environments’.80 Such a 
development he cautiously seems to adopt regarding horizontal effects of human rights.81 
 
Others suggest a form pluralism which is considerate of the different implications of a 
heterarchical set-up of the global realm but which does not go as far as Teubner with regard to 
the separation of the different units. In this vein Neil Walker introduces the notion of 
constitutional pluralism. In his understanding constitutionalism can be observed in different 
contexts - state, post state and post polity (private).82 Between these different units there is no 
hierarchy; ‘no neutral perspective from which their distinct representational claims can be 
reconciled’.83 As with Teubner he then attributes the final responsibility for the embodiment of 
the individual constitutionalism to each unit itself (‘the constitutional profile associated with 
each site in the final analysis will develop in accordance with the representative claims peculiar 
to that site, and with the particular traditions, social pressures and normative dynamics […] 
which shape these claims’84). In contrast to Teubner, however, Walker introduces a ‘relational 
perspective’ or a ‘metaconstitutionalism’.85 This is necessary as  
 
[i]n this plural configuration, unlike the one-dimensional Westphalian configuration, the ‘units’ 
are no longer isolated, constitutionally self-sufficient monads. They do not purport to be 
comprehensive and exclusive polities, exhausting the political identities, allegiances and shaving 
separate internal and external dimensions, since their very identity and raison d’être as polities or 
putative polities rests at least in some measure on their orientation towards other sites.86 
 
As a result of not being self-contained, it is necessary that the different units are somehow 
interrelated in order to achieve meta-authorisation. Lacking an overarching framework and being 
not sufficiently self-contained, deeper normative justification can only come from the interaction 
between the different units, a process which is complex, patterned (as opposed to universal) and 
fluid. Meta-constitutionalisation is therefore constantly shifting both regarding its formal 
                                                          
80  Ibid at 173 
81  Ibid, and in ibid Chapter 5 starting at 124 ff.  
82  See N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ 65 Modern Law Review (2002) 317, at 340. 
83  Ibid at 338. 
84  Ibid at 339. 
85  Ibid at 356. 
86  Ibid at 355 and 356 (italics in original). 
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configuration (with regard to which units interact for instance) as well as regarding its normative 
content.87 
 
3.1.3 Remaining Challenges  
 
A pluralist notion is adopted here, as described by Nico Krisch: 
 
Constitutionalism and pluralism are distinguished, in large part, by the different extent to which 
they formally link the various spheres of law and politics. While pluralism regards them as 
separate in their foundations (despite tight links in practice), global constitutionalism, properly 
understood, is a monist conception that integrates those spheres into one.88 
 
Thus, the thesis is in agreement with the pluralists in assuming distinguishable foundations 
between different regimes and institutions. However, the predominant focus of this chapter is on 
the ‘tight links’ which Krisch refers to. Here pluralist literature often leaves a number of 
unanswered questions, particularly regarding the interaction of different (functional) regimes 
(and spheres) characterising current global plurality (a);89 as well as the role actors different to 
more traditional public ones are to play in it (b). 
 
3.1.3.1 Relationships of the Different Units in the Global Legal Order 
 
Some pluralists argue for a significant autonomy of different individual regimes. This is most 
pronounced in Teubner’s notion of constitutional fragments. In line with his general system’s 
theoretical approach borrowed from Luhmann, individual units are highly independent and 
interact mainly in cases of conflicts and even then predominantly through internalisation 
(‘Networks translate the external contradictions manifested in conflicts of norms into the internal 
perspective of the individual nodes, which internally reflects the relations between various levels, 
subsystems, network nodes, and the overall network’90). 
                                                          
87  Ibid at 356 ff.  
88  Krisch, supra note 46, at 242.  
89  But see in this regard M Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law – Facing Fragmentation 
(CUP, 2012). 
90  See Teubner, supra note 59, at 159. 
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Other pluralists advocate a more moderate approach and acknowledge the possibility of some 
kind of more intensified coordination or linkage between the different fragments. For instance 
Kaarlo Tuori opts for what he calls ‘discursive pluralism’ which is distinct from the more radical 
models in the way that: 
 
[i]n a descriptive regard, […] points to existing phenomena of interlegality – overlap, 
interpenetration and dialogue – that refute all versions of black box theorising and show these to 
be, at best, one-sided generalizations. In a normative respect, it advocates discursive treatment of 
conflicts of authority, a search for compatible solutions to those conflicts, mutual learning 
processes and the inclusion of the perspective of relevant ‘foreign’ legal orders in a coherence-
seeking reconstruction of law.91 
 
Despite this what might be termed ‘cooperative’ form of pluralism he stresses the horizontal 
starting point of his approach and rejects ‘hierarchical meta-principles, which remain stuck to 
state-sovereigntist Stufenaufbau-models […]’92. Tuori sees himself in the tradition of other 
pluralists, particularly Paul Schiff Berman who also stresses the importance of an open pluralist 
approach. He attempts to provide a framework which is designed to show a ‘development of 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices that attempt to manage the 
overlapping of legal or quasi-legal communities’.93 Thus both concepts advocate a form of 
pluralism which acknowledges the inter-legality of different transnational systems. However, 
what they have in common with more radical positions is their strong (though perhaps not 
exclusive) focus on ‘overlaps’ and conflicts. Ultimately, they also regard different legal and 
social systems or regimes as fairly closed and self-sufficient and consider less the possibility that 
different actors may be dependent on each other beyond simple conflict resolution. Ralph 
Michaels therefore correctly criticises that ‘leading accounts of global pluralism have so far not 
provided the tools to fully capture the nature of the interrelationship among […] different 
                                                          
91  K Tuori, ‘Transnational Law: On Legal Hybrids and Legal Perspectivism’, in: M Maduro, K Tuori & S 
Sankari (eds), Transnational Law – Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (CUP, 2014) 11, at 54. 
92  Ibid at 54 (italics in original). 
93  P Schiff-Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 80 Southern California Law Review (2007) 1155, at 1196. 
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orders’.94 Even though different models describe the challenges and nature of legal pluralism 
they ‘fail to provide a full account of the interpenetration, overlap, and linkage among different 
normative orders [in the business context].’95 
 
These issues are more appropriately addressed by Krisch. In his view pluralism is a ‘hybrid 
between hierarchical and network forms of order’, in the sense that ‘it allows for regimes with an 
internally hierarchical structure, but denies them ultimate supremacy, and thus navigates between 
routine hierarchies and exceptional disruptions, to be solved eventually only through consensual 
forms’.96 He expands on this by introducing cooperation as a form of interaction between 
transnational actors. He states that ‘[w]hether courts (and other institutions) will associate with 
their counterparts in other spheres of post-national governance, thus probably hinges on the 
extent to which they can thereby hope to raise their own authority and ward off challenges from 
others’.97 He continues: 
 
This […] raises the question of how and when cooperation may be bolstered by the ‘authority’ of 
common institutions. The construction of such authority may not be necessary for institutional 
structures to emerge –indeed, these structures may often be based on mutual gains or coercion in 
the first place. But it helps them persist and be effective over time; …98 
 
Consequently, his account of cooperation goes beyond the predominant narrative of conflict and 
conflict resolution techniques. It takes into consideration other necessary elements of 
transnational ‘legal’ systems such as finding answers to authority challenges. Those may require 
interaction beyond simple conflict resolution.  
 
Above the thesis went one step further, arguing that rather than being independent and self-
sufficient, transnational institutions and regimes are predominantly incomplete and highly 
interdependent. Systems are not internally self-sufficient but rely on cooperation in order to fulfil 
their ‘regulatory’ agendas. This approach is in line with Walker’s meta-constitutionalism which 
                                                          
94  R Michaels, ‘The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law’, 71 Law and Contemporary Problems (2008) 
107, at 110. 
95  Ibid. 
96  Krisch, supra note 46, at 239 
97  Krisch, supra note 46, at 245 
98  Ibid. 
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is built on the assumption that different units must be oriented towards other sites as a meta-
authoritative, or even as a constituent, element. 99 
 
3.1.3.2 The Issue of Private Authority and Public Law in the Global Realm 
 
Another rather problematic issue in the debate is the treatment of private authority. There still 
appears to be some reluctance to integrate private actors into the political and legal structures of 
the global realm. This is less a problem in Teubner’s societal constitutionalisation. However, 
particular constitutionalists often consider private actors on the global level at best as 
‘contractors’ which public institutions bestow with clearly defined technical regulatory 
functions.100 This is to some degree understandable, given the strong inspiration stemming from 
nation state for these models. However, once we leave the domestic (or European) sphere it 
seems questionable whether this can be maintained or whether interactions between public and 
private actors are not also characterised by heterarchy and the absence of clearly established 
roles and hierarchies.101  
 
The changes outlined in the first two chapters102 require us not only to reconsider the structure of 
(global) governance but more fundamentally also our preconceptions of its components. Private 
actors, as outlined in more detail in the last chapter, must not only be perceived as purely self-
interested entities. They often represent a functional realm, a sphere with its own constituencies 
over which they exercise authority. These functional spheres interlink with the more traditional 
political realms in many ways -blurring the distinctions between them.103  
 
However, if we accept this then the question arises as to whether there is and should be any room 
for considerations of publicness (or even a stronger constitutional integration) more generally.104 
In the last chapter it was pointed out that there is certainly room for a significant role to be 
                                                          
99  See above at section 3.1.2.  
100  A description of these approaches can for instance be found in T Büthe & W Mattli, The New Global 
Rulers – The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2011), at 11. 
101  See K W Abbott & D Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2009) 501.  
102  See Chapter 1 and 2 and particular the references made to S Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights – From 
Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
103  See the next section for a more detailed depiction.  
104  Cf Kingsbury, supra note 3, at 31. 
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played by traditional public actors regarding the exercise and structure of authority in a 
transnational context. This goes, to some degree, hand in hand with both procedural and 
substantive values of public law. Nevertheless, whether this is achievable in general and 
universalist terms remains questionable. This does not however mean that there is not room for 
public law considerations and forms of partial constitutionalisation.  
 
3.2 Networks and the Global Legal Order  
 
How can a network approach help to overcome the obstacles set out above? As stated previously, 
networks are located between a non-integrated market type scenario and an integrated 
hierarchical structure. Thus they contain public and private elements, or better put flexibility and 
autonomy on the one side as well as integration and harmonisation on the other. As such, taking 
a network approach one does not assume a global legal order that is genuinely integrated or 
structured hierarchically. Networks embrace a pluralist account where regulation and law stems 
from independent entities which are in many cases functionally separated. Higher integration of 
and harmonisation between these entities is however possible; and as it will be shown in due 
course in the case studies in the next chapters certain constitutionalisation effects can emerge 
from this. The next section will first address the private aspects of this network approach 
referring to the remarks made above about pluralism (3.2.1); and secondly the public aspects 
where different forms of integration will be set out. Most importantly the final section will 
outline in greater detail what is meant by the aforementioned constitutionalisation effects (3.2.2).  
 
As an explanatory note it is first of all necessary to clarify that the term network will refer here, 
unlike in the last section, to a theoretical concept explicating a structure in the global realm. As 
such, this section does not refer to concrete empirical depictions of networks such as specific 
regulatory cooperation networks, or other forms referred to in literature when providing 
examples for less state centricity (network in the narrow sense).105 The term network is rather 
used as a description of an ‘institutional form of globalization’106 (network in a broader global 
sense) in which however, the different types of empirically observable networks play a role.  
                                                          
105  See for instance Kingsbury, Krisch, Stewart, supra note 50.  
106  See Ladeur, supra note 57, at 63 ff. 
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3.2.1 The Private Law Characteristics: Flexibility and Plural Autonomy 
 
Networks are a flexible way of structuring the global realm – they allow for cooperation when 
needed and for separation when a common approach is less useful or required. As the global 
economy specifically and the global realm in general is structured in a flexible, changing and 
fluid manner it also ‘demands flexible new forms of legal regimes that do not allow for stable 
legal and administrative hierarchical order but that are part of a heterarchy of overlapping public 
and private rules, practices, standards’.107 The main ‘private’ element to be introduced here is 
plurality. As I have outlined above plurality consists of actors of different internal composition, 
structure and regulatory activities in or among different functional or territorial realms.108 The 
production of law then takes place within the different units or as a ‘result of a spontaneous co-
ordination process, normally between formally equal actors’.109 Therefore, despite the lack of a 
general constitutionalisation at a global scale formal organizational structuring takes place within 
the different sites of polycentricism; and this happens to a degree that it has been claimed by 
some to be a form of constitutionalisation itself.110 Teubner depicts this with his societal 
constitutionalism, characterized by ‘the self-constitutionalization of global orders without a 
state.’111 Central is that these different societal spheres which are no longer constrained 
territorially and politically but which extent across borders and functionally distinguished parts 
of society (political, economic etc). His and others approaches have been criticized for various 
reasons. One of the more important ones is decoupling of constitutions form the political; and the 
generally the ‘oscillation between the political and the social,’112 ‘[T]o shift practice out of 
domains of morality, or ordinary politics, and into sub-specialized communities of interest and 
expertise that are barely accessible to civil society or even to most of the educated elite’ is 
considered a normatively little attractive concept ‘under modern democratic conditions’.113  
 
                                                          
107  Ibid at 116. 
108  See above at 3.1.2.  
109  Möllers, supra note 3, at 329. 
110  Again in different degrees proponents of this view are, among others, Teubner, supra note 59; Kjaer, supra 
note 75; Walker, supra note 82, 317 ff.  
111  Teubner, supra note 59, at 53 (original in italics). 
112  T Vesting, ‘Constitutionalism or Legal Theory: Comments on Gunther Teubner’ in: C Joerges, I-J Sand & 
G Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004) 29, at 31 ff.  
113  Kingsbury, supra note 3, at 55. 
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Here a different account of pluralism is therefore suggested, one which is less internally closed. 
Rather, what matters is the existence of a certain degree of autonomy that characterizes many 
transnational entities, whether public or private; and that, within this sphere of autonomy these 
entities structure and limit themselves. This has at least constitutional resemblance, whether it 
amounts to a constitution properly called so is then indeed a matter ‘of nuance and 
graduation’.114 
 
3.2.2 The Public Elements in Networks – Integration and Harmonisation 
 
A network approach, as indicated above, also means that there is a more integrated structure 
accompanying the autonomous orders, which is first and foremost shaped through bilateral 
interactions. And it is here where constitutionalisation effects do emerge and do matter. As 
shown, different actors do not stand alone but ‘intersect with other social structures in their social 
environment’. In fact I made the argument that this interaction is not only possible but necessary 
given the dispersal of authority in the global realm. Therefore transnational actors also must 
achieve some form of ‘external compatibility’.115 This Kjaer argues happens through a dual 
process: 
 
‘[F]irst, the transposition of social components, such as political decisions, economic capital and 
products, scientific knowledge or religious promises of salvation, into the wider society; and 
second, the channeling and incorporation of the social components produced elsewhere in society 
into a given organization. The praxis of fulfilling this dual function is what is described with the 
term ‘constitutionalisation’116 
 
A network account opens room for constitutionalisation effects throughout the realms of the 
different participants within the network along the aforementioned lines. By means of necessary 
interaction, entities both spread their own ‘social components’ into a wider realm, and at the 
same time integrate components arising out of other sources. Walker states that the  
                                                          
114  Walker, supra note 82, at 339. 
115  See Kjaer, supra note 75, at 143. Forms of interaction between the different realms have also been 
advocated for by Teubner and Walker see previous footnotes. 
116  Ibid (italics in the original) referring to M Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’ in: P Dobner & M 
Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP, 2010) 47, at 59.  
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development of new authoritative units from the interaction of existing units is structurally 
facilitated, and the map of constitutional authority becomes a complex and ever-shifting mosaic 
of the new and the old, the emergent and the mature, the relations between these new and old 
units as constitutionally significant (and transformative) as the units themselves.117 
 
In contrast to this account, I argue here that within the realms of individual transnational 
networks there is room for more consolidation than Walker seems to detect in the global realm in 
general. In private law and organisational theory networks are characterised as ‘long term stable 
relationships’.118 Translated into the sphere of transnational governance and law, transnational 
networks which develop between the different autonomous units have stabilising abilities and 
this then opens room for a stabilisation of public values which are more polity bound in a 
traditional understanding.119  
 
The following paragraphs will demonstrate how networks can transport constitutionalisation 
effects both in a foundational and limiting understanding of the term. After that illustration this 
section will look at the way the network approach responds to general criticism regarding the 
possibilities of constitutionalism in the global realm. Finally, some limitations will be set out by 
outlining for what kind of functions (advocated for by proponents of a more globally 
encompassing understanding of constitutionalism) the network approach does not provide.  
 
As stated above, it is first prudent to look at the different expressions of constitutionalisation 
effects to be found within transnational networks. Those are both foundational and limiting. 
Networks can create constitutionalisation effects in more foundational terms; though not in the 
more general understanding as developed in the context of the nation state (power which 
emanates from the people and is legitimised by them120). Foundational effects are more likely to 
be found within the individual units of networks and even within these units they are typically 
present in a more partial than universal sense. As a result foundational constitutional effects 
cause a particular realignment of the internal authority of individual units with the general 
                                                          
117  Walker, supra note 82, at 357. 
118  Collins, supra note 11, at 11.  
119  This is contrary to Teubner, supra note 59, at 115 ff.  
120  See above at sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. 
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dominant framework within the network. An example of this is the adaptation of the Olympic 
Charter whereby the environment was included as a third pillar of Olympicism. The IOC was 
from that moment on responsible for the regulation of environmental concerns related to sports 
in the Olympic context. For this reason it pushed this agenda in the realms of its member sport 
associations and even within local political communities. 
 
Although foundational constitutionalisation effects such as those described above can be 
observed within global networks, what is more common are effects which are limiting in nature. 
In particular states and public organisations (but also NGOs) can use the coordination structures 
and the venues of mutual learning existing in these networks121 to promote certain public values. 
Accordingly, networks can pursue an approach whereby its members have to implement 
participatory rights or specific procedural mechanisms for instance. In particular with regard to 
participation, networks have the ability to create a ‘public’ for a certain issue area. Thus, when 
engaging in social responsibility regulation ISO included international organisations such as the 
ILO, as well as the latter’s relevant members (for instance trade unions). Similarly, when 
assessing the implementation of environmental protection mechanisms in the context of the 
Beijing Olympics, UNEP involved several environmental NGOs to provide their evaluation for 
the report.122 
 
Limitative constitutionalisation effects can also be of a more substantive, public good oriented 
character and thus aim at the protection of human rights or environmental protection standards. 
Examples of such developments can for example be found in the manuals set up by international 
organisations to be followed when engaging in partnerships with the private sector. Thus, as 
shown in the first chapter the UN, and other IOs have guidelines in place which provide a 
general framework for the interaction with the business community. These state a number of 
exclusionary criteria, such as human rights violations, disregard of Security Council sanctions or 
systematic failure to meet UN Global Compact Principles.123 Any actor engaging with UN 
                                                          
121  See Collins, supra note 11, at 11.  
122  For details see Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
123  See UN, Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Sector, 20 November 
2009, at 3(c):  
‘The UN will not engage with Business Sector entities that are complicit in human rights abuses, tolerate forced or 
compulsory labour or the use of child labour, are involved in the sale or manufacture of anti-personal landmines or 
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organisations must align their own processes so that they are in compliance with these 
requirements. 
 
As mentioned above, the application of constitutionalism beyond the nation state has led to 
significant criticism following different strands of argument. Most forceful is the argument that 
constitutionalism is strongly interlinked with the nation state and any application outside this 
context may be considered a form of legalisation but can never ‘live up to the standard of 
constitutionalisation’.124 The network approach however, offers a dialectic, maybe transitory 
understanding which first and foremost leaves constitutionalisation within the public realm– 
where it can maintain its traditional links with politics (even though arguably in an adapted 
form).125 But, it also allows for a better consideration and integration of some achievements of 
publicness at the transnational level, which if not dominated, is at least strongly characterised by 
‘private law’ structures.  
 
However, as networks are based on a cooperative structure between fairly equal participants 
there is no top down approach, but rather a bargaining process whereby the prevailing effects of 
this process are transported through the venue of individual couplings. This has some 
implications for aspirations of publicness in a transnational context. First, a network approach 
does not, as already outlined above, provide for universality. It ultimately accepts fragmentation 
and the inability to find a generally uniting framework or an international community capable of 
agreeing on such a framework.126 
 
Even with regard to a more evolutionary development, whereby certain norms and values of 
publicness127 are slowly establishing transnationally, there are some doubts. Walker states that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cluster bombs, or that otherwise do not meet the relevant obligations or responsibilities required by the United 
Nations. 
d) The UN will not engage with Business Sector entities violating sanctions established by the UN Security Council 
e) The UN should not partner with Business Sector entities that systematically fail to demonstrate commitment to 
meeting the principles of the UN Global Compact. However, the UN may consider collaboration specifically 
intended to address this failure of commitment.’ (footnotes omitted) 
124  See above and Grimm, supra note 46, at 21. 
125  Cf ibid at 20. 
126  As advocated for by the ‘constitutionalists’ see footnotes 48 and 49; as well as Kumm, supra note 60.  
127  Kingsbury, Krisch & Steward, supra note 50. 
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‘just as the configuration of unities is not fixed, neither is the normative content of that which is 
represented by these unities’.128 Further he states that  
 
the represented unity of constitutional orders, and of their metaconstitutional justification, is a 
purely formal unity [which has no implication] about the substantive normative discourse through 
which a particular unit achieves its metaconsitutional justification nor about the substantive 
framework of constitutional norms which this metaconsitutional justification supports.129  
 
Thus, there is at least no settlement and also no guarantee of settlement on specific norms and 
requirements within these networks neither along the lines of a more cosmopolitan nor more 
general scheme of publicness. A network approach is a dialectic process and it allows for 
integration of such principles ‘less with a common substance of values and procedures than with 
mutual control through overlapping networks of relations’.130  
 
Whether such values and principles become a dominant or foundational characteristic of a 
network depends very much on the specific configuration of this network. Nonetheless, not all is 
lost for proponents of a more integrated constitutionalism or a more widespread application of 
principles of publicness. As outlined in the previous chapter different transnational actors are 
dependent on cooperation in order to be able to effectively regulate and they are particularly 
dependent on certain regulatory competences distributed unevenly between different actor sets. 
Consequently, public state based actors in particular are able to link back to traditional forms of 
justification and legitimation. Moreover, states remain dominant players within their territorial 
sphere as well as transnationally.131 In network structures this gives them a strong starting 
position to be the orchestrating actors within networks, 132 although whether and how they take 
up these challenges remains to be seen and will provide substance for further research. 
 
 
                                                          
128  Walker, supra note 82, 357. 
129  Ibid at 357-358. 
130  Ladeur, supra note 57, 113. 
131  See Chapter 1 and Sassen, supra note 102. 
132  Cf Abbott & Snidal, supra note 101. 
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4. CONCLUSION  
 
This Chapter aimed to evaluate the networks developing out of regulatory cooperation and then 
link this to the more general discussion regarding the political and legal order in the global 
realm. Regulatory networks are multi-party arrangements between different regulatory actors 
within one or across different but related issue areas. They are characterised by a certain degree 
of integration and stabilisation of the cooperation between the involved parties. Despite this, 
each regulator retains their autonomy and no general integration into an overarching hierarchical 
framework is taking place. 
 
Regulatory networks are an important phenomenon, characteristic also for a broader 
development, namely network structures in the global legal order. Consequently, in general, the 
global legal and political landscape is structured in a pluralist way, without any overarching 
framework of hierarchy. Units within this framework comprise a certain degree of autonomy 
which is however limited and which forces them to engage in cooperation, as was shown in 
Chapter 2. In a network scenario bilateral cooperation merges into more consolidated and stable 
structures within which constitutionalisation effects emerge. A network approach thus provides a 
dialectic umbrella under which elements of both public and private accounts of the global legal 
order are found. 
 106 
 
  
 107 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
ISO 26000 – REGULATORY COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED ISSUE 
AREA 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This case study examines the ISO 26000 process which is an example of public private 
cooperation in a decentralised and fragmented transnational setting. After deciding to create the 
26000 standard for social responsibility the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
concluded cooperation agreements with the International Labour Organization (ILO), the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN Global Compact 
(GC). These public organisations were granted particular participatory rights in the process 
which exceeded those of the numerous other stakeholders involved.  
 
This case study was chosen as it provides an illustration of cooperation in a fragmented issue 
area. The ISO itself lists 40 cross-sectoral and 35 sectoral initiatives in the area of social 
responsibility regulation.1 Furthermore, unlike the case study on sport and environment dealt 
with in the next chapter, cooperation in this particular case does not bridge different regulatory 
realms but rather harmonises existing regulation within one issue area. Thirdly, cooperation 
between the relevant organisations is project based in this specific case. The agreements 
concluded regulate the public organisations’ involvement in the 26000 standard setting 
procedure. Nonetheless the consequences of such cooperation are more long lasting and it is 
interesting to note the particular structure of one process and examine how it plays out in the 
general framework of social responsibility regulation. 
 
The following chapter will therefore first try to understand how cooperation was arranged in this 
particular example, what impact the general structure of the regulatory realm played and what 
motives led to cooperation. To this end, the following chapter will look at two levels of 
rationales for cooperation. The first is the commutative level. In line with the more general 
                                                          
1  See International Standard ISO 26000:2010 Guidance on Social Responsibility (BSI Standards 
Publication, 2010), Annex A, at 85 ff (hereinafter: ISO 26000:2010).  
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arguments elaborated in Chapter 2, it is argued that all organisations involved cooperated in 
order to exchange ‘regulatory commodities’. This section will focus on legitimacy, expertise and 
operational capacities in particular as the main components of exchange. The main aims of doing 
so are first of all to highlight that in this example one can also see the special importance of 
traditional legitimacy originating from the state. Secondly, as the 26000 process involved a 
higher number of public policy considerations as opposed to more traditional, technical standard 
setting, the ISO was in need of normative and political expertise. This could be accessed through 
cooperation with public organisations. Finally, the ISO has strong operational capacities when it 
comes to the distribution and implementation of standards in the business community. This is 
due to the special power and expertise it has as a focal institution in the area of technical 
standardisation.2 The international organisations sought to benefit from these capacities by 
ensuring that their own instruments were sufficiently considered in the 26000 standard. 
 
The final part will examine the broader network level of which the cooperative relations analysed 
are a component. Here, it is claimed that the international organisations aimed to achieve 
constitutionalisation effects through agglomeration and consolidation of existing regulatory 
frameworks. Their goal was to spread a consistent message to the business community which 
would then lead to path dependency effects. However, this approach is controversial. The role of 
private entities in ‘public policy’ areas is a hotly debated topic both in public law scholarship as 
well as within the institutions themselves.  
 
The case study mainly relies on organisational documents such as statutes, founding treaties or 
procedural guidelines. The ISO has furthermore publicised its archive of the 26000 process.3 As 
a result it was possible to access all documents produced in the 26000 working group and in 
other relevant bodies. These were complemented by publically available information which was 
mainly found on the websites of the various organisations through their official publications. In 
order to better understand the objectives pursued through cooperation several interviews were 
conducted with representatives of the relevant organisations. 
                                                          
2  See T Büthe & W Mattli, The New Global Rulers – The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy 
(Princeton University Press, 2011) at 29. 
3  Available at: http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=8929339&objAction=browse&sort=name 
(last accessed 22 December 2014). In the following the ISO documents regarding the 26000 process can be found in 
the archive.  
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The case study will be structured as follows. First, a short introduction to the ISO’s standard 
setting processes and its impacts on the global economy and broader political and social 
processes will be provided (2). Second, the commutative aspects of cooperation including a 
detailed description of the 26000 process, its technicalities as well as the regulatory challenges it 
faced during its duration will be examined (3). The final section will focus on the network 
established by this process and broader constitutionalisation effects to be observed in this context 
(4). 
 
2. THE ISO - THE PARTICULARITIES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT 
STANDARD SETTING 
 
2.1 General Information - Product Standardisation and Global Politics 
 
The ISO is an international non-governmental organisation made up of national standard setting 
bodies from 160 different countries. It was founded in 1947 and is a non-governmental 
organisation with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.4 Its mission is ‘to promote the 
development of standardization and related activities in the world with a view to facilitating 
international exchange of goods and services and to developing cooperation in the spheres of 
intellectual, scientific, technological and economic activity’.5 The ISO pursues this goal through 
what it calls expert consensus, meaning that experts in a certain area come together to draft a 
standard on the basis of consensus.6 In earlier years this was mainly limited to the creation of 
technical standards however in later years so-called management standards have risen and now 
complement the body of ISO standards.7 The ISO today consists of members from 161 countries 
and has drafted over 19,500 international standards.8 
                                                          
4  ISO, ‘Structure and Governance’, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/about_governance.htm 
(last accessed 12.12.2014). 
5  Article 2 ISO Statutes (17th ed, 2013) available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/statutes.pdf (last accessed 22 
December 2014) (hereinafter: ISO Statutes). 
6  See ISO, ‘About ISO’, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last accessed 22 December 
2014). 
7  See more below at section 3. Management standards are designed to ‘provide a model to follow when 
setting up and operating a management system’. See ISO, ‘Management System Standards’, available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards.htm (last accessed 12 December 2014). 
8  ISO, ‘About ISO’, supra note 6. 
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Particularly in the last two decades one can observe an important ‘shift from domestic regulation 
to global private rule making’ in this area.9 What has triggered this development? More 
generally, technical developments and the increase of transnational trade already mentioned in 
the first chapter demands a certain degree of global harmonisation. As long as firms and markets 
are ‘local’ there is little need for international standards, however as soon as markets integrate, 
non-harmonisation becomes a cost factor whereas coordination and harmonisation opens 
markets, increases trade and brings economic benefits for those thriving in it (particularly 
transnational corporations).10 
 
This development, however, has not only affected private firms but also economies at large and 
thus ultimately also affects the political realm. An often quoted example for this is the 
referencing of ISO standards in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, according to which using ISO 
standards as technical product specifications indicates consistency with international trade law.11 
This constitutes a manifestation of the importance of technical standards generally and of the 
ISO (together with other standard setters) in particular which cannot be overlooked.12 Other 
international organisations reference ISO standards in their regulation, a method also common in 
domestic policies.13 The ISO has thus evolved into a dominant global regulator. Together with a 
small number of other organisations, particularly the IEC and the ITU, the ISO has divided the 
issue area, and became a ‘focal institution’ in technical standardisation.14 
 
One question which emerges concerns the very nature of ISO standard setting. Is it merely an 
expertise driven form of technical problem solving, or does it have implications which make it 
difficult to characterise it as entirely apolitical? ISO standard setting can undoubtedly have broad 
                                                          
9  See Büthe & Mattli, supra note 2, at 6. 
10  See ibid. 
11  Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 UNTS 120.  
12  Cf also Büthe & Mattli, supra note 2, at 29 ff.  
13  For a number of examples see ISO/IEC, ‘Using and Referencing ISO and IEC Standards for Technical 
Regulation’ (September 2007), available at:  
http://www.iec.ch/affiliates/adoptions/pdf/iso_iec_standards_for_technical_regulations_en.pdf (last accessed 22 
December 2014) Annex A, B and C, at 13 ff. There numerous examples of referencing both by international 
organisations as well as by national or regional regulators are listed. See furthermore, Büthe & Mattli, supra note 2, 
at 6. 
14  Büthe & Mattli, supra note 2, at 29. 
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economic and social implications. For instance, one of its early standards concerning containers 
used in the shipping industry is said to have at least accelerated, if not constituted the foundation 
for, the revolution of global transportation and as a consequence global trade in its current 
form.15  
 
Nevertheless there are commentators who see the ISO standard setting process ‘as so rationalised 
and problem-driven that it has led some […] to declare the triumph of “technological rationality 
over power”’.16 However, this perception is not shared by many and is not even supported by the 
ISO itself. At least in more recent publications the ISO shows awareness of underlying economic 
and social factors when it states, referring to its standard setting process, that ‘[its] geographical 
reach […] combined with a multi-stakeholder environment […] ensures the representation of a 
wealth of technical views including those relating to social and economic interests’.17 Other 
authors have even more vividly stressed particular aspects of product standard setting which 
indicate its political character.  
 
First of all, product standards often have ‘important distributional implications’ in that they 
determine how to produce a certain product or deliver a certain service. As such, those who had 
hitherto based their production on a different standard will face severe adaptation costs.18 This is 
particularly the case since international standards are often the basis of supplier contracts and 
government regulations as well as being central to the establishment of legal liability and the 
determination intellectual property rights in courts or arbitral proceedings.19 Apart from 
economic effects Marcel Heires refers to an example where an ISO product standard on animal 
                                                          
15  A good depiction of this development is found in C N Murphy & JA Yates, The International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) – Global Governance through Voluntary Consensus (Routledge, 2009), at 50 ff.  
16  See M Heires, ‘The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)’ 13 New Political Economy 
(2008) 357, at 359 quoting T A Loya & J Boli, ‘Standardization in the World Polity: Technical Rationality Over 
Power, in: J Boli & G Thomas (eds), Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations 
Since 1875 (Stanford University Press, 1999) 169, for instance at 194, stating that: ‘[t]he standardization sector 
constitutes an alternative model – not coercive, not powerful, not even recognized as such except by those directly 
involved in its operations. Yet, as we have shown, the sector is eerily state-like in its effects, but based on a very 
different theory of rational, voluntaristic authority from that normally embodied by states’. 
17  See ISO/IEC, ‘Using and Referencing ISO and IEC Standards for Technical Regulations’, supra note 13, at 
2. 
18  Büthe & Mattli, supra note 2, at 30. 
19  Ibid, at 30. See furthermore, ISO/IEC, ‘Using and Referencing ISO and IEC Standards for Technical 
Regulations’, supra note 13, Annex A, B, and C, at 13 ff.  
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traps faced so much opposition from animal rights activists that it had to be abandoned.20 Thus, it 
had political implications going beyond the more inherent distributional economic aspects. 
 
In summary, given the ISO’s dominant position as a focal institution and the significant 
implications standards can have economically as well as in a broader social context it appears to 
be difficult to understand technical standard-setting as a purely functional activity, technically 
institutionalised and entirely apolitical. Instead one has to acknowledge that there are political 
implications in many standard setting processes. The question then becomes how such 
implication are accounted for in the standard setting and implementation process.  
 
2.2 Based on Consensus? – How ISO’s Governing Processes Function  
 
Bearing this issue in mind, we now turn to the internal set-up and processes of ISO. A number of 
questions are of particular relevance here such as who is involved in the ISO and in which 
capacity, how is standard setting conducted, and which procedures are in place? 
 
2.2.1 Membership 
 
As outlined above, the ISO is first and foremost a network of national standard setting bodies.21 
Those bodies participate in the international forum and in turn represent the ISO within their 
country.22 Their positions are, however, not entirely neutral. Rather they seek to promote 
preferences of their domestic stakeholders in order to prevent them from facing the economic 
disadvantages outlined above.23 As standard setting requires both expertise and resources, there 
is an imbalance regarding the capacities of different national bodies. Obviously, standard setters 
from large, economically developed countries can more easily supply a wide range of knowledge 
and expertise to the standard setting process. In developing countries, on the other hand, a fully 
developed standard setting body often does not even exist, and, if it does, it is likely to have far 
                                                          
20  Heires, supra note 16, at 360 referring to an article of the Neue Züricher Zeitung (Reto U Schneider ‘Was 
die Welt Zusammenhält’, NZZ Folio, February 2005. 
21  Heires, supra note 16, at 360 
22  ISO, ‘ISO Members’, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_members.htm (last accessed 22 
December 2014). 
23  See Büthe & Mattli, supra note 2, at 12. 
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more limited resources to participate in the ISO processes.24 This imbalance is reflected in three 
different membership categories. 
 
In the first category (P-Members) one finds full members who are standard setters with full 
capacity to participate in the ISO processes. Full members participate in standard development 
and set the policy agenda. They are equipped with voting rights and are thus those who have 
ultimate decision power. Furthermore, full members adopt and sell ISO standards nationally.25 
The second category is so-called correspondent members. These members participate in standard 
setting and policy-making processes but have an observer status (and do not have voting rights). 
Nonetheless they are able to adopt and to sell ISO standards within their own country.26 Finally, 
there are the so-called subscriber members. Those members do not have the capacity to 
participate in the different ISO activities. As subscribers they are ‘keeping up to date with ISO’s 
work’. In their home countries they neither adopt nor sell ISO standards.27  
 
Besides financial issues another factor has been highlighted as determining influence in the 
standard setting process. Thus, the ability to collectively represent national interests and to speak 
with one voice in the ISO committees has been considered a crucial advantage in the regulatory 
process.28 This however depends very much on how standard setting is structured domestically. 
In the US for instance standard setting is more pluralistically organised with functional and 
regional differentiation. This, it has been argued gives an advantage to European standard setters 
which are usually hierarchically structured with one single domestic focal institution.29 
 
Another group (however heterogeneous) which should be mentioned at this point are third 
parties which form relationships with the ISO and which also participate in the standard setting 
processes.30 These relationships are organised through different forms of liaison arrangements. 
                                                          
24  See ISO ‘ISO and Developing Countries’, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso-and-
developing-countries.htm (last accessed 22 December 2014). See furthermore Heires, supra note 16, at 360 ff.  
25  See Article 3.1.1 ISO Statutes; see furthermore ISO, ‘ISO Members’, supra note 22.  
26  See Article 3.1.2 ISO Statutes; see furthermore ISO, ‘ISO Members’, supra note 22. 
27  See Article 3.1.2 ISO Statutes; see furthermore ISO, ‘ISO Members’, supra note 22. 
28  See Büthe & Mattli, supra note 2, at 12 ff.  
29  See ibid; and Heires, supra note 16 at 362. 
30  This is provided for in Article 16.1 ISO Statutes which stipulates: ‘The Organization may cooperate with 
other international organizations interested partially or wholly in standardization or related activities. The conditions 
of cooperation shall be established by the Council.’ 
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There are liaisons at different levels of ISO standard setting. First at the technical or 
subcommittee level third party organisations can either be actively involved in the committee 
work (category A liaison), or they may merely wish to be informed (category B liaison).31 On the 
subsidiary working group level one finds a third category, the so-called D-liaison organisations 
which usually make technical contributions.32 Liaison organisations generally are required to 
have some international or regional basis and an interest in the respective area. Furthermore, they 
should be willing to make a contribution to the work of the committee or working group.33 In 
addition, D-liaison organisations are required to have a ‘sufficient degree of representativity 
within its defined area of competence…’34. In the 26000 process D-liaison organisations played a 
particularly crucial role because of the necessity for a wide representation of interests. 
 
2.2.2 The Standard Setting Process 
 
As stated above the core of the standard setting process takes place within the technical 
committees (TCs), sub-committees (SCs) and the WGs. The standard development process is 
split into different stages, the first being the ‘proposal stage’. Here a new work item is put on the 
agenda of a TC or an SC. 35 This can be done by national bodies, the secretariat of the committee, 
another committee, a liaison organisation, the Technical Management Board or the Chief 
Executive Officer.36 To be accepted as a new work item it has to reach a simple majority of P-
Members votes in the Committee and furthermore a commitment of four or in some cases five P-
Members of the Committee to participate actively.37  
 
Upon acceptance the work item will enter the preparatory stage. Here a working group composed 
of the experts nominated by the P-Members as well as D-Liaisons is set up to prepare a working 
draft which will then be circulated among the members of the respective committee and the 
                                                          
31  See para 1.17.2.1 ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1, Consolidated ISO Supplement – Procedures Specific to ISO 
(5th ed, 2014) (hereinafter ISO/IEC Directives). 
32  See para 1.17.2.2 ISO/IEC Directives. 
33  See para 1.17.2.1 and 1.17.2.2 ISO/IEC Directives. 
34  See para 1.17.2.2 ISO/IEC Directives 
35  A work item can be a new standard, a new part of a standard, a revision of or amendment to an existing 
standard and a specification. See para 2.3.1 ISO/IEC Directives.  
36  Para 2.3.2 ISO/IEC Directives.  
37  P-Members demonstrate their will to active participation by nominating experts which will be involved in 
the standard creation process. See para 2.3.5 ISO/IEC Directives.  
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Central Secretariat.38 It is important to note in this regard that in the working groups no 
distinction is made between the experts. As such, experts of P-Members have the same voice as 
those appointed by D-Liaison Organisations.39 Nonetheless, the possession of the capacity to be 
involved in the process depends very much on expertise and resources, which, as pointed out 
above, is usually less available in developing countries.  
 
Another important aspect of the working group or technical committees concerns their 
coordination. This task is performed by a secretariat, usually allocated to a national body which 
is willing and capable to fulfil the necessary tasks.40 The secretariat then determines a chair who 
leads negotiations.41 Even though secretariat and chair are formally neutral in the standard setting 
process they do have influence by way of managing the group or committee. Heires incisively 
depicts the importance of these positions in practice by pointing out that the committee of 
horology is presided over by the Swiss standard setter, whereas petroleum products and financial 
services committees are led by the US body.42 Consequently, there is a strategic interest in taking 
a steering position in domestically relevant industries. Yet, again, the ability to take up such a 
position depends significantly on the capacity of individual national bodies. 
 
After the working group stage the proposal enters the committee stage. Here it is examined by 
the national bodies who can comment on it.43 The draft is then, together with the comments, 
circulated again among all members of the TC or SC which have to decide to either discuss the 
draft and its comments in the next meeting, circulate a revised draft for consideration or let the 
draft pass to the next stage. The main objective at this stage is to reach consensus among the P-
Members in order to move the draft forward to the next stage (the enquiry stage). If consensus is 
not reached immediately, successive drafts can be created which will be considered again until 
finally either consensus is reached or a decision to defer or abandon the project is made. 44 It is 
                                                          
38  Para 2.4 ISO/IEC Directives. 
39  Interview with Kevin McKinley (ISO), 25 February 2013. 
40  Paras 1.9.1 and 1.9.2 ISO/IEC Directives. 
41  Heires, supra note 16, at 361. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Para 2.5 ISO/IEC Directives. 
44  Para 2.5.6 ISO/IEC Directives, consensus thereby implies: ‘General agreement, characterized by the 
absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a 
process that involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned to reconcile any conflicting 
arguments’. 
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important to note, however, that ‘in case of doubt concerning consensus, approval by a two-
thirds majority of the P-members of the technical committee or subcommittee voting may be 
deemed sufficient for the committee draft to be accepted for registration as an enquiry draft’.45 
As a result, it is not always necessary to ensure complete support for the standard - in fact, as 
abstentions are not counted, actual support may even be fairly low for the standard to still pass to 
the next level.  
 
If consensus within the TC or SC was reached the project will go forward to the enquiry stage, 
where the standard is forwarded by the Central Secretariat (the Secretary General) to all national 
bodies, which are given a period of three months to vote on the draft. The options are a positive 
vote, a negative vote or abstention. Member bodies may also provide technical or editorial 
comments. In case of a negative vote, the member body is required to give reasons for its 
decision, as otherwise the vote will not be counted as a negative vote in the final ballot. The 
enquiry draft is approved if two thirds of the P-Members of the respective TC or SC vote in 
favour and not more than one quarter of the total votes are negative.46  
 
If no negative votes were cast the draft can immediately go to publication. Only if it meets the 
requirements will it be registered as a Final Draft International Standard and reach the approval 
stage. At this stage it is distributed to all national bodies for a two month voting period. Again it 
is possible to vote positively, negatively or to abstain. The standard is approved if two thirds of 
the P-Members voted in favour of it and if no more than one quarter of the total votes were 
negative. Where the standard does not receive sufficient support a modified version may be 
resubmitted as a committee, an enquiry or as a final draft. It may be published as a technical 
specification or the project may be cancelled. In the other case the standard will advance to 
publication stage, whereby the Secretary General arranges the printing and distribution of the 
standard.47 
 
                                                          
45  Ibid. 
46  Para 2.6.1-2.6.3 ISO/IEC Directives.  
47  Para 2.7 and 2.8 ISO/IEC Directives. 
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3. ISO 26000 – THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REGULATION 
AND THE COMMUTATIVE ASPECTS OF COOPERATION  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Why did public organisations ultimately cooperate with the ISO? And what were the reasons for 
the ISO to involve them in the 26000 process and to grant them a particular status which 
exceeded that of other stakeholders? As outlined in the preceding chapters, in order to answer 
these questions one has to look at both the individual motives of each organisation as well as 
their general understanding of the regulatory regime and their particular contribution to it. This 
section will focus on the first, the commutative benefits involved in the cooperative process. The 
complexities of the ISO standard setting process and the broad impacts it can have on a variety 
of different actors has been demonstrated above. It has also been shown how the ‘regular 
standard setting process’ already incorporates a number of participatory elements for third 
parties. However, ISO 26000 however is distinct from traditional technical standard setting and 
comes with a different set of challenges. This type of regulation has clear public policy aspects to 
it. Nonetheless as social responsibility had become a major factor in corporate governance and 
many of the ISO’s members had an interest in one model standard which would cover the 
different obligations originating from a variety of sources, the ISO felt the need to engage in this 
domain. At the same time public organisations realised that the corporate level was of crucial 
importance with regard to their mission to protect environmental or human rights and that many 
of their own instruments had only limited reach in this regard. The situation was thus one where 
both sides felt that their own regulation was insufficient, yet they individually faced serious 
challenges to change this condition. In this context cooperation and an exchange of regulatory 
commodities as described in Chapter 2 was seen as a means to overcome these limitations.   
The following sections will further expand the context broadly described in the previous 
paragraphs. This will be complemented by a detailed overview of the challenges faced by the 
different organisations and how this has been translated into different forms of regulatory 
cooperation (3.2). This section will be followed by a detailed analysis of the commutative 
aspects of the cooperative processes examined here. Of particular relevance are three features: 
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public legitimacy, expertise of the public organisations involved in the process, and operational 
capacities and regulatory power of the ISO as a focal institution (3.3).  
 
3.2 Challenges in the Regulatory Process and Cooperation 
 
3.2.1 The Move from Technical to Social Standards and Its Challenges  
 
ISO 26000 is a guidance standard developed to help businesses and organisations to conduct 
their operations in a ‘socially responsible way’.48 The initiative is part of a general movement 
within the ISO to compliment purely technical standard setting with standards that are designed 
to facilitate organisations’ operations in a globalised environment. The most prominent 
standards49 in this context are the so-called management systems standards. These standards are 
designed to help organisations (of any type50) implement procedures into their structures in order 
to meet certain objectives such as, for instance, energy efficiency (ISO 50001 – Energy 
Management), good environmental performance (ISO 14000 –Environmental Management), 
quality (ISO 9000 – Quality Management), or food safety (ISO 22000 – Food safety 
Management).51 As management standards are intended to lead to continual improvement they 
are accompanied by regular audits. Finally, most management standards are open for 
certification by external certifiers (third party certification).52 
 
ISO 26000 falls within this trend. However, even though the ISO lists it under the category of 
‘management system standards’ it should be regarded as a standard sui generis.53 In contrast to 
other ISO standards, ISO 26000 is considered to provide guidance and not to constitute a 
requirement. It is therefore not open for certification.54 Furthermore, it has been remarked that in 
                                                          
48  See ISO, ‘ISO 26000 – Social Responsibility’, available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
49  See ISO, ‘Standards’, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm (last accessed 22 December 
2014) – section on ‘Popular Standards’ can be found on the bottom of the page. 
50  ISO phrases this as follows: ‘These standards can be applied to any organisation, large or small, whatever 
its product or service and regardless of its sector of activity’, see ISO, ‘Management System Standards, supra note 
7. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid. 
54  See ISO, ‘ISO 26000 – Social Responsibility’, supra note 48.  
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distinction to other management standards which place greater focus on procedures and less on 
specific content, ISO 26000 prescribes both and is consequently not only process but also result-
based.55  
 
The Guidance is intended to ‘regulate’ social responsibility in relation to organisations and 
consists of seven sections.56 Noteworthy in this context are Clauses 4 and 6. The former contains 
seven overarching principles of social responsibility: accountability; transparency; ethical 
behaviour; respect for stakeholder interests; respect for the rule of law; respect for international 
norms of behaviour and respect for human rights.57 The latter addresses the core subjects of 
social responsibility which are: human rights, labour practices, the environment; fair operating 
practices; consumer issues; community involvement and development.58 Each of these subjects is 
broken down into several sub-issues, such as prevention of pollution in the case of the 
environment or conditions of work in the case of labour practices.  
 
Furthermore it is important to note that the ISO was not the first to develop SR standards. As 
mentioned in the introduction, a number of public and private organisations were active, creating 
norms and rules in one or several areas falling within social responsibility, before the start of ISO 
26000.59 The ISO therefore understood its mission less as creating something entirely new, but in 
providing a standard that harmonised and refined other approaches and that was easily 
implementable.60 It thus integrated a variety of public and private stakeholders into the process.61 
In line with its general approach the ISO sees the 26000 standard as representing ‘international 
                                                          
55  See J M Diller, ‘Private Standardization in Public International Lawmaking’, 33 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (2012) 481, 485. 
56  These are: Scope (1); terms and definitions (2); understanding social responsibility (3); principles of social 
responsibility (4); recognizing social responsibility and engaging stakeholders (5); guidance on social responsibility 
core subjects (6); guidance on implementing practices of social responsibility (7). 
57  See ISO 26000:2010 para 4. 
58  Ibid. para 6. 
59  E.g. the ILO has been active in creating labour standards since its foundation in 1919. Both the Global 
Compact with its 10 Principles (see UN Global Compact, ‘The Ten Principles, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/index.html (last accessed 22 December 2014)), as well 
as the OECD with its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (see below fn 208) are also active participants in the 
area for some time. 
60  ISO, ISO 26000 Project Overview (2010), available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/ru/iso_26000_project_overview.pdf (last accessed 22 December 2014) at 3. 
61  See below in section 3.2.1.3. 
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consensus’. As such it cannot only be applied by private entities but also by the public sector in 
developed and developing countries.62 
 
3.2.1.1 The Public Policy Domain and the Necessity for Adapted Procedures 
 
A few issues regarding the 26000 standard deserve particular attention. The first concerns the 
fact that it touches upon the domain of public policy which, traditionally were more or less 
exclusively regulated by public entities narrowly defined (state or international organisations). 
There was concern whether private actors such as the ISO should operate in an area where a 
substantive body of public regulation already exists at all. Janelle Diller for instance criticises the 
ISO’s goal of developing consensus in an area where decisions had already been made by 
‘publicly convened representative stakeholders’.63 This she states further  
 
present[s] a genuine risk of compromising the public democratic processes based on the rule of 
law by requiring a new consensus between public actors broadly representing the community and 
private actors representing various stakeholders concerned64 
 
Despite these more general substantive considerations the ISO also faced significant practical 
challenges from the very outset of the process. As stated above, many commentators have called 
into doubt the apolitical nature of product standard setting. Such an approach, however, can 
certainly not be maintained with regards to social responsibility regulation. Since it is a public 
policy matter it necessarily comes with the challenges of public policy making.65 Moreover, as 
social responsibility is a fragmented domain, the ISO is no longer a quasi ‘monopolist’ as it is in 
many areas of product standardisation. It therefore had to accommodate many different public, as 
well as other private, regulators active in the area. Applying ‘consensus ideal’ under which the 
ISO usually operates met significant challenges in this context. 
 
                                                          
62  See ISO, ISO and Social Responsibility (2008), available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/socialresponsibility.pdf 
(last accessed 22 December 2014). 
63  See Diller, supra note 55, at 528. 
64  Ibid, at 528-529. 
65  See in this regard ibid. 
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The ISO tried to accommodate these challenges from the early stages of the procedure. The ISO 
26000 standard setting process started out in 2001 with an initiative of the ISO Consumer Policy 
Committee. This was followed by the formation of a multi-stakeholder ISO Advisory Group by 
the Technical Management Board, which examined the various organisations and programs 
active in the area of SR regulation.66 The Group finally recommended the creation of a guiding 
standard on social responsibility under certain conditions. Those were in particular the 
recognition that a social responsibility standard is qualitatively different to previous ISO 
standards, the respect for existing authoritative public regulation in the field and the political 
nature of certain issues, proper involvement of the ILO and finally meaningful participation of 
interested parties.67 In 2004 the ISO held a multi-stakeholder conference which endorsed the idea 
of the ISO becoming active in the area. In the aftermath, the Technical Management Board 
circulated a New Work Item Proposal68 which was in the following adopted by the ISO 
Members.69 A working group on social responsibility (WG SR) was launched with the mandate 
to develop a social responsibility standard.70 
 
3.2.1.2 Actors Involved and Set Up 
 
As stated above the awareness of the special conditions in the area of social responsibility 
regulation was already an issue from the initial meetings of the Advisory Group. Trying to 
integrate different constituencies however remained a challenge until the very end of the process. 
To achieve decent representation six stakeholder groups (industry, government, consumers, 
labour, NGOs, and a final group including service, support research and others) were formed. 
Each group was to represent a different cluster of interests within the ISO/WG SR. In total 450 
experts participated, joined by 210 observers from ISO Member Countries and 42 liaison 
organisations.71 It is important to note is that the creation of ISO 26000 took place within the 
                                                          
66  See Recommendations to the Technical Management Board, ISO/TMB AG CSR N32, stating: 
‘[T]heTechnical Management Board (TMB) approved Resolution 78/2002 establishing the Advisory Group on 
Social Responsibility’. 
67  See ibid. 
68  See New Work Item Proposal Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO/TMB N 26000, 1 October 2004.  
69  See Table of replies on the New Work Item Proposal Social Responsibility, ISO/TMB N 26000, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 7, 25 February 2005. 
70  See ISO, ISO 26000 Project Overview, supra note 60, at 8. 
71  Ibid, at 9. 
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ISO’s general standard setting process (even though in slightly abbreviated form).72 This implied 
that the representatives within the working group (ideally from all six stakeholder groups) were 
appointed by national member bodies. Other experts were to be nominated from liaison 
organisations. However only experts nominated by the member bodies had voting rights. Liaison 
organisations on the other hand were only allowed to submit comments (simultaneously with the 
voting process) or to formally back the draft.73 Most importantly, only member bodies voted on 
the final draft.74  
 
Another aspect which was intended to increase the number of representatives was the formation 
of so called ‘mirror committees’ at the national level. These committees, also grouped into six 
different categories, were to develop national positions that were then transmitted to the 
international standard setting process. Naturally those national committees were also created by 
the national member bodies. Thus, here as in other standard setting processes the sphere of the 
national members was crucial for the general direction the process took and the final outcome.75 
 
For the purpose of better involving representatives of developing countries a support system was 
set up to which both developed countries as well as multinational companies were asked to 
donate.76 Furthermore, certain management positions, such as the chair of the WGSR as well as 
participants in other groups of increased importance were designed to follow the ‘twining’ 
principle, which meant the equal inclusion of representatives from developing and developed 
countries.77 
 
 
 
                                                          
72  See ISO, ‘How Does ISO Develop Standards’ available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development.htm (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
73  See Diller, supra note 55; and H Ward, The ISO 26000 International Guidance Standard on Social 
Responsibility: Implications for Public Policy and Transnational Democracy, 2
nd
, Foundation for Democracy and 
Sustainable Development (Second Draft, 2010), available at: http://www.fdsd.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/ISO26000_and_transnational_democracy_Sept_draft.pdf (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
74  See ISO, ‘ISO Members’, supra note 22. 
75  See Diller supra note 55, at 492 ff. 
76  Ibid at 494. 
77  Ibid at 495. 
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3.2.1.3 The Drafting Process 
 
As indicated above, the drafting process followed the general ISO standard setting framework 
with some specifications to meet the specific requirements of the 26000 process.78 This standard 
setting process usually consists of five stages: the preparatory stage, the committee stage, the 
enquiry stage, the approval stage and finally the publication stage.79 The main part of the drafting 
process usually takes place at the first stage within the Working Group(s) (WG) set up for this 
purpose. The drafting process in the case of ISO 26000 was immensely complex due to its 
ambition to be as representative as possible, the necessity of not contradicting public law, 
combined with the ISO’s usual practice of reaching decisions through consensus.80 The 
following paragraphs attempt to provide a concise overview over the different aspects of this 
complex process. This is necessary as otherwise it will be very difficult to understand the 
specificities of the involvement of the individual IOs in the process. As such, the structure of the 
working group must be explained, with its different sub-groups before the different stages of the 
standard are set out in chronological order.81 
 
The organisational structure of the WGSR: Responsibility for the overall management of the 
WG lies with the Chairman. The TMB decided on the chairmanship of the WGSR during its 
meeting on September 13-14, 2004. Due to the twinning principle the chairs were distributed to 
Sweden and Brazil who also established the Secretariat of the Working Group.82 The Chairs 
were supported by the so-called Chairmen’s Advisory Group (CAG), an institution within the 
working group, which mainly fulfils advisory functions.83  
                                                          
78  See ISO/IEC Directives; the application of the operating procedures was established in Resolution 21 
during the first meeting of the Working Group. See Resolutions from the First Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, 
Salvador, Brazil, 2005-03-07 – 11, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 15, 17 March 2005. 
79  See above at 2.2.2. 
80  See Resolution 22 as reprinted in Resolutions from the first meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Salvador, 
Brazil, 2005-03-07 – 11, supra note 78; Diller, supra note 55, at 505 ff.  
81  As stated in supra note 3, ISO has published the documents of the 26000 process online. From the first 
steps to the Final Draft International Standard several hundred documents are published, which are in the 
complemented by numerous minutes of meetings and resolutions etc. In order to be able to understand and structure 
this information in its chronological and logical order, the very detailed description made by Diller, supra note 55 
were relied upon. 
82  See ISO Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) on SR: Update Briefing #9: October 2004, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/standards_csr_briefing_9.pdf (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
83  See Proposal for the Organizational Structure of and Terms of Reference for the ISO/TMB/WG Social 
Responsibility, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 3, 20 January 2005, at 3. The CAG consisted of the two chairs and the two 
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The structure of the WGSR consisted of the so-called Task Groups (TGs) (of which there were 
twelve in total). Those were allocated specific tasks in the standard drafting process and 
therefore comprised experts in their respective fields. Each TG had a Convenor and a Secretary 
which was nominated by the Group’s members. Five TGs were responsible for the translation 
into commonly spoken languages such as Spanish or French.84 TGs 1 and 2 were concerned with 
Funding and Stakeholder Engagement as well as Communication.85 TGs 3-6 were directly 
entrusted with the standard setting process.86  
 
Within TG5, which was responsible for identifying core SR issues, seven SR issues were 
identified: Organisational governance, environment, human rights, labour practices, fair 
operating practices, consumer issues and community involvement/society development.87 Those 
issues were then distributed to four ad hoc core issues groups or drafting teams.88 In order to 
process the outputs of the different groups and teams in an integrated manner, an Integrated 
Drafting Task Force was created.89 At a later stage the Editing Committee was responsible for 
the review and the editing of the draft versions of the 26000 standard.90 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
secretaries, the task group convenors, two representatives (ideally following the twinning principle) nominated by 
each stakeholder group, and possibly additional representatives appointed by the chair to ensure the balance (eg 
regarding regional distribution or gender) of the Group. 
84  For more information on the different task forces and their respective mandates visit the ISO Platform on 
Social Responsibility – Working Area – available at: 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=3935837&objAction=browse&sort=name (last accessed 22 
December 2014). 
85  See Proposal for the Organizational Structure of and Terms of Reference for the ISO/TMB/WG Social 
Responsibility, supra note 83, 4.  
86  Ibid. which states that TGs 3-7 have the tasks of ‘[d]rafting [the] designated clauses according to Design 
specification’ and ‘[r]evise and review drafts based on comments received’. TG3 with the operational procedures, 
TG4 with scope, SR context & SR principles, TG5 with guidance on core SR subjects/issues, and TG6 for guidance 
for organisations on implementing SR. 
87  See Resolutions from the 4th meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Sydney, Australia 
2007-01-29 — 2007-02-02, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 107, 2 February 2007, Resolution 3. 
88  See ibid. Resolution 4. 
89  See Resolutions from the 5th Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Vienna, Austria, 2007-11-05—09, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 132, 11 September 2007, Resolution 2. This institution consisted of the convenors and co-
convenors of Standard Setting TGs, two experts from each stakeholder category (as far as possible following the 
twinning concept), one representative from the Editing Committee, one expert from ILO (in accordance with MoU), 
one expert from UNGC (in accordance with MoU), one representative of the ISO Central Secretariat, and finally two 
Secretaries, appointed by the WG SR Chairs. 
90  See Proposal for the Organizational Structure of and Terms of Reference for the ISO/TMB/WG Social 
Responsibility, supra note 83, at 5. 
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Finally, additional ad hoc groups were established at different stages of the process and at 
different levels of the WG structure depending of the necessity for further input or expertise.91 
 
The Different Stages of the ISO 26000 Standard: After the decision to adopt the New Work 
Item Proposal and the creation of the WGSR, the ISO officially commenced the drafting process 
of the ISO 26000 standard. This process consisted of two major elements. The first are the 
different stages of the ISO 26000 draft consisting of drafting phases followed by several 
comment periods for comments. The second element consisted of a number of meetings where 
more fundamental decisions concerning the directions of the WGSR were taken.92 In total eight 
meetings took place over a period of five years. 
 
At the beginning of the development process was the so-called design phase which led to a 
Proposal for Design Specification,93 the first document which provided a full outline of the 
prospective content of ISO 26000.94 Comments received from stakeholders on the proposal were 
addressed by an ad hoc group established for this purpose.95 Another ad hoc group was then 
entrusted with writing a revised draft. The New Proposal, adopted in September 200596 
contained seven categories (scope, normative references, terms and definitions, SR context in 
which organisations operate, SR principles relevant to organisations, guidance on core SR 
subjects/issues, and guidance on implementation) as well as an annex which provided guidance 
to the drafters.97 
 
This preliminary stage was followed by the drafting stage within the respective task groups. 
From 2006 until 2008, five working drafts were generated (given that the fourth stage was 
                                                          
91  See Resolutions from the Second Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Bangkok, Thailand 2005-09-26--30, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 50, 30 September 2005, Resolution 3 & 4, and see Diller, supra note 55, at 506. 
92  See, e.g. Draft Resolutions from the 7th meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Quebec, Canada, 2009-05-18—22, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 170, 23 May 2007. 
93  Diller, supra note 55, at 505. 
94  ISO Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility – ISO 26000, Proposal for Design Specification, Proposal 
for Design Specification, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 31. 
95  Diller, supra note 55, at 506. 
96  Ibid. See ISO Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility – ISO 26000 – Design Specification, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 49, 30 September 2005. 
97  Ibid. 
 126 
 
divided into two parts,98 each of which was followed by a comment period. The structures of the 
different drafts were very much based on the design proposal but started to change significantly 
towards the later versions. Thus Draft Version 4.2 consisted of the following areas: scope, terms 
and definitions, understanding social responsibility, principles of social responsibility, 
recognising social responsibility and engaging stakeholders, guidance on social responsibility 
core subjects, guidance on implementing practices of social responsibility99 – a development 
since the design proposal is clearly visible here. 
 
After the different working draft versions, ISO 26000 reached the stage of the committee draft.100 
This is the stage where the draft leaves the working group and enters the committee level, where 
it will be circulated together with the comments it received among the ISO members represented 
within the Technical Committee. These members can either vote in favour and thus ensure the 
draft advances to the next stage; or require the creation of a new version to be put to vote again. 
At this level as throughout the whole process consensus was required.101 It should be noted 
however that ‘in case of doubt concerning consensus, approval by a two-thirds majority of the P-
members of the technical committee or subcommittee voting may be deemed to be sufficient for 
the committee draft to be accepted for registration as an enquiry draft’.102 As a result support by 
two-thirds of full ISO members represented in the TC was necessary and could also be 
obtained.103  
 
The final stages which ISO 26000, just like any other ISO standard, went through were the 
enquiry stage (as draft international standard (DIS))104 and the approval stage (as final draft 
                                                          
98  Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO /TMB/WG SR N 55, 28 March 2006; Guidance on Social 
Responsibility – Working Draft 2, ISO TMB /WG SR N 80, 6 October 2006; Guidance on Social Responsibility – 
Working Draft 3, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 113, 23 July 2007; Guidance on Social Responsibility – DRAFT ISO 26000 
WD4.1, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 137, 11 March 2008; Guidance on Social Responsibility - DRAFT ISO 26000 WD4.2, 
ISO/ TMB WG SR N 143, 2 June 2008. 
99  See Guidance on Social Responsibility - DRAFT ISO 26000 WD4.2, supra note 98. 
100  Guidance on Social Responsibility – Committee Draft, ISO/TMB WG SR N 157, 12 December 2008 
101  See para. 2.5.6 ISO/IEC Directives. 
102  Ibid. 
103  See Result ISO/CD 26000, Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 160, 25 March 2009. 
It is important to note, that the decisions made by the Members were to reflect also the opinions of the 
representatives of the six stakeholder groups. 
104  See Guidance on Social Responsibility – Draft International Standard ISO/DIS 26000, ISO/TMB/WG SR 
N 172, September 2009. 
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international standard (FDIS)).105 At the enquiry stage the standard was forwarded by the Central 
Secretariat (the Secretary General) to all national bodies, which were given a period of three 
month to vote on the draft. Members were able and partly obliged to make technical or editorial 
comments. At the approval stage, all members were asked to vote again, but only those voting 
against it were to provide reasons for this. According to Diller, the ISO managed to improve 
support for the standard significantly between the two stages.106 Reasons for a negative vote in 
the first case were manifold and concerned regional and cultural reservations, trade 
considerations, as well as the perception that the standard could go further than it did.107 
Generally, during the transition from the Technical Committee to the enquiry and approval stage 
a certain element of politicisation can be observed; as is also the case where several members 
changed their support in the latter stages.108 However, as stated above, in the end the standard 
achieved the necessary two-thirds majority and was adopted. 
 
3.2.2 The Involvement of Public Organisations in the 26000 Process 
 
Three public international organisations were particularly involved in the ISO 26000 standard 
setting process. Their involvement was framed by Memoranda of Understanding concluded with 
the ISO. Those organisations were the ILO, the UN Global Compact (which represented the 
wider UN System (except the ILO of course)), as well as the OECD. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105  This standard is not made public, as ISO sells its standards and the FDIS is very close to the final product.  
106  See Diller, supra note 55, at 509; the approval rate in the DIS was 56 votes in favour and 18 negative votes 
(see ISO DIS 26000, Result of Voting, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 175, February 2010); for the FDIS it was 66 votes in 
favour and 5 negative votes (see ISO/FDIS 26000 – Result of Voting, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 196, September 2010). 
Importantly, when calculating the percentage of the P-Members in favour, abstentions are not included. They are, 
however when determining the percentage of the votes against the standards. 
107  Diller, supra note 55, at 509 ff. 
108  Interview with Kevin McKinley (ISO), 25 February 2013. Examples of these changes and ‘political’ 
reservations are outlined by Diller, supra note 55, at 509, who also refers to H Ward, ‘The ISO 26000 International 
Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility: Implications for Public Policy and Transnational Democracy’, 12 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2011) 665, at 699 ff.  
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3.2.2.1 ILO 
 
a) General Information on the ILO 
 
The ILO was created in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles. The underlying assumption was 
that peace was dependent on social justice as a necessary foundation.109 In its first year the ILO 
adopted six international labour conventions. During World War II the ILO Constitution was 
extended by the Philadelphia Declaration and the ILO was integrated into the United Nations 
system as a specialised agency. In the second half of the 20th century the ILO was transformed 
by the increase in membership of developing countries, which today outnumber developed 
countries. The ILO was also, however, troubled by a Cold War blockade. Nonetheless, over time 
the ILO has created a system of more than 160 labour standards which are ‘aimed at promoting 
opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of 
freedom, equity, security and dignity’.110 More recently it has focussed on the promotion of a fair 
globalisation as well as on helping to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals.111 
 
As an international organisation the ILO is of course first and foremost comprised of states. At 
the moment the ILO has 183 member states, making it one of the most encompassing 
international organisations. However, specifically the ILO follows a tri-partite structure. This 
means that it includes employer and worker representatives as well as government delegates. 
Workers are represented through ‘free trade unions’, which are defined as ‘democratic, self-
organizing institutions of working people wishing to advance their rights as workers and 
citizens’. Employers are grouped into employers’ organisations, which are ‘institutions set up to 
organize and advance the collective interests of employers’.112 The ILO consists of three main 
bodies: the General Conference, the Governing Body, and the International Labour Office 
                                                          
109  See Preamble to the ILO Constitution, 1 April 1919, available at: 
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO (last accessed 22 
December 2014). 
110  See ILO, ‘Introduction to International Labour Standards’, available at: 
 http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/lang--en/index.htm (last 
accessed 22 December 2014). 
111  See ILO, ‘Origin and History’, available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--
en/index.htm (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
112  Information and quotes taken from ILO, ‘Tripartite Constituencies’, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/tripartite-constituents/lang--en/index.htm (last accessed 22 
December 2014). 
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(which is controlled by the Governing Body)113 – which all follow the tri-partite structure as 
outlined above.  
 
The main task of the ILO is the promotion and realisation of international labour standards.114 
Apart from this the ILO is also engaged in the ‘formulation of international policies and 
programmes to promote basic human rights, improve working and living conditions, and enhance 
employment opportunities’. It is furthermore engaged in technical cooperation, research and 
information distribution.115 It is in this context that it also cooperates with organisations such as 
the ISO. 
 
As the standard setting processes constitute the core domain of the ILO it should be given a 
closer look at this point: labour standards are either conventions or recommendations. 
Conventions are legally binding international treaties whereas recommendations (as the name 
indicates) constitute non-binding guidelines. They often (but not exclusively) supplement 
conventions, to which they provide details regarding implementation.116  
 
Labour standards are complemented by another instrument, namely declarations: ‘[d]eclarations 
are resolutions of the International Labour Conference [and the Governing Body] used to make a 
formal and authoritative statement and reaffirm the importance which the constituents attach to 
certain principles and values.’117 There are older declarations such as the Philadelphia 
Declaration mentioned above, however, a number of important declarations are more recent. 
They in particular try to address the challenges the ILO is facing in a globalised context. The 
ILO is also affected by the changing role of the state and the increase in trade and private 
economic power. There has been a debate on whether labour standards could and should be 
                                                          
113  See Article 2 of the ILO Constitution. 
114  See ILO, ‘Mission and Objectives’, available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-
objectives/lang--en/index.htm (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
115  H Sauer, ‘International Labour Organization’, in: Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 
(OUP, 2010), available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil (last accessed 22 December 2014) para 32. 
116  ILO, ‘Conventions and Recommendations’ available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-
to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last accessed 22 December 
2014). Both instruments can be found on the ILO Website: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12000:0::NO::: (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
117  See ILO, ‘ILO Declarations’, available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/declarations.htm 
(last accessed 22 December 2014) 
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integrated with trade regulation in order to use more effective sanctioning systems such as those 
in place under the umbrella of the WTO. Even though the EU and other countries have 
implemented labour conventions or social standards in their trade relationships,118 the general 
approach was rejected.  
 
Against this background the ILO adopted several declarations itself which deal with the 
challenges outlined above. One is the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(1988) where it declares eight ILO conventions as fundamental as they reflect core principles and 
rights at work. Four conventions are of specific relevance with regard to the functioning and the 
application of labour standards. Those are the ‘Governance Conventions’ and member states are 
encouraged to ratify them in order to support the general functioning of the labour standard 
system.119 Other declarations more directly address the impacts of global transformations such as 
the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, or the Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977, last revised 2006). 
There is particular overlap between the content of the declarations just listed (and the 
conventions they refer to) and the ISO 26000 standard. 
 
b) The ILO’s Participation in the ISO 26000 Process  
 
Given these overlaps, and particularly its traditional status as ‘the’ international organisation 
dealing with labour law and politics, the ILO was of course suited for involvement in the 26000 
process. And indeed its engagement started at a very early stage. The Advisory Group on Social 
Responsibility, which was established by the Technical Management Board to determine 
whether and in what framework the ISO should engage in the field of social responsibility, 
stressed the importance of the ILO and labour standards for the process.120 This was in particular 
reflected in the condition that the ISO should only proceed with the standard setting process if it 
                                                          
118  See Sauer, supra note 115, at para 31. 
119  ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, Adopted by the 
International Labour Conference at its Eighty-sixth Session, 18 June 1998 (Annex revised 15 June 2010) at para 
2.Those core principles are: ‘Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and 
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation’. And see furthermore, Sauer, supra note 
115, at para 32. 
120  See above at section 3.2.1.  
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‘recognizes through a formal communication the ILO's unique mandate as the organization that 
defines, on a tripartite basis, international norms with respect to a broad range of social 
issues’.121 Upon this recommendation the TMB adopted Resolution 35/2004 where it confirmed 
that it ‘recognizes the instruments adopted by global inter-governmental organizations (such as 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international labour conventions and 
other instruments adopted by ILO and relevant UN conventions)’122 and further states in the New 
Work Item Proposal that: 
 
it is necessary to consider the activities of other bodies that have developed or are developing SR 
standards, norms, guidelines and tools. United Nations (Global Compact) and other inter-
governmental organizations, eg ILO, OECD, UNHCR and UNEP, would need to be included in 
the process, in view of the fact that they already have or are developing international standards.123 
 
On 4th March 2005 the ISO concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the ILO.124 The 
WGSR which had its first meeting only after the conclusion of the MoU promptly adopted 
Resolution 29 wherein it was stipulated that: 
  
The WG recognized the special status of ILO as reflected in the MoU signed between ILO and 
ISO on 4 March 2005 …; specifically, the leadership of the WG as well as of any of its subgroups 
will consult ILO when starting their work and regularly thereafter (at the different drafting and 
circulation stages) to identify early on any ILO issues that may come up and thus ensure the 
effective and timely implementation of article 1.2, 2.1 through 2.4, 6.1 and 6.2 of the MoU.125 
 
                                                          
121  Recommendations to the ISO Technical Management Board, ISO/TMB AG CSR N32, April 2004, at 1. 
See furthermore the Working Report on Social Responsibility, Prepared by the ISO Advisory Group on Social 
Responsibility, 30 April, 2004, available at: http://iso26000.jsa.or.jp/_files/doc/2004/sagreport_eng.pdf (last 
accessed 22 December 2014) which outlines the overlaps between the ILO Framework and a possible standard on 
social responsibility in more detail. 
122  ISO/TMB Resolution 35/2004, which is reprinted in part in: New Work Item Proposal Guidance on Social 
Responsibility, ISO/TMB N 26000, 1 October, 2004. 
123  New Work Item Proposal Guidance on Social Responsibility, supra note 122. 
124  See Memorandum of Understanding between the International Labour Organization and the International 
Organization for Standardization in the Field of Social Responsibility, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 18, 4 March 2005 
(hereinafter: MoU ILO/ISO). 
125  Resolution 29, reprinted in Resolutions from the First Meeting of ISO/TMB/WG SR, Salvador Brazil 2005-
03-07 – 11, supra note 78, at 7, quote taken from Diller, supra note 55, at 500. 
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The MoU mentioned in the Resolution has a number of highly remarkable provisions which 
frame ILO’s role in the ISO 26000 process. First, the MoU sets out the relationship between both 
ILO standards and the ISO 26000 Guidelines. It opts for a certain hierarchy whereby in situations 
where labour issues are concerned ILO standards will prevail. This is determined by two 
provisions in particular: 
 
That any guidance or other ISO International Standard to be developed in the area of social 
responsibility, which implicates ILO issues will be fully consistent with the object and purpose of 
the provisions of international labour standards incorporated in ILO instruments, and their 
interpretation by the competent bodies of the ILO and in no way detract from the provision of 
those standards, …126 
 
and: 
 
That international labour standards adopted by the ILO will take priority in any case of conflict in 
the context of development, and of any promotion, support, evaluation and approval, or periodic 
review of any ISO International Standard in the field of SR, as well as in any case of conflict 
involving ILO issues with any private initiative with which ISO may collaborate in the context of 
this Standard;127 
 
Moreover, in the process of standard creation ‘the provisions of ILO instruments [will] serve as 
the authoritative and definitive source of reference, and minimum base line for any elements 
which relate to international labour standards’.128 Furthermore, it is provided that the ISO’s 
activities should not interfere in labour issues ‘that should only be resolved through 
representative political or legal processes’.129 
 
Secondly, the MoU regulates the ILO’s participation in the standard setting process. Regarding 
the working and task group level, before any proposed text is circulated for review within one of 
these groups, the ILO can decide in consultation with the ISO whether ILO issues are concerned 
                                                          
126  Article 2.1 MoU ILO/ISO. 
127  Article 2.3 MoU ILO/ISO. 
128  Article 6.1 MoU ILO/ISO. 
129  Article 2.4 MoU ILO/ISO such processes would be identified through consultation between the parties. 
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(and if this is the case review the proposed text and possibly comment on it). If comments are 
provided those have to be circulated with the text for review by the relevant group.130 A similar 
process is foreseen in the later stages of the standard setting process. According to the MoU: 
 
[a]ny committee or enquiry draft or final draft International Standard (CD, DIS, FDIS) will be 
subject of a pre-circulation process seeking full and formal backing of the ILO relating to any of 
the elements in such draft standard that implicate ILO issues prior to circulation for vote and/or 
comment of any such draft Standard…131 
 
and further: 
 
In the event ILO does not provide the backing … ILO’s comments on such draft Standard will be 
circulated, together with the draft Standard (CD, DIS, FDIS), to all statutory ISO members, to the 
D-liaison organizations in the SR Working Group and to the Technical Management Board prior 
to submission to a vote by any ISO body132 
 
Thirdly, the MoU specifies ILO’s involvement in the standard setting process. Article 5 of the 
MoU establishes the general right of participation for the ILO in the ISO 26000 process by 
stating that: 
 
… ISO will provide, within the Working Group on SR including all of its subgroups, and all other 
ISO bodies concerned with any ISO International Standard in the field of SR, for full 
participation by the ILO and, through the appropriate ISO mechanisms, by its tri-partite 
constituency, at ILO’s request.133 
 
The concrete arrangements of this participation are clarified throughout the MoU. As outlined 
above, Article 2 sets the out the comment procedure, by which the ILO can intervene in different 
stages of the standard setting process in labour matters. Furthermore, Article 6.2 foresees that the 
                                                          
130  Article 2.1.1 MoU ILO/ISO. 
131  Article 2.1.2 MoU ILO/ISO. 
132  Article 2.1.3 MoU ILO/ISO. 
133  Article 5 MoU ILO/ISO. 
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ILO will share its expertise regarding its own labour instruments and there will be regular 
consultations (Article 4) and exchange of information (Article 3) in relation to the MoU. 
 
Finally, the MoU does not only look at the contribution of the ILO to the ISO, but it also 
provides stipulations that are concerned with the ISO’s role in supporting labour standards. 
Article 2.2.1 therefore states that the ‘ISO activities and/or publications… will [f]acilitate greater 
awareness and wider observance of international labour standards …’134 However, perhaps even 
more interesting is Article 2.2.2 which states that the same activities or publications should 
‘complement the role of governments in ensuring compliance with international labour 
standards’. In this case clearly one of the motivations pursued by the ILO in the process shines 
through, namely the increase in the effectiveness of the ISO’s own instruments with the help of 
the private actor. We will return to further examine the ILO’s motivations for engaging in the 
process below. But first it is necessary to ask how these provisions were applied in the actual 
processes of ISO 26000. 
 
Of particular interest in this regard is the commenting practice, specifically whether the ILO had 
an almost veto-like power regarding labour issues that the MoU suggested. The first comments 
the ILO submitted shortly after having signed the MoU concerned preliminary work such as a 
first draft of the Interim Task Group 5 on core context issues.135 Of particular relevance here, 
however, are the comments on draft versions of ISO 26000 and their subsequent implementation. 
From the second working draft, the ILO regularly submitted comments. At the beginning those 
were circulated separately from the other stakeholder’s feedback. From the Committee Draft 
Stage onwards they were compiled with the other comments.136 Implementation was difficult to 
follow during the first stages as the specific draft versions changed significantly due to the 
extensive work within the task groups. Therefore the comments that the ILO provided at that 
stage are better understood as suggestions for the next drafting period. In particular the ILO was 
                                                          
134  Article 2.2.1 has to be read in combination with Article 2.2 MoU ILO/ISO. 
135  Draft ITG 5 SR Core Context Issues Paper, Version3, ISO/TMB/WG SR N 21, 30 June 2005.  
136  For the comments provided by ILO to the different draft versions see under ‘projects’ in the archive of the 
ISO 26000 process, available at: 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=3974907&objAction=browse&viewType=1 (last accessed 22 
December 2014). 
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involved in several task groups, such as TG 1,137 the Integrated Drafting Task Force;138 as well as 
TG 4139 and TG5140 which were predominantly charged with the drafting process. Towards the 
later stages, changes became more specific and thus the WGSR Secretariat clearly stated whether 
it would implement a comment or not.141 Even though this was not always the case, the ILO 
finally backed the FDIS stating that it does not appear to conflict with international labour 
standards whilst stressing the need for further post-publication cooperation.142  
 
3.2.2.2 The Global Compact and the Wider UN System 
 
a) The Global Compact and the Ruggie Process 
 
The Global Compact: The Global Compact (GC) with its ten universally accepted principles in 
the area of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption, targets, as the 26000 standard 
does, global business activities.143 The GC was therefore included in the ISO 26000 process from 
an early phase. Moreover, apart from representing its own regime the GC was also entrusted with 
addressing concerns of other UN agencies.144  
 
The Global Compact was launched by Kofi Annan in an address to the business community at 
the World Economic Forum in 1999.145 It is designed as a ‘strategic policy initiative’ for 
business, and has been endorsed by business leaders who agreed to submit their practices under 
the Global Compacts so called ‘ten universally accepted principles’. The GC today is the largest 
voluntary corporate citizenship and sustainability initiative in the world with over 10,000 
                                                          
137  ISO/TBM Working Group on Social Responsibility – Task Group I, Funding and Stakeholder Engagement, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR/TG1 N 02, 12 December 2005. 
138  Minutes, Constitution of Integrated Drafting Task Force, IDTF, Annex A, ISO/TMB/WG SR, 15 
November 2007. 
139  List of Experts and Observers, ISO/TMB WG SR TG 4, 14 March 2006. 
140  Composition of ISO/TMB/WG SR TG 5 on 23rd May 2006, 23 May 2006. 
141  See Comments Received on ISO/CD 26000 (WG SR N 157), ISO/TMB/WG SR N 161, 25 March 2009. 
142  Comments of the International Labour Office for Circulation with ISO/FDIS 26000:2010(E), 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 194.  
143  UN Global Compact, ‘Overview of the UN Global Compact’, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
144  Article 2.2of the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Global Compact Office and 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO/TMB/WG SR N 82, 9 November 2006 (hereinafter: 
MoU GC/ISO).  
145  See R Khan, ‘Global Compact’ in: Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2011), 
available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
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participants from 135 countries. Its two main complementary objectives are to ‘[m]ainstream the 
ten principles in business activities around the world’ and to ‘catalyze actions in support of 
broader UN goals, including the Millennium Development Goals’.146  
 
The GC operates as a network in which different participant and stakeholder groups cooperate. 
At the core of the initiative one finds the Global Compact Office and seven UN agencies. Other 
groups are business and labour associations, NGOs, public sector and city representative as well 
as academic participants. 147 
 
The GC has a distinct governance structure compared to the other international organisations 
presented here. It constitutes a policy initiative in a network-structure that is embedded within 
the UN system.148 Therefore its governance structure is intended to be ‘light, non-bureaucratic 
and designed to foster greater involvement in, and ownership of, the initiative by participants and 
other stakeholders themselves’.149 It does not consist of the typical bodies that can be found in 
other regulatory organisations. However, certain components are in place to guarantee the 
functioning on the GC network. In total the GC is comprised of seven governance entities, each 
pursuing a different role in the GC framework.150  
 
The main requirement under the Global Compact addresses business participants. They have to 
adhere to and promote human rights, fair labour practices as well as environmental protection, 
enshrined in the ten principles.151 For that purpose they are to draft an annual Communication on 
Progress (CoP). This Communication is directed at the stakeholders of the respective company 
and outlines the progress the company made regarding the GC Ten Principles and the UN 
Development Goal. The aim of this disclosure is to create transparency that provides 
                                                          
146  UN Global Compact ‘Overview of the UN Global Compact’, supra note 143. 
147  Ibid, The seven UN Agencies are: The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the 
ILO, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN 
Women). 
148  Ibid. 
149  Ibid. 
150  These are the Board, the Global Compact Leader Summit, Local Networks, the Global Compact Office, an 
Inter-agency team including the UN organisations and finally the Donor Group. 
151  See Khan, supra note 145. 
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stakeholders with the information they need to ‘make informed choices about the companies they 
interact with, whether as consumers, investors, or employees’.152 Therefore, one requirement for 
business participants is that the Communication is published on the GC’s website.153 Generally 
there is no required template which participants have to follow when drafting the 
communication.154 That said, there are certain minimum requirements regarding the content of 
the publication. First, each CoP must contain a statement by the CEO which expresses 
‘continued support for the Global Compact and renewing the participant's ongoing commitment 
to the initiative and its principles’.155 Furthermore, the company has to describe within the 
Communication which activities it has undertaken to implement the ten principles in each of the 
issue areas – human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. Finally, the outcomes of 
those activities are to be measured, including, for example, the degree to which the targets 
previously set were met.156 
 
The GC has also faced criticism. The most notable criticism is probably the question regarding 
the actual impact of the ten principles and the reporting scheme. Some NGOs have accused the 
GC of facilitating green- and blue-washing.157  
 
The Ruggie Process: The so-called Ruggie Process is not directly linked to the UN Global 
Compact.158 It was in fact initiated by the UN Human Rights Council who requested the 
Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.159 Professor John Ruggie, who was 
                                                          
152  See UN Global Compact, ‘How are COPs Used?’ available at: 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/analyzing_progress/index.html (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
153  The annual CoPs can be found here: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants/search (last accessed 22 
December 2014). 
154  There is, however, a pattern available as well as guidelines for the different levels of reporting. The pattern 
can be found here: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/communicating_progress/basic_cop_template.html (last 
accessed 22 December 2014); the Guide and other reporting tools are available under the following link: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/communicating_progress/reporting_tools.html (last accessed 22 December 
2014). 
155  See UN Global Compact, ‘Policy on Communicating Progress’, Version of 25 February 2011, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication_on_progress/COP_Policy_Feb11.pdf. (last accessed 22 
December 2014) [emphasis omitted]. 
156  Ibid.  
157  See Khan, supra note 145, at para 20 ff.  
158  Ward, supra note 108, at 695 ff. 
159  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, 20 April 2005. 
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given this task initially three years, proposed the ‘protect, respect and remedy framework’.160 
According to this framework, the state has a duty to protect human rights whereas business has a 
responsibility to respect them. Finally, victims of violations should have greater access to an 
effective remedy.161 Subsequently the Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the 
Special Representative for another three years until 2011.162 Within this second term Professor 
Ruggie and his team developed the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’.163 
Following an online consultation held by the Special Representative and a number of comments 
submitted by different actors,164 the Principles were endorsed by the Human Rights Council.165 
 
Despite this independence there is a connection between the two initiatives.166 For this reason 
UNGC and the Special Representative published an explanatory note which outlines their 
relationship.167 Therein it is specifically stressed that the: 
 
UN Protect, Respect and Remedy framework provides further operational clarity for the two 
human rights principles championed by the Global Compact. Principle 1 calls upon companies to 
                                                          
160  See Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008. 
161  See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework’, 
available at: http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy-Framework 
(last accessed 22 December 2014). 
162  Human Rights Council, ‘Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/RES/8/7, 18 June 2008. 
163  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 
2011. 
164  See Special Representative of the United Nations, Secretary-General for Business & Human Rights, Public 
Consultation on Draft U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights Attracts Input from 120 countries - 
Submissions from Wide Range of Stakeholders to Inform Final Recommendations, 2 February 2011, available at: 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/public-consultation-on-guiding-principles-press-
release-2-feb-2011.pdf (last accessed 22 December 2014); and Business and Human Rights Resource Center, UN 
"Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework > Guiding Principles > Submissions to Consultation on Draft Guiding 
Principles, available at: http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy-
Framework/GuidingPrinciples/Submissions (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
165  Human Rights Council, Seventeenth Session, Agenda Item 3, Promotion and Protection of All Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, 
A/HRC/RES/17/4, 6 July 2011. 
166  Ibid. 
167  See UNGC and UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, ‘The UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Relationship to UN Global Compact Commitments’, July 2011 (updated June 2014) 
available at: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Resources/GPs_GC%20note.pdf (last 
accessed 22 December 2014). 
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respect and support the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and Principle 2 
calls upon them to ensure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.168 
 
Based on this the clarification of the effect that the ‘protect, respect and remedy framework’ has 
on the UNGC, a number of additional (more specific) effects were detected. First, the principle 
of ‘due diligence’ should be used by companies in order to fulfil their obligations to respect 
human rights. In particular, the principle is said to help companies to ‘become aware of, prevent 
and address adverse human rights impacts linked to their activities’.169 Another important 
concept that both the GC and the Ruggie Process expanded on is the ‘sphere of influence’. This 
concept is designed to be particularly useful with regard to the voluntary support of human rights 
by companies. Here the concept of ‘sphere of influence’ can ‘help map the scope of a company’s 
opportunities to support human rights and make the greatest positive impact’.170 Accordingly, 
companies have most opportunities to support human rights among their own workers, for 
example. Yet the more they move outwards, to workers in the supply chain or to communities, 
the smaller the ability to support human rights becomes.171  
 
In sum, the GC cannot be seen as entirely independent from the ‘protect, respect and remedy 
framework’. There have been inter-linkages from the beginning and both initiatives have 
benefited from each other. 
 
b) Involvement of the Global Compact and the Special Representative in the ISO 26000 Process 
 
Global Compact’s Involvement: As in the case of the ILO, cooperation was fixed through a 
MoU, signed at an early stage of the standard setting process.172 Even though similar at the 
outset, there were some important differences between both agreements. The GC-ISO MoU 
stipulates that ISO 26000 ‘needs to be consistent with the United Nations Global Compact and 
                                                          
168  See ibid. 
169  See UNGC, ‘UN Framework and the Global Compact’, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/human_rights/The_UN_SRSG_and_the_UN_Global_Compact.html (last 
accessed 22 December 2014). 
170  Ibid. 
171  Ibid. 
172  MoU GC/ISO. 
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its ten universal principles’.173 It furthermore foresees participation of the GC in the working 
group (and subgroups) responsible for ISO 26000.174 The GC is also granted the right to submit 
comments to the different draft versions which will be circulated to the respective participants in 
the process at the same time as the draft version.175 Finally, the ISO also ‘[sought] the full and 
formal backing’ of the GC for the FDIS,176 and in case this was not provided GC’s comments 
were to be circulated to all relevant actors, in particular ISO members.177 Peculiar, however, is 
the wording in the case of the GC/ISO MoU which does not have the same strong language. This 
might be due to the ‘principle character’ of the GC’s instrument, which makes it less easy 
adequate to be considered an ‘authoritative and definitive source of reference’. Furthermore, in 
the GC/ISO MoU there are no provisions which emphasise a particular role of the ISO in the 
support of the GC’s agenda. Thus the status of the GC was closer to that of a D-Liaison 
organisation (the regular status under which third party organisations can participate in ISO 
Working Groups) than that of the ILO.178 Nonetheless, the GC was as actively involved as the 
ILO. It regularly commented on draft versions (even though its comments were always compiled 
with the feedback of other organisations).179 Furthermore, it participated in different task groups 
such as TG4,180 TG 5181 and the Integrated Drafting Task Force.182 
 
The Ruggie Process: The Special Representative role in the ISO 26000 process was of particular 
importance and should therefore be addressed separately here. As stated above, the UNGC 
became the umbrella organisation for all UN Organisations originally participating in the 
process, apart from the ILO.183 However, at a certain point in the process the SRSG felt the need 
to intervene in the standard setting process, as a development was detected that could have led to 
                                                          
173  Article 2.1 and Article 1.1 MoU GC/ISO. 
174  Article 4.1 MoU GC/ISO. 
175  Article 2.3 MoU GC/ISO. 
176  Article 2.4 MoU GC/ISO. 
177  Article 2.5 MoU GC/ISO. 
178  See para 1.17.3.1 ISO/IEC Directives. 
179  Diller, supra note, 55, at 501. 
180  List of Experts and Observers, supra note 139. 
181  Composition of ISO/TMB/WG SR TG 5 on 23rd May 2006, supra note 140. 
182  See Minutes, Constitution of Integrated Drafting Task Force, IDTF, Annex A, ISO/TMB/WG SR, 15 
November 2007. 
183  Ward, supra note 108, at 691. 
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a conflict with his own framework.184 His main concern was the ISO’s definition of the concept 
of the ‘sphere of influence’, not only in relation to the part dealing with human rights (which is 
also the concern of the Ruggie Process) but generally throughout ISO 26000. His criticism thus 
was that: 
 
The draft Guidance is internally inconsistent on this issue, and beyond the human rights section it 
is inconsistent with the UN framework. This will send mixed and confusing messages to 
companies seeking to understand their social responsibilities, and to stakeholders seeking to hold 
them to account.185 
 
The SRSG subsequently referred to a report he drafted for the HRC on the matter of the sphere 
of influence186 in which he criticises the concept as ambiguous and imprecise.187 A particular 
problem arises because it is not clear whether influence should be understood as ‘impact’, 
meaning that the companies ‘activities or relationships’ cause human rights violations, or as 
‘leverage’, which a company can exercise over other actors to prevent human rights abuses.188 
Moreover, Ruggie points out that when applying the second reading companies’ influence over a 
certain actor could much too easily be read as an obligation to exercise it – in other words, ‘can 
implies ought’.189 However, this would be particularly undesirable where the actor concerned is a 
government, as this could lead to strategic manipulations. To elaborate, governments could 
deliberately not fulfil their obligations on the basis of speculation that a big multinational 
enterprise operating in their territory might feel pressured to take this responsibility over.190 
Based on these considerations Professor Ruggie ‘urged’ the WGSR to ‘review all references to 
                                                          
184  See Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights Prof. John G. Ruggie, 
Note on ISO 26,000 Guidance Draft Document, available at: 
http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/bhr/files/Ruggie-note-re-ISO-26000-Nov-2009.PDF (last 
accessed 22 December 2014). 
185  Ibid. at 2. 
186  HRC, Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity”, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/16, 15 May 2008. 
187  Ibid. para 10. 
188  Ibid. para. 12. 
189  Note on ISO 26000, supra note 184, at 2. 
190  Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity”, supra note 186, para.14. 
 142 
 
sphere of influence in the document to ensure that they are consistent with the UN framework 
not only in the human rights section but throughout’.191 
 
The ISO took this criticism very seriously which was mainly a result of the authority Professor 
Ruggie possessed in his position as a Special Representative.192 The Integrated Drafting Task 
Force proposed to better clarify the concept of ‘sphere of influence’ within the 26000 framework 
in order to avoid conflict with the UN Framework.193 Despite these efforts the final document 
has been said to still contain a number of provisions which refer to responsibility to make use of 
leverage.194 The concrete understanding of such passages depends of course on interpretation and 
as such can also be understood as being more in line with the UN Framework. Nevertheless, they 
can also be seen as a ‘rebuke to the view that social responsibility can only arise from 
contribution to negative impacts’.195 
 
3.2.2.3 OECD 
 
a) The OECD and the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises  
 
The OECD was founded in 1960 through the Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, as a reconstitution of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation.196 The goal pursued by the founding parties was to create an organisation that was 
to promote policies to achieve ‘highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a 
rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to 
contribute to the development of the world economy’, as well as to contribute to economic 
expansion and the expansion of world trade.197 Today the OECD has 34 member states, 
                                                          
191  Note on ISO 26000, supra note 184at 3. 
192  Ward, supra note 108, at 696. 
193  Copenhagen Discussion Document, Copenhagen Key Topics (CKTs), ISO/TMB/WG SR N 186, 4 May 
2010, at 11 ff.  
194  For an extensive analysis of ISO 26000 in this respect see S Wood, ‘The Meaning of the ‘Sphere of 
Influence’ in ISO 26000’, in: A Henriques (ed), Understanding ISO 26000. A Practical Approach to Social 
Responsibility (BSI 2011) 127 ff.  
195  Ibid., at 130. 
196  The OECD founded in 1948 was set up for the administration of the aid under the Marshall Plan, see 
OECD, ‘History’, available at: http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
197  See Article 1 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 888 UNTS 
180, 14 December 1960. 
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predominantly developed countries, as well as several emerging economies such as Mexico or 
Turkey, and performs numerous activities ranging in areas as wide ranging as agriculture, 
education, anti-bribery, tax and corporate governance amongst others.198  
 
Central to the governance activities of the OECD are committees and the assistance they receive 
from the Secretariat. The latter sets the agenda of the committees in accordance with priorities 
given by the Council and member state input.199 The agenda is usually based on data collected 
and analysis of a particular issue or field; often accompanied by a number of proposals that could 
later result in reports, proposal or documents. All such documents, which have been elaborated 
in one of the substantive committees, must be submitted to one of the standing committees for 
prior evaluation before being transmitted to the Council.200 The Council then has the power to 
adopt them as an OECD Act, which is either a decision or a recommendation.201 Decisions in the 
OECD context are legally binding on OECD Members (unless they abstained at their adoption), 
but do not constitute treaties under international law. The member states of the OECD are 
obliged to implement them.202 Recommendations are not binding but members may implement 
them.203 However, the OECD stresses that ‘practice accords them great moral force as 
representing the political will of Member countries and there is an expectation that Member 
countries will do their utmost to fully implement a Recommendation’.204 Apart from the OECD 
Acts other legal instruments were developed in recent years, including declarations,205 
arrangements and understandings,206 and agreements207. 
                                                          
198  For more detailed information visit the OECD Website at: www.oecd.org (last accessed 22 December 
2014). 
199  See Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Organization, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/legal/Rules%20of%20Procedure%20OECD%20Oct%202013.pdf (last accessed 22 December 
2014) (hereinafter: OECD Rules of Procedure). 
200  See Rule 25 of the OECD Rules of Procedure. The Standing Committees may make comments and suggest 
amendments or even refer the document back to the substantive committee. 
201  See Rule 18 of the OECD Rules of Procedure. 
202  See Article 5 OECD Convention, supra note 197, and OECD, ‘Legal Instruments’ available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/legal/legal-instruments.htm (last accessed 22 December 2014) for more detailed information. 
203  See Rule 18 b of the OECD Rules of Procedure. 
204  See OECD ‘Legal Instruments’, supra note 202. 
205  Declarations are informal non-legally binding texts that constitute policy commitments that member states 
subscribe to. They are noted by the Council and the OECD body in charge usually monitors their application. Cf 
ibid. 
206  Arrangements and Understandings are negotiated and adopted within the OECD framework by certain 
member states. They are not legally binding but they are noted by the Council and implementation is monitored. Cf 
ibid. 
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The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are the OECD’s own social responsibility 
instrument. In fact the Guidelines are an annex to the 1976 OECD Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises,208 and have been amended on five occasions since 
they were adopted.209 The Guidelines constitute ‘recommendations addressed by governments to 
multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries’210 which are accompanied by 
an implementation mechanism (the national contact points), offering mediation and conciliation 
services in case an enterprise is accused of having committed violations. Given their almost four 
decade long tradition the Guidelines have been influential on other more recent responsibility 
movements, as well as having been influenced by other instruments and organisations (such as 
ILO instruments, or the ‘Guiding Principles’).211 
 
b) The OECD’s Participation in the 26000 Process 
 
The MoU between the OECD and the ISO was only concluded in 2008, shortly before the 
Committee Draft was launched, thus at a later phase of the standard setting process.212 
Nonetheless, there had already been some involvement at an earlier stage.213 The MoU signed 
between the two organisations mirrors to a large extent the GC/ISO MoU. One small divergence 
is the stipulation, similar to that in the ILO/ISO MoU that the ISO is to ‘facilitate greater 
awareness and wider observance of the OECD Guidelines’.214 Article 4.2 furthermore provided 
an opportunity for the ISO to participate in OECD bodies concerned with the development of the 
MNE Guidelines. Even though the ISO in the end was not engaged in this process to a significant 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
207  Agreements are also negotiated and concluded in the framework of the OECD, they are however legally 
binding on the parties to it. Cf ibid. 
208  See OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises – Responsible Business Conduct Matters’, 
available at: http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/MNEguidelines_RBCmatters.pdf (last accessed 22 December 2014) at 2. 
209  See also OECD, ‘About the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, available at: 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/about/ (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
210  The OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic 
Texts, Annex I The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Version of May 2011) Preface, para 1. 
211  See OECD, ‘Responsible Business Conduct Matters’, supra note 208, at 4 and 5; Ruggie Report, supra 
note 163. 
212  Memorandum of Understanding between the OECD and ISO in the Area of Social Responsibility, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 144, 19 June 2008 (hereinafter: MoU OECD/ISO). 
213  Eg the OECD had already been part of TG 4 in 2006 see ISO/TMB WG SR TG 4: List of Experts and 
Observers, 14 March 2006. 
214  Article 2.7 MoU OECD/ISO.  
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extent,215 the ISO process was said to have inspired some of the changes made to the Guidelines, 
to the degree that even hard-referencing was considered (although it did not materialise in the 
end).216 The OECD commented on the second Working Draft,217 and then provided comments on 
the Working Draft 3 and 4 as well as to the Draft International Standard. There appeared to have 
been no backing for the FDIS.218 Furthermore, the OECD was involved in WG 4 and 5 but not in 
the Integrated Drafting Task Force.219 
 
3.3 An Analysis of the Commutative Aspects of the Cooperation  
 
3.3.1 A Tendency towards Origin-Based, Traditional Legitimacy 
 
The second Chapter looked at different types of legitimacy and the way in which they can be 
managed by different organisations. In the present example the ISO pursued a strategy based on 
high levels of participation. It created a framework which would include as many stakeholders as 
possible, who would at least at first glance meet on equal footing. State representatives deliberate 
with labour delegates or with NGOs and business experts. The final standard is then the 
consensus reached in these deliberations.  
 
However, there is a general tension between public state-based policy and multi-stakeholder 
negotiations such as the 26000 process, which will be dealt with in more detail below.220 What is 
necessary to keep in mind here is that the ISO generally placed considerable importance on 
ensuring that publically created instruments, linked at least to some degree to democratic 
legitimation were not interfered with and that public, state based organisations with relevant 
                                                          
215  Interview with Marie-France Houde (OECD), 7 February 2013 and see furthermore, OECD, Responsible 
Business Conduct Matters, supra note 208, at 4 and 5 
216  Interview with Kevin McKinley (ISO), 25 February 2013. 
217  Comments received on ISO/WD 26000.2, Guidance on Social Responsibility, Document WG SR N 80, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 83, 18 December 2006. 
218  Available under ‘projects’ in the archive of the ISO 26000 process, supra note 136. Comments on later 
stage versions can be found at: 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=8742970&objAction=browse&viewType=1 (last accessed 22 
December 2014). 
219  See List of Experts and Observers, supra note 139, and Composition of ISO/TMB/WG SR TG 5 on 23rd 
May 2006, supra note 140. 
220  See Diller, supra note 55, at 529; and Watt, supra note 108, at 707 
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regulation in the area were properly represented.221 The previous chapter called this the turn 
towards traditional legitimacy. Though generally following a non-state based, expert driven 
regulatory model, the ISO requires and seeks public endorsement and legitimation. This can also 
be observed in other, particularly competitive, issue areas. For instance in a 2010 document the 
ISO distinguishes between ‘private standards’ as issued by sectorial bodies and associations 
(such as GlobalGAP in the area of food safety) and ‘international standards’ (ISO or IEC 
standards). The distinction is made based on the link to WTO procedures and designation. The 
ISO states that: 
 
However, not all standards are created equal. WTO disciplines for the use of standards as he basis 
for regulatory measures demand that “international standards” be developed by designated 
organizations in the case of the SPS Agreement or according to principles for international 
standards development – in the case of the TBT Agreement. Formal international standards, such 
as those from ISO and IEC, follow such principles and are conventionally not considered “private 
standards”.222 
 
Thus, the link to a public entity and publicly prescribed procedures according to the ISO lifts its 
standards to a different level, presumably one of higher legitimation.  
 
Cooperation with the public organisations has to be understood in this context. It exceeds pure 
representativeness and thereby creates a link to more traditional forms of legitimacy. As was 
demonstrated above, the three international organisations had special agreements framing their 
participation in the process. Even more ‘special’ in this troika was the ILO-ISO MoU whereby 
the ILO was granted extensive participation rights. Even though in the interviews the 
representatives of both organisations did not provide explicit reasons for this, the representative 
of the OECD thought that it was due to the ILO’s special position as an organisation representing 
interests of states, as well as the other two stakeholder groups – labour and industry. 
Furthermore, this was also the case as a result of the fact that it was able to bring (partially) 
proper international law provisions (as opposed to soft law) to the table.223 Origin based 
                                                          
221  See above at section 3.2.2. 
222  ISO, International Standards and “Private Standards”, February 2010/1500, available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/private_standards.pdf (last accessed 22 December 2014). 
223  Interview with Marie-France Houde (OECD), 7 February 2013. 
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legitimacy considerations seem to be of relevance, particularly the ability to link to traditional 
state based (democratic) instruments and organisations. Private organisations use cooperation in 
their legitimacy management in order to link themselves to these traditional actors. 
 
On the other side of the coin, cooperation might not only open up venues to address legitimacy 
claims, it might also create new venues. Thus, when cooperating with a public organisation, a 
private regulator may have to adapt its procedures in order to accommodate special public 
requirements. The ILO attributed significant importance to certain provisions in the MoU to 
ensure that the ISO standards were consistent with ILO instruments and that in case of conflict 
the latter would prevail.224 The ILO also needed to make sure that its participation would not tie 
itself to the ISO to a degree that its own responsibilities vis-à-vis its members would be violated. 
Thus, the MoU between both organisations clearly states that: 
 
ILO assistance or participation provided in this Agreement in any ISO process or activity relating 
to development, promotion, support, evaluation and approval, or review of any International 
Standard in the field of SR does not imply the specific endorsement by ILO of that ISO 
International Standard or any other ISO product or activity225 
 
The ISO 26000 process is generally a good example of the increase of legitimacy claims through 
a cooperative approach. The numerous different actors involved came to the table with the 
expectations of their own stakeholders. Those could not be ignored but had to be integrated into 
the process. The mirror committees, which the ISO asked its member bodies to establish in order 
to represent the respective national positions had similar effect. In the end the process became 
highly complex, requiring enormous effort to integrate the very different demands which 
originate from such diverse groups. Ultimately, evaluations regarding the success of these efforts 
vary; even actors from the same stakeholder group came to different conclusions regarding the 
legitimacy of the ISO 26000 standard setting process.226 
                                                          
224  See Article 2.1 and 2.3 MoU ILO/ISO. 
225  See MoU ISO/ILO Article 9.1. 
226  The ILO for instance supported the process in the end. Others remained sceptical, for instance Diller, supra 
note 55, at 529, who arrives at a negative result. For an overview over organisations supporting the ISO/DIS 26000, 
see ISO/TMB/WG SR N 176 NSB Consensus Comments and Comments from D-Liaison Organizations Received 
on ISO/DIS 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility, 1 March 2010. Non-consensus comments can be found in the 
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3.3.2 Expertise 
 
As highlighted above, the ISO is an expertise driven organisation. It understands its standards as 
reflecting expert consensus. Therefore it is only natural that the ISO also included experts in this 
standard setting process, and in fact the ISO representative named ‘expertise’ as the main reason 
for cooperating with international organisations.227 Given the nature of the 26000 Guidance it 
was, however, less technical expertise that was in demand but rather different forms of expertise 
necessary in the public policy domain. Chapter 2 refers to the different regulatory capacities 
Abbott and Snidal list in their ‘Governance Triangle’. Expertise, being one of them, can come 
about in different forms. Thus there is not only technical expertise but also normative and 
political expertise.228 The ISO sought to benefit predominantly from the expertise of the public 
organisations in these two latter categories. In particular, the ILO possessed long-standing and 
unique knowledge in the area of labour law and the tripartite system.229 Similarly Professor 
Ruggie’s intervention and the swift uptake by the WGSR of his suggestions can be seen as an 
example of the appraisal of specific legal expertise by the ISO. 
 
3.3.3 The Power and Operational Capacities of the ISO as a Focal Organisation 
 
The International Organisations involved in the process had problems in ensuring 
implementation of their policies in certain parts of the business community. This did not only 
concern individual rules and instruments but in fact there was a perceived compliance deficit in 
the regime at large.230 One reason for international organisations to cooperate was to link their 
regulation to the particular operational capacities of the ISO and its power as a focal 
organisation.231 Both the ILO and the OECD stressed that ISO 26000 would be more accessible 
for certain Asian companies, as those are already well acquainted with other ISO management 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
document titled: Non Consensus Comments Received on ISO/DIS 26000, Guidance on Social Responsibility, 
ISO/TMB/WG SR N 178, 1 March 2010. 
227  Interview with Kevin McKinley (ISO), 25 February 2013. 
228  K W Abbott & D Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of 
the State’, in: W Mattli & N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 44, 
at 64 
229  Interview with Kevin McKinley (ISO), 25 February 2013. 
230  Interview with Emily Sims (ILO), 25 February 2013 
231  See above at section 2.  
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standards, such as the 9000 or 14000 series.232 The ISO therefore possessed particular 
operational capacities at the implementation phase which were considered to complement public 
regulation. For the public organisations it was therefore of interest that their own regulatory 
mechanisms were sufficiently considered in the process and the final document. 
 
Until today the take up of the instrument was rather weak - ISO 26000 was not as successful as 
expected. One reason for this could be the decision to make it a non-certifiable guidance regime. 
As such it may have less appeal to the industry than other management standards that follow the 
more traditional ISO pattern.233 One reason for the decision (among others) not to open it for 
certification was a compromise made with the trade unions who feared their influence would 
fade if companies could buy the certification that they are a good, labour-friendly entity.234 The 
effort of the IOs to help create an instrument which is closer to industry usage and needs might 
have not paid off as anticipated. 
 
4. NETWORK LEVEL: CONSTITUTIONALISATION EFFECTS THROUGH 
AGGLOMERATION AND CONSOLIDATION 
 
As stated above, cooperation is not always based on purely commutative motives but often also 
aims at a broader set of goals. Concretely, regulators may also engage in cooperation if it leads to 
stronger and better regulation or a more comprehensive global regulatory framework (if it has 
constitutionalisation effects).235 The framework in which the ISO 26000 process is embedded has 
a decentralised character. It has been demonstrated that each actor involved in the cooperative 
process possessed one or even several instruments targeting social responsibility issues. This led 
to a high potential of conflict between the different regimes, organisations and instruments. 
However, the preferred strategy was a cooperative one. There was a strong ‘more is better’ 
attitude, which was combined with the idea that an industry-based actor specifically such as the 
ISO could open new venues through which the message of (corporate) social responsibility could 
                                                          
232  Interview with Emily Sims (ILO), 25 February 2013. Also interview with Marie-France Houde (OECD), 7 
February 2013. 
233  Interview with Emily Sims (ILO), 25 February 2013. 
234  Ibid. 
235  See above Chapter 3. 
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then be communicated.236 These motives seem to suggest that there was first and foremost a need 
to increase the overall regulatory authority of the regime, rather than those of the individual 
organisation. Competition between regulatory bodies with contradictory contents would have 
undermined these efforts.237  
 
The ISO stressed that it engaged in cooperation in order to avoid creating a conflict with 
publicly-established policies, as it had no authority to rewrite existing public instruments being a 
private actor.238 Its goal was to create a guidance regime which is consistent with established 
mechanisms and which as such has the advantage of integrating different policies into one 
document.239 Cooperation with public actors was thus aimed at creating this coherence. After all, 
the Standard was intended to provide a fairly complete venue for all types of organisations to 
comply with social responsibility obligations or recommendations.240 The objective to create a 
standard on which different organisations could rely to fulfil any kind of social responsibility 
obligation would have not been met had it not involved all of the important actors in the field and 
were it not in harmony with the other relevant instruments in the issue area. A standard which 
contradicted established public regulation would have failed the purpose of providing a ‘one 
includes everything’ solution. In a similar vein one can note the attempt to make the process as 
representative as possible, thus ensuring both a representative process and meeting the final goal 
of creating an encompassing instrument.  
 
Whereas the reasons for the ISO to avoid conflicts and to achieve harmonisation were 
predominantly based in self-interest, such as achieving high take up of the standard; the 
international organisations pursued broader and arguably more ‘altruistic’ goals. Such 
                                                          
236  Interview with Emily Sims (ILO), 25 February 2013, and Interview with Marie-France Houde (OECD), 7 
February 2013. 
237  See also K Webb, ‘ISO 26000: Bridging the Public/Private Divide in Transnational Business Governance 
Interactions’, Osgoode Hall Research Report No. 21/2012, who states that: ‘In addition to the mutual legitimacy and 
authority-enhancing nature of their participation, the fact that such a range of leading international SR instrument 
developers participated in the development of ISO 26000 suggests a conscious effort among these entities to move 
in this instance from SR rule instrument competition to a form of co-opetition, with ISO 26000 creating a “common 
ground” framework instrument, intended to be and considered to be compatible with the SR Rule instruments of the 
other SR Rule instrument developers’ (at 16). He further argues that from a legal perspective ‘ISO 26000 represents 
a sophisticated statement of emerging global SR“custom”’(at 20). 
238  Interview with Kevin McKinley (ISO), 25 February 2013. 
239  Ibid; and Interview with Emily Sims (ILO), 25 February 2013. 
240  See above at 3.2.1and ISO 26000 Project Overview, supra note 60, at 3. 
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organisations sought to improve the overall regulation in the field. The ILO for instance 
characterises the area of social responsibility regulation as having three levels. First, there are 
normative institutions such as the ILO or the OECD which set the framework. One level below 
one finds governments, MNEs, and labour organisations. Entities on both levels affect the third 
stage – business practices – through their policies, legislation, rules and agreements. ISO 26000 
in this framework is considered as having a special status. It belongs to the normative sphere (the 
drafting process was not only industry driven but also involved to a high degree public actors), 
but, as a long-standing technical standard setter, it has also particular links with the industry. As 
a result it can open another channel through which the message of social responsible business 
behaviour can be conveyed. An important goal for the international organisations was to create 
policy coherence between the different regulators in order to transform business culture. All 
normative institutions should convey a consistent message through which expectations on 
business will be clearly stipulated and as a result actions and practices are influenced. Law sets a 
framework and private policies (on MNE level or below) determine what happens within a 
company.241  
 
Consequently, both are sought: firstly to increase the number and types of actors spreading the 
message of social responsibility (agglomeration) and secondly to achieve harmonisation 
regarding the content of the message spread (consolidation). This ultimately had 
constitutionalisation effects, not in a foundational sense, but in its limitative function. It became 
harder for businesses and states to evade specific rules – the area of social responsible business 
practices became more consolidated and thus constitutionalised. 
 
This approach however has been criticised. As mentioned above, there were general doubts as to 
whether a private entity such as the ISO is the correct partner for this endeavour and whether it 
should engage into the public policy domain at all or at least whether this should not happen in a 
much more cautionary way.242 Several arguments can be made against this position. First of all 
there are, as has been pointed out by the representatives of international organisations, the 
benefits of having a private actor on board. The ISO has different relationships with the private 
                                                          
241  Interview with Emily Sims (ILO), 25 February 2013.  
242  See above and Diller, supra note 55, at 529. Less critical however Ward, supra note 108, from 685 
onwards. 
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sector than international organisations have and this can be an advantage in the implementation 
of social responsibility standards. Secondly, as argued in the previous chapters, public actors 
have ways to ‘steer’ cooperative processes. The example of ILO’s engagement depicts this well. 
Being aware of its special status, it also required special participation rights which ensured the 
respect of publicly elaborated rules in the area. Though not perfect this shows an issue that has 
already been mentioned in the beginning of this book: ‘the public’ is not simply replaced by 
powerful private entities taking over. Rather there are a variety of actors shaping the global realm 
and traditional public actors can be the heavyweights among them.243 
 
Another problem is whether harmonisation in a highly fragmented and complex environment is 
possible or desirable at all. The example of Professor Ruggie’s intervention illustrates some of 
the problems this may cause. The direct involvement of the SRSG has been criticised as an 
illegitimate interference in the process, exceeding the scope of the Ruggie process.244 And indeed 
there is a risk that harmonisation within one instrument leads to conflicts in a different process or 
organisation, or that harmonisation can impose certain standards in fields where they are less 
useful and less desired by the relevant stakeholders. More generally, harmonisation comes with 
the risk of closing venues for contestation and room testing and deliberating different and 
potentially better solutions.245 This is an inherent risk in any cooperative process, and one that 
should not be left unconsidered. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has depicted the ISO 26000 standard setting process with a particular focus on the 
involvement of international organisations. It has shown how the ISO’s move to complement its 
set of technical standards with management standards saw it enter more and more into the public 
policy domain. Such a move comes with a number of additional challenges. First, there is the 
general question whether it is legitimate for a private actor to engage in such areas, and secondly, 
there is the requirement of specific regulatory expertise. In the 26000 process the ISO tried to 
                                                          
243  See Chapter 1 at section 2.2. and 3, and S Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global 
Assemblages (Princeton University Press, 2006), at 228 ff more particularly on the role of the state. 
244  Ward, supra note 108, at 696.  
245  N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism – The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP, 2010) at 78 ff.  
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respond to these challenges by increasing the overall representation of stakeholders in general 
and by including public actors already active in the area in particular through regulatory 
cooperation agreements. 
 
The cooperative process, it has been shown, included two levels. First, there is a commutative 
level, where both sets of actors exchanged capacities necessary to effectively regulate. The ISO 
sought to benefit particularly from the traditional legitimacy of public state based actors. The 
international organisations on the other hand hoped to profit from the ISO’s specific standing 
with certain industry sectors and more generally its implementation capacities. 
 
The commutative level here was strongly connected to the second – the network level, which 
was characterised by the attempts of both actors to achieve some form of agglomeration and 
consolidation of the sector. The technique of choice to accomplish this was to harmonise 
standards and to spread a consistent message to the business community. This, as argued above, 
had constitutionalisation effects in the sense that it clarified, harmonised and strengthened the 
limits of acceptable business behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CASE STUDY ON SPORT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The following case study describes the cooperation between the Olympic Movement and its 
main governing organ the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on the one hand, and the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) on the other. This example of cooperation is 
relevant to the present thesis for a number of reasons. First of all, the value of this example lies 
in the duration of the cooperation in question. The IOC’s engagement with UNEP began in the 
early 1990s and therefore it is possible to trace the different stages and developments in this 
long-term cooperation. More important however are the following substantive reasons: the study 
focuses on two organisations originating from different regimes (sports and environment), which 
are almost opposite in their composition. Whereas the realm of sport is generally hierarchically 
structured and composed of highly authoritative organisations with clearly defined areas of 
responsibility, the environmental regime is fragmented, without strong hierarchies. Finally, the 
cooperation process from its very beginning did not take place solely on the international level 
but always had a particular relationship with the local and national level. This is especially so for 
the Olympic Games mega-events which are: 
 
‘… regulated by multi-level, multi-actor governance regimes, in which authority to define the 
events and its terms and conditions is negotiated between public and private non-state actors, 
such as FIFA, UEFA and the IOC, and their national emanations. … these latter international 
organizations are ‘sovereignty-free actors’ who engage in contractual relationships with other 
sovereignty-free actors and with ‘sovereignty-bound’ state actors. Their increased political 
saliency reflects the diffusion of political and economic authority in the multi-centric post-Cold 
War context …’1 
 
                                                          
1  G Hayes & J Karamichas, ‘Introduction: Sport Mega-Events, Sustainable Development and Civil 
Societies’, in G Hayes & J Karamichas, Olympic Games, Mega-Events and Civil Societies (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012) 1 at 5 the concept is taken from J N Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuity (Princeton University Press 1990) at 36. 
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The study will therefore examine the dynamics of cooperation between two actors from such 
diverse backgrounds, as well as in the multi-level context including the local and state level. In 
line with the previous theoretical chapters, this chapter first sets out to understand the 
commutative elements which characterise cooperation. Here the main claim is that both 
organisations are dependent on the cooperative process in order to achieve their regulatory goals. 
Even for powerful hierarchically structured and functionally specified organisations such as the 
IOC, the complexity of the transnational context presents challenges in terms of authority. The 
significant reach of their main deliverable, the Olympic Games, and its particular transformative 
potential makes the IOC an easy target for criticism and rejection of its governance processes, as 
well as for activism expressing general discontent with broader global developments. The IOC 
therefore is required to find means to strengthen its legitimacy and pre-empt criticism at an early 
stage. UNEP on the other hand is set in a fragmented environment characterised by competition 
between different environmental institutions. It is underfinanced and lacks support from 
powerful states and other organisations within the UN family. Cooperation with an organisation 
such as the IOC not only fits the general regulatory approach of UNEP but it can furthermore 
link the rather weak organisation with a powerful private actor that has strong operational 
capacities and effective enforcement mechanisms in place.  
 
The second part of this study examines more closely the network components which emerge out 
of the commutative process. In the cooperation depicted here, network building is developed in 
particular and is pursued by both organisations independently as well as inter-connectedly. The 
main premise is that constitutionalisation within these network structures happens in two ways. 
First, more straightforwardly, through the prerequisites set up by the public organisation in 
particular before engaging in cooperation. This requires private actors to ensure that their own 
activities are in line with certain minimum standards (such as the Global Compact’s 10 
Principles). More important here, however, is the second way in which constitutionalisation 
occurs. To elaborate, through using the particular structure and operating mode of the Olympic 
Movement, UNEP was able to (co-)implement sustainability and environmental protection 
standards into a much wider community, extending to the national and local level in the host 
countries, as well as to numerous private actors linked to the Olympics. 
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This analysis mainly relies on documents produced by the organisations involved, general public 
information and to a lesser degree secondary literature. Furthermore, interviews were conducted 
with representatives of the organisations in order to ascertain a better overview over the 
objectives they pursued with the cooperation.  
 
2. THE COMMUTATIVE ASPECTS OF THE IOC UNEP COOPERATION 
 
2.1 The IOC’s Need for Legitimate Environmental Regulation  
 
It is first necessary to address the IOC’s need to set in place environmental regulation in the 
sports realm which would be considered legitimate by the respective stakeholder groups. As 
outlined in Chapter 2, legitimacy is not an attribute determined once and forever. Changing 
environments can alter the legitimacy expectations and requirements of a transnational regulator. 
Organisations need to respond to such expectations in order to maintain existing legitimacy, or 
when this has been called into question, to repair and rebuild it.2 A particular problem in this 
context are so-called multiple legitimacy claims. This refers to the situation where stakeholders 
from within or from outside a regulatory regime make different (and possibly contradictory) 
legitimacy claims to which the regulator has to respond.3 The IOC despite, or perhaps because 
of, its dominant role in the area of sports regulation faces these problems. A major reason for this 
is the unique role the Olympics, as mega-events play on the global level and their far-reaching 
impact on local and global economics, politics and culture. The Games are constantly in the 
spotlight and receive close media attention. This makes them very attractive and susceptible to 
political activism. The following sections will first describe the Olympic Movement’s special 
character and the particularities of mega-events causing its increased exposure to political 
activism and critique of its governance style and focus. The final part will show how the IOC 
attempted to address these issues in the context of environmental regulation through cooperation 
with UNEP. 
 
                                                          
2  See Chapter 2 at section 3.2.2.1; See also M C Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches’, 20 The Academy of Management Review (1995) 571. 
3  Again Chapter 2 at section 3.2.2.1; and J Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and 
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’, 2 Regulation & Governance (2008) 137. 
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2.1.1 General Information on the Olympic Movement’s Governance Structure 
 
The Olympic Movement with the IOC as its dominant governing organ is a unique organisation. 
Founded on June 23, 1894 through the initiative of Pierre de Coubertin,4 the Movement 
encompasses, apart from the IOC, two other main constituencies: the International Sports 
Federations (IFs) and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs). These again consist of athletes, 
judges, referees, coaches, other sport officials, technicians and additional ‘organizations and 
institutions’ recognized by the IOC.5 Legally, the IOC constitutes an international, non-
governmental, non-profit organisation which is incorporated as an association in Switzerland 
(with its seat in Lausanne). Its status as a legal person has been recognised by the Swiss Federal 
Council on the basis of a special agreement.6 This agreement notably limits the applicability of 
Swiss law with regard to the association in a way that it is usually only granted to international 
organisations.7 The preamble acknowledges the special status by stating that: 
 
‘in its capacity as the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement, the International Olympic 
Committee has assumed global dimensions,’ 
 
and:  
 
‘… that the universal role of the International Olympic Committee in the vital field of 
international relations, its global reputation and the cooperation agreements that it has concluded 
with intergovernmental organizations, bring to fore features of an international legal personality’8 
 
Considering a private actor to have international legal personality might at first glance appear 
disturbing, at least for a traditional international lawyer. However, it can be explained (to some 
degree) by looking closer at the history and the general impact of the IOC. As stated above the 
                                                          
4  Preamble to the Olympic Charter, available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
5  Rule 1 of the Olympic Charter.  
6  Rule 15 of the Olympic Charter. As well as the Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and 
International Olympic Committee Regarding the Statute of the International Olympic Committee in Switzerland, 1 
November 2000, available at: http://archive.icann.org/en/psc/annex6.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
7  See for instance Articles 1 to 9 Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and International Olympic 
Committee, supra note 6. 
8  Ibid Preamble (underlining added). 
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Committee was founded in the late 19th century, more than 20 years before the League of 
Nations.9 Today, the Olympic Movement includes athletes from all five continents and consists 
of 205 NOCs (again for the purposes of comparison, the UN has 193 member states).10 The 
Olympic Games, as the single most important deliverable of the Movement, are broadcast to 
more than 200 national territories, reaching up to 4.8 billion people; the London Olympics 
broadcast rights alone created a revenue of 3.9 billion US dollars.11 All of this is ‘governed’ by 
the IOC, which has the ‘supreme authority and leadership’12 over the wider Movement, and 
whose other members ‘shall abide by the decisions of the IOC’.13  
 
Internally the IOC consists of the Session, the IOC Executive Board and the President.14 The 
Session is the general meeting of all members of the IOC. It meets ordinarily once a year but can 
be convened by the President in an extraordinary meeting. According to the Charter the Session 
‘is the IOC’s supreme organ [and i]ts decisions are final’.15 The duties of the Session are to adopt 
and amend the Olympic Charter, to elect the members of the IOC, the President and the 
Executive Board, and last but not least to choose a host city for the Olympic Games.16 The 
Session consists of natural persons (up to 115 in total) which are all linked to a country with a 
NOC (only one member per country).17 The Executive Board consists of the President, four 
Vice-Presidents and ten additional members, a structure which reflects the composition of the 
Session. The Executive Board is generally responsible for the overall management and 
administration of the IOC, as is reflected in numerous duties such as monitoring the observance 
of the Charter and being responsible for rules and regulations of the IOC, including the Charter.18 
                                                          
9  C J Tams, ‘League of Nations’ in: Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2006), 
available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil (last accessed 19 December 2014), para 6.  
10  See Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 4. 
11  All numbers steam from the 2012 London Summer Olympics, see IOC, Marketing Media Guide, London 
2012, at 6 and 11, available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/London_2012/IOC_Marketing_Media_Guide_2012.pdf (last 
accessed 19 December 2014). 
12  Rule 1.1 of the Olympic Charter.  
13  Rule 1.4 of the Olympic Charter. 
14  Rule 17 of the Olympic Charter. 
15  Rule 18.1 of the Olympic Charter. 
16  Rule 18.2 of the Olympic Charter. Further powers are: approval of the annual report, appointment of 
auditors, awarding and withdrawing of recognition to NOCs and IFs, expelling IOC members, to resolve and to 
decide upon matters assigned by law of by the Charter. 
17  Rule 16.1.1.1 of the Olympic Charter, as well as 2.2.5 By-Law to Rule 16. 
18  Note that the Charter can only be changed by a 2/3 majority of the Session, see Rule 18.3 of the Olympic 
Charter. 
 160 
 
Finally there is the President who is a central and powerful figure in the IOC framework. Elected 
by the Members of the Session, the President serves a first period of eight years, which can be 
extended for another four years. The President’s main function is to represent the IOC and to 
preside over its activities.19 An important prerequisite of the President is his entitlement to 
establish IOC Commissions (except where explicitly provided for otherwise in the Charter or 
other regulations as for instance in the case of the Ethics Commission)20 In 2012 there were 26 
commissions including the Sport and Environment Commission.21 
 
The IOC’s broader mission underlying its governance activities is enshrined in Rule 2 of the 
Olympic Charter: It is first and foremost the promotion of ‘Olympism throughout the world’.22 
However, it is important to be aware that Olympism is a broadly defined concept. From its 
beginning Olympism was thought of having a much more extensive impact than just the 
promotion of sport. Thus the Charter stipulates that: 
 
 Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of 
body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way 
of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and 
respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.23 
 
And further:  
 
The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of 
humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of 
human dignity.24 
 
Thus, sport is considered to be put into service to help promote broader and more fundamental 
goals, such as peace and human dignity. There is a strong rights-driven discourse that endorses 
                                                          
19  Rule 20 of the Olympic Charter. 
20  Rule 21 of the Olympic Charter.  
21  See Comité International Olympique, Commissions du CIO, Révisées en 2012, available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/All_Commissions/Commissions_2012.pdf   
(last accessed 19 December 2014). 
22  Rule 2 of the Olympic Charter.  
23  Rule 1.1 of the Olympic Charter. 
24  Rule 1.2 of the Olympic Charter. 
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Western liberal values underlying this agenda – which can be seen for instance in statements 
such as ‘build a better world through sport’.25 The Charter specifies this in concrete missions. 
Apart from the promotion of ethics and good governance in the field of sport and the general 
promotion of sport events, it demands that sport be used to fight discrimination, support equality 
between men and woman, help protect the environment and promote sustainable development in 
sport, to achieve a positive legacy from the Olympic Games in the host cities, and to support 
culture and education.26 There is the argument therefore that ‘the Olympics [specifically and the 
Movement generally] are constructed as promoters of historically specific ‘universal world 
views’.27 
 
2.1.2 The Olympic Games as Mega-Events 
 
Having this particular agenda in mind we now turn to the one most fundamental deliverable of 
the Movement – the Olympic Games. The following sections will address two specific aspects; 
first, very briefly, some thoughts on the effects the Games have beyond the sporting community 
will be provided, and secondly the procedures through which a host city is elected and the 
preparation is conducted will be outlined.  
 
2.1.2.1 Impacts of Mega-Events 
 
The exceptional reach in terms of broadcasting of the Games and the significant economic 
revenue generated for the IOC have already been mentioned. What has not yet been addressed, 
however, are the social, economic and political dimensions of such ‘mega-events’ beyond the 
Olympic Movement and the more general sporting community. The term ‘mega event’ is used to 
describe ‘large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic 
character, mass popular appeal and international significance’.28 This includes the broad reach 
                                                          
25  Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 6. See for an overview over the Movements activities in this regard 
the website: ‘Olympism in Action – Building a Better World through Sport’, available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/olympism-in-action (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
26  Taken from Rule 2 of the Olympic Charter.  
27  Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 6 who are referring to M Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity: 
Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture (Routledge, 2000), at 198.  
28  Roche, supra note 27, at 1.  
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these events have globally and the impact they have at the local level.29 It is suggested that there 
are four main themes usually addressed in this context. These are: the impact of mega-events on 
the local economy, mega-events and ‘global culture’, political developments particularly at the 
local level, and finally the interrelation between mega-events and local communities and civil 
society groups. 
 
The first point, which is not at the core of this chapter, but has an impact on the other three 
themes, concerns the relationship between the Games and local economies. Research dedicated 
to this issue often concerns economic impact assessments where the long and short-term benefits 
for the local economy generally (and for certain industry sectors such as tourism specifically) are 
contrasted with public investment needed to execute the Games. Results are mixed and they 
become relevant for local political discourses.30 
 
The second category concerns the cultural impact of a global event such as Olympic Games, both 
on the host countries but also on the broader global audience. As stated above, the Games have a 
tremendously broad reach and the Olympic Movement has a strong value driven agenda. The 
Olympics thereby ‘create a unique cultural space and provide unrivalled opportunities to dissolve 
spatial and temporal distance, to participate in a notional global community, and to promote, 
albeit transitorily but recurrently, individual and collective experiences of ‘globality’ or ‘one 
world’ awareness’.31 Consequently, there is room to transport and promote ‘universalistic ideals’ 
and to (at least try to) change cultural practices along these lines. This is something which is also 
important in the context of environmental protection and sustainability considerations – an issue 
to which we shall return in due course. 
 
                                                          
29  See among the many contributions on the topic ibid; as well as Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1; J Horne 
& W Manzenreiter (eds), Sports Mega-Events – Social Scientific Analyses of a Global Phenomenon (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006). 
30  See for instance, C Gratton, S Shibli & R Coleman, ‘The Economic Impact of Major Sports Events: A 
Review of Ten Events in the UK’, in: J Horne & W Manzenreiter (eds), Sports Mega-Events – Social Scientific 
Analyses of a Global Phenomenon (Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 41. And in the same volume: D Whitson & J 
Horne, ‘Underestimated Costs and Overestimated Benefits? Comparing the Outcomes of Sport Mega-Events in 
Canada and Japan’, at 73 ff.  
31  M Roche, ‘Mega-Events and Modernity Revisited: Globalization and the Case of the Olympics’, in: J 
Horne & W Manzenreiter (eds), Sports Mega-Events – Social Scientific Analyses of a Global Phenomenon 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 27, at 31. 
 163 
 
The issue of cultural impact (or even some form of universalisation) leads to the third, and for 
our present purposes most important, point - the impact of the mega-event on local and national 
politics and the broader relationship between the transnational regime and the local level. There 
are indeed two forms of influence which are to be considered, the first being ‘top down’ 
influences. A very common narrative when talking about mega-events is that international 
associations under whose umbrella they are conducted have transformatory impact on local 
policies. In this vein Hayes and Karamichas for instance state that: 
 
‘…sports mega-events impinge increasingly on the definition of public policies (urban planning, 
transport infrastructure, environment, social welfare, health, etc.) and the allocation of the 
increasingly scarce public resources available to achieve these (or other, competing) collective 
goals. And that they do so, even in liberal democratic regimes, by circumventing normative, 
established, collective decision-making structures and processes.’32 
 
However, this is only one side of the coin. As outlined in the previous chapters, transnational 
actors such as sports organisations do not possess absolute authority. Therefore, ‘mega-events 
are regulated by multi-level, multi-actor governance regimes, in which authority to define the 
event and its terms and conditions is negotiated between public and private non-state actors.’33 
This interaction can moreover have an impact on the rules of the transnational organisation 
which derive from the local level, as will be shown below.34  
 
Closely related to the interrelationship between national, local and transnational rule-making is 
the last issue which deals with the (civil) society reaction to large-scale sporting events. One can 
distinguish between reactions concerning the Games themselves and those activities which use 
mega-events as a platform in order to spread a particular message to a wider audience. The first 
type deal with reactions to different effects the Games produce, for instance, on the environment, 
civil (participatory) rights or on the use of economic resources and restriction of access to 
economic benefits (such as the prohibition of the sale of non-licensed products in and around the 
                                                          
32  Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 5. 
33  Ibid. 
34  See also H Cantelon & M Letters, ‘The Making of the IOC Environmental Policy as the Third Dimension 
of the Olympic Movement’, 35 International Review for the Sociology of Sport (2000) 294 ff, who depict how 
Norwegian longstanding experience with environmental protection influenced rules at the IOC level. 
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sports venues).35 An example of the second type are dissident groups in the host country and 
wider interest groups who challenge certain policies within the host country, such as the ‘free 
Tibet’ protests in advance of the Beijing Olympics,36 or terrorist groups which use the platform 
of the event to spread their political message (even if this is not necessarily directly related to the 
organising country, as was the case in Munich 1972).  
 
What can be observed especially in the last two categories is that mega-events have an almost 
unique reach and significant transformative potential but they are also dependent on local level 
support. In particular, they are prone to civil discontent. The next section will look at the bidding 
process and the way in which the IOC addresses this dualistic relationship. 
 
2.1.2.2 Rules Regulating the Awarding and Execution of the Games 
 
When examining the impact of a mega-event such as the Olympics on local policies and the 
effect it has had on local laws and regulations, it is necessary to look at how they are awarded to 
host cities. The bidding process which requires aspiring cities to make very detailed 
commitments regarding the later execution of the Games is the issue on which the IOC has most 
say. As will be described momentarily, it alone sets out the requirements to be fulfilled by 
candidates and expects far-reaching guarantees by all relevant local actors (including public and 
private entities) before even considering the application.  
 
Regulated in Chapter IV of the Charter the process usually starts with the election of the host 
city, seven years before the Olympic Games are to take place,37 and ends in their aftermath with 
the so called post Games dissolution.38 
 
                                                          
35  See Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 14 ff. See furthermore, E Dansero, et als, ‘Olympic Games, 
Conflicts and Social Movements: The Case of Torino 2006’, in: G Hayes & J Karamichas, Olympic Games, Mega-
Events and Civil Societies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) at195 ff; and D Whitson, ‘Vancouver 2010: The Saga of 
Eagleridge Bluffs’, in: G Hayes & J Karamichas, Olympic Games, Mega-Events and Civil Societies (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012) 219 ff.  
36  See X Renou, ‘Resisting the Torch’, in: G Hayes & J Karamichas, Olympic Games, Mega-Events and Civil 
Societies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 236 ff.  
37  See Rule 33 (7) of the Olympic Charter.  
38  See ‘From Candidate to Host City’, available at: http://www.olympic.org/host-city-election (last accessed 
19 December 2014). 
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The start of the bidding phase is the election of the host city. The application is regulated by Rule 
33 of the Charter. Accordingly, any interested city must first be approved by the NOC of the 
country in which the city is located and only one city per country may apply.39 All candidates 
must comply with the Olympic Charter, other regulations or requirements set out by the IOC 
Executive Board, and with all technical norms issued by the IFs.40 Furthermore, they ‘shall 
comply with the candidature acceptance procedure, conducted under the authority of the IOC 
Executive Board’.41 As mentioned above, this procedure requires candidate cities to provide 
extensive information and make large-scale commitments regarding political, economic and 
legal issues relevant to the Games. Even though this procedure is of top-down nature it is 
important to note that some of these requirements concern the involvement of the general public, 
stakeholders and concern the protection of public goods (particularly the environment).42 As 
such, there is consideration of local specificities and awareness of the need to gain public 
support. 
 
From the applications received the Executive Board chooses the candidate cities.43 These 
candidates then undergo an evaluation procedure. To this end, an evaluation commission set up 
by the President assesses the applications (including through site inspections) and drafts a report 
on its findings, which is circulated to the Executive Board and the Session.44 On the basis of this 
report, the Executive Board creates a final list with candidates which are submitted to the Session 
to be voted upon. A simple majority is sufficient for a city to be nominated. Upon selection the 
IOC will enter into the host city contract with the elected candidate and the respective NOC.45 
 
From this moment the preparation phase of the Games starts. For this purpose an Organizing 
Committee is formed which is the responsibility of the NOC of the country where the host city is 
located. The Organizing Committee consists of the IOC members of the respective country, the 
President and the secretary general of the NOC as well as of at least one representative of the 
                                                          
39  Bye-Law to Rule 33, 1.1 of the Olympic Charter. 
40  Bye-Law to Rule 33, 1.5 of the Olympic Charter. 
41  Bye-Law to Rule 33, 1.6 of the Olympic Charter. 
42  See for instance the IOC, 2018 Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire (2010), document available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/2018_CPQ-ENGLISH-FULL.pdf (last accessed 19 
December 2014). 
43  Bye-Law to Rule 33, 1.6 of the Olympic Charter.  
44  Bye-Law to Rule 33, 2 of the Olympic Charter. 
45  Bye-Law to Rule 33, 3 of the Olympic Charter. 
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host city.46 Host city, NOC and Organizing Committee are jointly responsible for the Games. If 
there are any instances of non-compliance with the Charter, regulations, or the host city contract, 
the IOC has the right to withdraw the award of the Games. In this case there will be no claim of 
compensation against the IOC even though it is possible for the IOC to claim compensation from 
the host city.47  
 
Furthermore, conflicts are not to be settled in national courts but by the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport in Lausanne.48 However, as outlined above, the IOC tries to avoid conflicts as early as the 
bidding phase by requiring significant guaranties from local authorities and other important 
actors involved.49 In order to guarantee cooperation among all relevant actors within the 
organisation of the Olympic Games (Organizing Committee, the IOC, NOCs and IFs) the 
President of the IOC establishes the so-called Coordination Commission, which has a wide-
ranging mandate.50 Its tasks are to monitor the progress of the Organizing Committee, to review 
and examine aspects of the organisation, to provide assistance and to resolve differences between 
the different organisers, to ensure that NOCs and IFs as well as the IOC are kept informed about 
the progress and to inspect facilities amongst other things.51 Finally, it is important to note that 
for the executing process of the Games the IOC is the authority of last resort.52  
 
In summary, considering the impact mega-events such as the Olympic Games have in different 
sectors of society it is important to understand the role the IOC plays in this context. As ‘the’ 
international sport organisation it has an interest in being at the top of the organisation and 
execution process. This position is secured mainly through the commitments which have to be 
made prior to host-city election. As a result, through the bidding commitments which ultimately 
flow into the host city contract and the rather unique legal system underpinning it (through the 
                                                          
46  Bye-Law to Rule 35 of the Olympic Charter. 
47  Rule 36 of the Olympic Charter. 
48  See for instance, Host City Contract for the XXI Olympic Winter Games in the Year 2010 (Vancouver, 18 
June 2003) para 67, available at: http://nogames.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/vancouver_2010_host-city-
agreement.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
49  See for instance IOC, 2018 Candidature Procedure and Questionaire, supra note 42, which lays out the 
different types of guarantees in the respective categories relevant in the bidding process. 
50  Rule 37 of the Olympic Charter. 
51  Bye-Law to Rule 37 of the Olympic Charter. 
52  Rule 58 of the Olympic Charter. 
 167 
 
Court of Arbitration),53 the IOC guarantees its dominant role in the process. This, however also 
means that it has significant influence on the different transformative processes the Games 
facilitate at the local level. 
 
2.1.3 Sport and Environment: Legitimacy Concerns of a Dominant Transnational Private 
Actor 
 
The preceding sections have set out the Movement’s powerful governance structures and its 
tremendous influence even on national and local political systems. Yet, as shown above, this also 
makes the system vulnerable to political activism, which either criticises the governance 
processes or which uses the Games as a platform to reach a wider audience. In the 1992 
Albertville Games environmental advocacy groups saw an opportunity to draw attention to the 
broader global political issue of environmental destruction by pointing to developments in a 
particular, but well publicised context - sport.54  
 
Previously, claims such as those made in the early 1990s regarding the impact of the Games on 
the environment could have been considered a problem of the local organisers.55 However, with 
increased global awareness of environmental destruction ‘the local led directly to the global’.56 
Together with additional problems concerning doping and corruption, intense criticism caused a 
legitimacy crisis.57 The Olympic Movement’s widely shared self-understanding as mentioned 
above is that of an actor contributing to the development of humankind. This particular 
‘mandate’ had, even in the 1990s, been closely linked to lucrative sponsorship contracts which 
could have been in peril if criticism continued.58 The way the IOC decided to address the 
problem was to implement environmental policies at IOC level and to include environmental 
protection in its mandate. These original considerations however soon turned into a new self-
understanding of the Movement as ‘an environmental custodian’.59  
                                                          
53  See for more information on the particularities on the particular structure of lex sportiva: A Duval, ‘Lex 
Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law’, 19 European Law Journal (2013) 822, at 827 ff.  
54  Cantelon & Letters, supra note 34, at 300. 
55  Ibid at 302 
56  Ibid.  
57  Ibid at 301; Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 8 and 9 
58  Cf also Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1 at 9. 
59  Ibid. 
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The clearest example of the custodian approach was the alteration of the Olympic Charter 
through the inclusion of an additional paragraph in Rule 2 in 1996, which states that the mission 
of the IOC is ‘… to encourage and support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to 
promote sustainable development in sport and to require that the Olympic Games are held 
accordingly’.60 This was accompanied by the recognition of environment as the third pillar of the 
Olympic Movement, alongside sport and culture.61 The new paragraph illustrates this tripartite 
approach: First, its contribution to the promotion of universal values (in this particular case 
protection of the environment), secondly its implementation of environmental policies 
throughout the Olympic Movement, and finally the concrete implementation of environmental 
and sustainability principles in the execution of the Games. The changes were preceded by the 
Centennial Olympic Congress, held in Paris in 1994, which recognised the ‘importance of 
environment and sustainable development’, and which led to the creation of the Sports and 
Environment Commission at the IOC.62 The Commission is composed of different stakeholders 
including members of the Olympic Movement as well as external experts.63 Its mission is to 
advice the Executive Board on environmental policy developments of the IOC or the Movement 
in general.64 Another important step regarding the integration of environmental and the Olympic 
Movement was the Agreement between UNEP and the IOC concluded in 1994.65 Cooperation 
with UNEP was engaged into for two reasons in particular. 
 
First, the Movement needed additional expertise in relation to its new approach to the 
environment. Even though the IOC possessed some in-house environmental expertise many 
initiatives such as program and policy development needed very specific capabilities which the 
IOC did not have when starting the program and to some degree still does not have today. 
                                                          
60  Rule 2 para. 13 of the Olympic Charter. 
61  See ‘Sports and Environment Commission – Mission’, available at: http://www.olympic.org/sport-
environment-commission?tab=Mission (last accessed 19 December 2014) 
62  Ibid. 
63  See ‘Sports and Environment Commission – Composition’, available at: http://www.olympic.org/sport-
environment-commission?tab=Composition (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
64  See IOC, ‘Factsheet – The Environment and Sustainable Development’, Update – January 2014, at 1, 
available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_documents_Factsheets/Environment_and_substainable_developeme
nt.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
65  See Cooperation Agreement between the International Olympic Committee and the United Nations 
Environment Programme, signed February 1994 (on file with the author). 
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Through cooperation with environmental organisations this expertise can be accessed when 
needed.66 This relates to the problem of multiple legitimacy claims. The IOC is first and 
foremost a sporting association. It has strong capacities to lead the international sporting 
Movement and to (co-)deliver the Olympic Games. It has, however, less capacity in ‘social 
regulation’; a field which is not at the centre of its mandate. Yet, as the example shows, its 
legitimacy as regulator can be questioned even on basis of effects caused in these specific fields 
outside its actual mandate. 
 
Secondly, the public nature of UNEP played an important role. Public international law literature 
has traditionally based legitimacy of international organisations on state consent. Recently this 
has been complemented by additional moral or normative considerations.67 Kumm for example 
has distinguished between formal legitimacy, jurisdictional legitimacy, procedural legitimacy 
and outcome legitimacy in the international realm.68 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart focus on 
procedural mechanisms (such as procedural participation, transparency, as well as reasoned 
decisions, review, proportionality, means-ends rationality, avoidance of unnecessarily restrictive 
means, and legitimate expectations) in their GAL project.69 As shown above the IOC has at least 
to some degree implemented these mechanisms both transnationally and as requirements for the 
local level. Nonetheless, one can observe here the tendency to consider international 
organisations as particularly legitimate, and therefore as valuable or even necessary cooperation 
partners.  
 
One way of interpreting this is that also in the transnational realm a more traditional perception 
of legitimacy is still dominant. As such, international organisations are considered particularly 
legitimate as they can be linked back to state consent or at least to state representation. 
Moreover, in the current context cooperation was particularly necessary for the execution of the 
Games. Here UNEP was required to support national and local (governmental) entities in their 
implementation of the bidding commitments. UNEP has a long history of practice in dealing 
                                                          
66  Interview with Ms. Katia Mascagni (IOC), 26 February 2013. 
67  See Chapter 2 at section 3.2.2 for a more detailed distinction between the different legitimacy claims.  
68  M Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’, 15 EJIL 
(2004) 907, at 917.  
69  B Kingsbury, N Krisch & R B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2005) 15, at 37. 
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with these entities as capacity building is one of its main tasks. Therefore, in an interview which 
was conducted for this case study, the IOC also stressed that it particularly appreciates the 
advocacy power which UNEP provided for the development of various policies and programs 
within the Olympic Movement. Being a public organisation was considered a further asset of 
UNEP, as it allows for collaboration on a number of platforms from advocacy, policy 
development, program setting, visibility and branding. According to the IOC there is no similar 
organisation that can contribute as much in each of these areas.70 
 
2.2 UNEP – A Weak Institution Attaining Strength through Cooperation 
 
When talking about the benefits UNEP draws from the regulatory relationship one has to look at 
the Programme’s weak position as an environmental anchor organisation and the resulting need 
to govern through cooperation. As pointed out in Chapter 2, depending on the architecture of the 
issue area, regulators may be endowed with a regulatory monopoly (in the case of a centralised 
issue area) or they may have to compete (or at least arrange themselves) with other regulators in 
a fragmented context.71 In the first case the monopolist most likely possesses a high degree of 
coercive power, as those targeted by the regulation have little choice other than a ‘take it or leave 
it’ option. One possibility which regulatory cooperation could thus open is to link less powerful 
regulators from weaker and fragmented areas to strong monopolists. In the following sections it 
will be shown that UNEP constitutes a rather weak organisation which has to operate in a highly 
fragmented issue area. Through cooperation and with the help of stronger organisations it is 
however able to implement its regulatory agenda in other issue areas (such as the sporting 
community in our case).  
 
2.2.1 General Remarks on the UNEP 
 
UNEP is not an international organisation as such but is the environmental program of the 
United Nations. UNEP was not created by a treaty between member states but came into 
                                                          
70  Interview with Ms. Katia Mascagni (IOC), 26 February 2013. 
71  See Chapter 2 at section 2.3.1. 
 171 
 
existence through a UN General Assembly Resolution.72 This resolution was adopted in the 
aftermath of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which took place in 
Stockholm in 1972 where the recommendation was made to set up an institution that would 
manage and coordinate environmental issues within the UN system.73 Its general mission is ‘to 
provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, 
informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without 
compromising that of future generations’.74 Not being a ‘proper’ international organisation, 
UNEP cannot become a party to international treaties and therefore usually relies on Memoranda 
of Understanding when organising its relationships with other organisations or actors.75 Until 
recently, membership in UNEP resulted from an election within the General Assembly. The 
Governing Council of UNEP had been composed of 58 member states which each had a four-
year mandate. However, within the general transformation process taking place at the 
organisation at the moment,76 at its 27th session held in Nairobi between 18-20 February 2013, 
the Governing Council adopted a resolution on paragraph 88 of the Rio + outcome document,77 
which opens UNEP for universal membership and thus replaces the Council with the 
Environmental Assembly. Therefore UNEP’s governance bodies are now the Assembly, which is 
supported by the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Secretariat, and the Environment 
Fund.78 Furthermore the Programme maintains a number of regional offices and hosts several 
secretariats of environmental conventions, such as the Convention on International Trade in 
                                                          
72  See General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) on Institutional and Financial Arrangements for 
International Environmental Co-Operation, 15 December 1972. 
73  See ‘United Nations Environment Programme, Environment for Development’, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/ABOUT_UNEP_ENGLISH.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
74  See ‘About UNEP, The Organization’, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=43 (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
75  See E Pushkareva, ‘United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law, available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
76  See General Assembly Resolution 66/288, The Future We Want, 11 September 2012, as well as the Annex 
to A/RES/66/288; and General Assembly Resolution 67/213 Report of the Governing Council of the United Nations 
Environment Programme on Its Twelfth Special Session and on the Implementation of Section IV.C, Entitled 
“Environmental Pillar in the Context of Sustainable Development”, of the Outcome Document of the United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development, para 4. 
77  See Annex to General Assembly Resolution 66/288, supra note 76, where it is stated: ‘In this regard, we 
invite the Assembly, at its sixty-seventh session, to adopt a resolution strengthening and upgrading the United 
Nations Environment Programme in the following manner: (a) Establish universal membership in the Governing 
Council of the United Nations Environment Programme, as well as other measures to strengthen its governance as 
well as its responsiveness and accountability to Member States;…’. 
78  General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) on Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International 
Environmental Cooperation; and see also Pushkareva, supra note 75, at para 5 ff.  
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Endangered Species, or the Convention on Biological Diversity.79 The Secretariat, located in 
Nairobi is responsible for the administration of UNEP. In order to fulfil its duties the 
administration is divided into a number of sub-units such as the Division of Technology, 
Industry & Economics, or the Division on Environmental Policy Implementation.80  
 
The final component of UNEPs governance structure is the Environment Fund. The Fund is 
endowed by voluntary contributions from UN member states. It is governed by the Assembly, 
which is also required to lay down general procedures to this end.81 The fund is intended to 
finance environmental activities within the UN System and other international organisations. 
Furthermore, it can also be used for financing programs of general interest at regional level. 82  
 
2.2.2 UNEP’s Difficult Role as an Anchor Organisation 
 
UNEP is said to have three mandates. First, it is an ‘integrative agency’ which incorporates 
environmental aspects into all parts of the UN family. Secondly, it is a ‘coordinating agency’ 
which brings together different actors and capacities to contribute to an overarching 
environmental program. Finally UNEP is a ‘funding agency’ that supports particular actors and 
projects.83 The main areas of UNEP’s activities comprise climate change, disasters and conflicts, 
ecosystem management, environmental governance, harmful substances, and resource 
efficiency.84 In all these areas UNEP carries out or simply supports numerous programs. Often 
this happens in partnership with other international organisations (from within the UN System85, 
                                                          
79  For an overview over the other secretariats under the roof of UNEP see 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=43&ArticleID=234&l=en (last accessed 19 
December 2014). 
80  See ‘UNEP Organigram’, available at: http://www.unep.org/pdf/UnepOrganigram.pdf (last accessed 19 
December 2014). For more details on the activities of the individual Divisions see Pushkareva, supra note 75, at 
para 8 ff.  
81  General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII), supra note 78, at III. 
82  Ibid. This can involve monitoring, assessment and data collection, public education and training, promotion 
of research, support of national or regional environmental institution, etc. Particular attention shall thereby be put on 
the developing priorities of developing countries. 
83  See Pushkareva, supra note 75, para 16 ff. 
84  Activities in each area are illustrated on UNEPs webpage: www.unep.org (last accessed 19 December 
2014). 
85  There is almost no UN Organisation that is not somehow engaged with UNEP. Common partners are the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Health 
Organization; UNICEF, just to name a few. 
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or from outside86), governments and regional institutions,87 as well as with private actors.88 
Whether UNEP is successfully fulfilling its mandate or not is disputed.89  
 
In political science literature organisations such as UNEP have been described as an anchor 
organisation. Such organisations are characterised as the ‘primary, though not the only, 
international organizations in a global issue area’.90 Their main functions are monitoring and 
assessment (in this case of the state of the environment), agenda setting and managing policy 
processes (in the issue area as a whole), and capacity development to address persisting problems 
in the issue area.91 Here the thesis focuses in particular on the latter two elements as they relate 
more closely to the specific issues in the intersection of sport and environment. 
 
Agenda setting and the management of policy processes is one of the central tasks of UNEP. It 
covers large sections of its mandate. As stated above, UNEP is responsible for the coordination 
of environmental treaties as well as general programs and policies in this area. More generally, 
UNEP is in charge of coordinating environmental activity taking place within the UN System 
and beyond.92 Treaty coordination has for example taken place in the case of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, where UNEP has created clusters of closely related conventions in the 
                                                          
86  Such as the OECD, the World Bank Group, or the WTO; see ‘The WTO and the United Nations 
Environment Program’, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_unep_e.htm (last accessed 
19 December 2014). 
87  Apart from partnerships to finance special programs UNEP cooperates on many levels with governments 
and further on regional level, see for instance: ‘Regional Workshops on Facilitating Understanding Between 
Officials Responsible for Development Planning and Officials Responsible for Chemicals Management – UNEP-
Norwegian Fund project on “Integration of Chemical Safety Concerns into Development Agendas wi’, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/chemicalsandwaste/UNEPsWork/Mainstreaming/IntegrationofSMCintoDevelopmentPlanning
Proce/Background/UNDPUNEPPIGuidanceDocuments/TheUNDPUNEPPartnershipInitiativeEconomicAn/UNEPN
orwegianFundproject/tabid/79378/Default.aspx (last accessed 19 December 2014).  
88  Such activities can for instance be found in the Sport and the Environment Programme, where UNEP 
cooperates with several private associations in the field of sport. See UNEP, ‘Sport and the Environment’ available 
at: http://www.unep.org/sport_env/ (last accessed 19 December 2014); or in UNEP’s ‘Finance Initiative’, where it 
cooperates with the financial sector, information available at: http://www.unepfi.org/ (last accessd 19 December 
2014). 
89  M Ivanova, ‘UNEP as Anchor Organization for the Global Environment’, in: F Biermann, B Siebenhüner 
& A Schreyögg (eds), International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance (Routledge, 2009) 151. 
90  Ibid at 152. 
91  Ibid. 
92  General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII), supra note 78, at I 2 b states: ‘[the Council shall] provide 
general policy guidance for the direction and co-ordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations 
system’. Pushkareva, supra note 75, para 19. 
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field.93 A further coordination process takes place regarding the secretariats of different 
environmental treaties. This includes general coordination processes (such as conferences for 
secretariats or providing a meeting platform) but also the hosting of several environmental 
convention secretariats. For those secretariats, even though they remain bodies of the respective 
treaty they are part of, UNEP executes the administrative tasks necessary.94  
 
However, UNEP struggles in fulfilling its role, particularly due to the conclusion of numerous 
environmental treaties. These all come with treaty organs which have ‘autonomous influence’ 
sometimes stronger than that of UNEP. Similarly, within the UN family and vis-à-vis other 
international organisations, UNEP was not able to emerge as the central institution for 
environmental issues.95 Rather, environmental regulation remains fragmented and UNEP’s 
activities dispersed. Many organisations are not willing to give up important features of their 
governance activities just because they relate to the environment and UNEP lacks the capacity 
but also the ‘institutional vision’ to take a more prominent role.96  
 
In capacity building UNEP faces problems as well. Similar to the previous point, capacity 
building can be found throughout UNEP’s mandate.97 The Programme has extensively 
contributed to the development of environmental law at the international, national and local 
level.98 This was mainly done through the facilitation of inter-governmental platforms which 
helped create international environmental agreements, principles and guidelines.99 These 
activities are conducted under the so-called Montevideo Programmes (there are four in total). 
They define the strategy UNEP is to take regarding the development and the periodic review of 
international environmental law.100 Apart from driving the normative agenda UNEP is designed 
to support governments in particular in the implementation of environmental instruments. 
                                                          
93  Pushkareva, supra note 75, para 21. 
94  Ibid para 22 and 23. 
95  Ivanova, supra note 89, at 158. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Pushkareva, supra note 75, para 24. 
98  See DELC, ‘About DELC’, available at http://www.unep.org/delc/AboutDELC/tabid/54412/Default.aspx 
(last accessed 19 December 2014); and Pushkareva, supra note 75, para 24. 
99  See DELC, supra note 98. 
100 See DELC, ‘Montevideo Programme’, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/delc/MontevideoProgramme/tabid/54416/Default.aspx (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
Some of the Environmental Agreements concluded under the auspices of the Montevideo Programmes are listed by 
Pushkareva, supra note 75, para. 25. 
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However, due to the explosion of environmental treaties and the strong demand for governments 
to receive assistance UNEP’s human and financial capacities are stretched to the limit.101 
 
One of the major weaknesses of UNEP which results in these problems, apart from its limited 
budget, is its informal structure and its lack of support from certain states.102 There have been 
various attempts to change UNEPs role as a ‘second class’ UN Organization over the years. 
Crucially, at the Rio+ 20 Conference mentioned above it was decided to strengthen and upgrade 
it.103 For the moment however, the success of these measures is still unclear. UNEP’s means of 
choice is therefore to cooperate with existing organisations, which already at this stage turns it 
into a ‘policy forum where various clusters of agencies and networks convene to negotiate and 
exchange experience’.104 This function could increase even further in the future.105 
 
2.2.3 Sport and Environment - Cooperation as a Way to Overcome Weaknesses in the 
Governance Structure 
 
The claim made in this thesis is that the main benefit for UNEP in the cooperation process was 
its ability to access the Olympic Movement’s unique implementation capacities. As such it was 
able to shape the environmental policies within the sporting community and beyond. As will be 
shown in greater detail below, from the very outset of the IOC’s environmental turn, UNEP was 
included. It not only helped shaping policies at the transnational level but also supported 
organising committees at the local level and cooperates with host cities and countries.106 UNEP, 
due to its particular expertise, had significant influence in drafting policy documents on Sport 
and Environment. Due to the strong and monopolistic character of the IOC, those policies were 
swiftly implemented throughout the Movement, thus allowing UNEP to reach a wide audience 
                                                          
101  Ivanova, supra note 89, at 160. 
102  Ibid at 161 ff.  
103  See General Assembly Resolution 66/288, supra note 76, and in particular Annex to General Assembly 
Resolution 66/288, at para 88. See General Assembly Resolution 67/213, supra note 76, para 4; and UNEP, 
Notification by the Executive Director Twenty-seventh session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial 
Environment Forum (Nairobi, 18–22 February 2013), 5 December 2012, para. 6. 
104  Ivanova, supra note 89, at 168. 
105  Ibid. 
106  See below at section 3.2. 
 176 
 
previously not specifically targeted by environmental policies.107 Particularly in the preparation 
and execution of the Olympic Games, UNEP had significant impact on projects which it was 
anticipated would have a long-lasting legacy in the host country. UNEP thereby benefited from 
the host city arrangement which contractually obliged any host city vis-à-vis the IOC to comply 
with its bidding commitments. As these commitments always contain an environmental 
component local authorities are, depending on their own capacities, bound to cooperate with 
experts (UNEP) which help them fulfil these requirements. Often those commitments foresee 
projects involving enormous amounts of financial investment. It is also significant that UNEP’s 
participation was not only limited to the Games but usually extended to the city or the region in 
which the event was taking place. UNEP was furthermore able to link local authorities with other 
environmental organisations in the area, thus expending their influence and connecting their 
expertise to the developments in the respective environmental domain. 
 
The present case study thus exemplifies cooperation where regulators from differently structured 
issue areas engage into a regulatory project which helps one actor to benefit from the powerful 
position of the other one.  
 
2.3 Summary 
 
What this section shows is that cooperation is driven by commutative benefits for the parties. 
When facing a legitimacy crisis, the IOC could benefit not only from UNEP’s expertise but also 
from its reputation and particularly its public character as member of the UN family, backed 
from participating governments. Additionally, UNEP was familiar with capacity building at local 
and national level, skills which were useful when helping organising committees to fulfil their 
environmental commitments of the host city contract. UNEP on the other hand found in the IOC 
a powerful organisation with an exceptionally wide reach. As will be shown in more detail 
below, through this cooperation it had the opportunity to implement environmental protection 
and sustainability standards into a broad network which reached not only the sporting 
community but also national and local levels.  
                                                          
107  However, see also the criticism by the representative of UNEP that the IOC could invest more resources 
into implementing better environmental protection at the local level, below section 3. 
 177 
 
 
3. SPORT AND ENVIRONMENT – A COMPLEX NETWORK INBETWEEN TWO 
REGULATORY FIELDS 
 
The following part will show how, based on and alongside the original bilateral cooperation, 
UNEP and the IOC have created interlinked networks of environmental regulation in the sporting 
context. This complex web extends from the sporting community, includes supplying business 
sectors, the national and local political level, and environmental protection and sustainability 
standards. This reveals a form of constitutionalisation as described in Chapter 4. In order to 
properly grasp the different processes and inter-linkages it is necessary to first of all describe the 
Sports and Environment Programs of the Olympic Movement (3.1). Secondly, the thesis will 
address UNEP’s participation in the different regulatory levels of the Program (3.2). 
Subsequently it will then briefly assess UNEP’s own sports and environment network (3.3). 
Ultimately, the final part will return to the main research claim and point out different forms of 
constitutionalisation throughout the sport and environment network (3.4). 
 
3.1 The Olympic Movement’s Sport and the Environment Program 
 
3.1.1 Overview over the Program at the IOC Level  
 
The Olympic Movement’s Sports and Environment Program developed from very modest 
environmental regulation in the late 1980s to a comprehensive set of policies in the late 1990s. 
These policies cover the large network of the wider Olympic family, encompassing not only 
sports federations but host cities, their home states, local communities, civil society and business 
actors. After the structural changes already described above (such as the amendment of the 
Charter for instance), various policies emerged at the IOC level. One of the most prominent 
policies is the Agenda 21 for the Olympic Movement, adopted by the Session 1999, which is 
modelled on the Earth Summit’s Agenda 21.108  
 
                                                          
108  See IOC, Focus Sport and Sustainability, April 2011, available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympism_in_action/Sport_and_Environment/FOCUS_Sustainability-
April_2011.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
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The Agenda: ‘[lays] out the general principles of the Olympic Movement’s policies and 
programmes associated with sport, sports events and environment-related initiatives’,109 and aims 
‘to encourage the members of the Olympic Movement to integrate sustainability principles into 
their operations’.110 In concrete terms, the Agenda provides for three major areas of actions for 
sustainable development. Those are improved socio-economic conditions (such as health 
protection, changing consumer habits, or human habitat), conservation and resource management 
(in particular regarding the implications of large-scale sport events), and finally the strengthening 
of major groups such as women, young people or indigenous populations.111 The Agenda is 
complemented by additional documents. One is the IOC Guide to Sport, Environment and 
Sustainable Development, which was developed in collaboration with all International 
Federations, and has the goal of transforming the recommendations of the Agenda into ‘concrete 
actions and programmes’.112 Another is the Manual on Sport and the Environment, a document 
which is intended to address all levels of the Olympic Movement, in awareness of their different 
competences in environmental issues. The Manual is aimed at ‘[providing] basic tools to identify 
problem areas, establish priorities and find appropriate responses to issues stemming from the 
relationship between sport and the environment’.113 Most recently, the report on ‘Sustainability 
through Sport: Implementing the Olympic Movement’s Agenda 21’ provided a summary of the 
developments of environmental protection in the area of sport in particular with regard to the 
Olympic Games, stakeholder initiatives and partnerships with UN agencies. Apart from this it 
also looks into and addresses future challenges.114 
 
Every second year the IOC conducts the World Conference on Sport and the Environment. This 
event includes representatives of the Olympic Movement, and other entities, such as 
                                                          
109  Ibid. 
110  See IOC, ‘Factsheet’, supra note 64, at 1. 
111  See IOC/Sport and Environment Commission, ‘Olympic Movement’s Agenda 21, Sport for Sustainable 
Development’, available at: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_300.pdf (last accessed 19 
December 2014). 
112  See IOC, ‘Factsheet’, supra note 64. 
113  See IOC, ‘Manual on Sport and the Environment’, at 7, available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_963.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
114  See IOC, ‘Factsheet’, supra note 64, at 2. See also IOC, ‘Sustainability through Sport, Implementing the 
Olympic Movement’s Agenda 21’, in particular at 85 ff, available at: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/SportAndEnvironment/Sustainability_Through_Sport.
pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
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governments, IOs, NOGs, industry and business, research institutes and the media.115 Its goal is 
to assess the progress made by the Olympic Movement regarding sustainable development, 
combined with the suggestion of new policies. It furthermore brings different actors together and 
in doing so allows for sharing experiences, expertise and for initiating or fostering cooperation. It 
furthermore provides a venue for education in environmental matters in the sports field.116 
 
Apart from these particularly prominent actions, the IOC pursues further activities (seminars or 
the creation of information material for example) to foster environmental and sustainability 
considerations within the Olympic Movement. There are also events at the local level conducted 
by NOCs or IFs. They vary depending on local specificities, preferences and concerns. More 
visible and more prevalent events are the so-called regional seminars, which are conducted 
together with Olympic Solidarity, an IOC entity which organises support programs for NOCs.117 
These seminars, which are adapted to local conditions, advocate use of sport for sustainable 
development, and help to identify environmental issues that need to be addressed. They 
furthermore encourage commitment of NOCs to programs that need to be implemented at 
national level. Finally, the seminars enable NOCs to share experiences concerning their local 
environmental programs.118  
 
3.1.2 Greening the Olympics 
 
Being at the centre of the Olympic Movement, the Games are also at the centre of environmental 
concerns. In fact, as stated above, the driver behind the environmental agenda of the IOC was to 
‘green’ the Games in order to appease parts of the public concerned with the negative 
environmental externalities of the mega-events. Therefore, just after the ‘environmental disaster’ 
of the 1992 Games119 environmental concerns and sustainability increasingly became of primary 
concern both in the application and execution phase of the Games.  
 
                                                          
115  See IOC, ‘Factsheet’, supra note 64, at 2. 
116  Ibid. 
117  Ibid. 
118  Ibid. 
119  See above section 2.1.3. 
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As outlined above, the applications phase follows two stages, a candidature acceptance and a 
candidate phase. In the first, applicants are required to answer a questionnaire provided by the 
IOC. Under the category ‘environmental conditions and impact’ cities have to: 
 
- Provide an assessment of current environmental conditions in the city 
- Provide details of ongoing environmental projects and their organisation 
- Provide an assessment of the environmental impact of staging the Games in that city/region 
- Provide information in regard to any environmental impact studies carried out on proposed 
venues and if legislation requires such studies.120 
 
The information gathered is assessed with that gathered in other categories and a final decision is 
made on this basis. Cities which have made it to the candidate phase are then required to submit 
a detailed ‘candidature file’. This file includes a section labelled ‘environment and metrology’. 
Here the candidate has to provide information on its environmental approach ‘in regard to 
geographical features; public authorities; environmental management systems; venue 
construction and development projects’.121 Thus, at both stages environmental concerns are part 
of the criteria by which a host city is chosen. 
 
All commitments made in the second application stage are binding and have to be implemented 
by the organising committee if the city is chosen. For this the Organizing Committee must 
cooperate with governmental authorities and other stakeholders in order to implement the 
policies across the city and nationwide. Experts from the IOC and other organisations (such as 
UNEP) assist the Organizing Committee in development and implementation.122 Furthermore, 
the IOC Coordination Commission monitors the process (together with external actors, such as 
UNEP, NGOs or the media) in order to ensure ‘maximum fulfilment of commitments and 
maximum use of the opportunity to improve environmental conditions and practices’.123 
 
                                                          
120  Sport and Environment Commission, ‘Environmental Protection and the Olympic Games’, available at:  
http://www.olympic.org/sport-environment-commission?tab=games (last accessed 19 December 2014).  
121  Ibid. The details of this include: ‘[A]ir quality; protected areas; public authorities' roles and responsibilities; 
Environmental Impact Assessments; construction work; work with NGOs; integration of environmental approaches 
into contracts with suppliers and sponsors; special features and actions; and Games-time rainfall, wind, temperatures 
and humidity levels’. 
122  Ibid. 
123  Ibid. 
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Since Lillehammer the green approach of the Olympic Games has steadily increased. Nagano in 
1998, as the first city where the IOC had prescribed an environmental protection policy to be 
implemented by the Organizing Committee,124 included a number of environmental friendly 
activities in its agenda such as the use of low-emission vehicles. Sidney in 2000 already put the 
‘green theme’ at the centre of the Games and sought to create a beneficial impact for the 
environment.125 In Athens (2004) and Torino (2006) environmental aspects became more and 
more important. The Athens’ Organizing Committee was the first to sign a MoU with UNEP, 
even though UNEP had more of an observer role due to the fact that this happened at a late point 
in the organizing phase. In general there were a number of environmental failures linked to the 
Games in Athens.126 In contrast, Torino began cooperation with UNEP at an earlier stage, the 
result of which according to UNEP, ‘was seen as a genuine step forward in the environmental 
management of sporting events’.127 However, the legacy of these two early examples of ‘Green 
Games’ has been challenged by other observers.128 
 
Two years later Beijing followed this trend by trying to make the Games a ‘catalyst in bringing 
the concept of environmental sustainability into a comprehensive city development plan’.129 The 
bidding commitments covered the areas of air and water quality, transport, energy, ecosystems 
and protected areas.130 In total 17 billion US dollars were allocated to fund 20 different 
environmental projects over a period of nine years.131 The measures taken in the individual areas 
were manifold, ranging from raising public awareness for environmental concerns, to concrete 
infrastructure construction, the promotion of environment-related industries and detailed 
                                                          
124  See Cantelon & Letters, supra note 34, 294. 
125  IOC, ‘Sustainability through Sport’, supra note 114, at 39 ff.  
126  Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 9.  
127  See UNEP News Center, ‘London 2012 Will Leave a Lasting Legacy for the UK and the Olympic 
Movement: UNEP Executive Director’ (26 July 2005), available at: 
http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2691&ArticleID=9239 (last accessed 19 December 
2014) 
128  See J Karamichas, ‘Olympic Games as an Opportunity for the Ecological Modernization of the Host 
Nation: The Cases of Sydney 2000 and Athens 2004’, in: G Hayes & J Karamichas, Olympic Games, Mega-Events 
and Civil Societies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 151 ff.  
129  Ibid at 42. 
130  UNEP, ‘Independent Environmental Assessment, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, 2009’, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/BEIJING_REPORT_COMPLETE.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014) at 14f. 
131  Ibid at 16; and UNEP, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games – An Environmental Review (2007), at 26. 
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pollution reduction efforts.132 These endeavours were monitored by NGOs and UNEP which 
provided expertise and conducted audits. Results of these measures were an increase in the green 
area in Beijing by 43% and the promotion of a waste sorting and recycling system.133 
 
For the execution of the Games in Vancouver in 2010 the Organizing Committee for the first 
time created a sustainability department. The underlying concept of the environmental plans for 
the Games was the combination of ecological, social and economic benefits. This was intended 
to be achieved through six sustainability performance objectives, which were ‘accountability, 
environmental stewardship and impact reduction, social inclusion and responsibility, aboriginal 
participation and collaboration, economic benefits, [and] sport for sustainable living’.134 These 
criteria translated inter alia into green construction of the game venues, waste management, and 
CO2 neutrality.135  
 
London 2012 put its environmental program under the motto ‘one planet living’136 which was 
designed to raise awareness of the imbalanced exploitation of the earth’s resources, with 
particularly burdensome behaviour displayed by developed countries.137 Therefore, apart from 
building green facilities and infrastructure, London 2012 attempted to raise environmental 
awareness in five areas: Climate change, waste, biodiversity, inclusion, and healthy living.138 
These fields also constituted priority areas in the environmental plan for the Games and thus 
translated into low carbon measures, a zero waste target, and the creation of new green spaces 
within the city.139 
 
Finally Sochi, the host city of the last Olympic Games, had set up an environmental action plan. 
Its goal was to achieve zero waste and climate neutral Games. Furthermore, the event was to be 
                                                          
132   See UNEP, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games – An Environmental Review, supra note 131, at 26 ff, which also 
provides a detailed overview over the different projects into which the money was allocated. 
133  IOC, ‘Sustainability through Sport’, supra note 114, at 42.  
134  See Sport and Environment Commission, ‘Environmental Protection and the Olympic Games’, supra note 
120. 
135  IOC, ‘Sustainability through Sport’, supra note 114, at 44 f. 
136  A concept developed by the World Wildlife Fund, the Global Conservation Organization, and BioRegional, 
see ibid at 46. 
137  Ibid at 46 ff.  
138  Sport and Environment Commission, ‘Environmental Protection and the Olympic Games’, supra note 120. 
139  IOC, Sustainability through Sport, supra note 114, at 47 f.  
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conducted in harmony with the surrounding nature, whilst at the same time trying to promote 
sustainable development in the region. The Games were to create an ‘enlightenment’ effect for 
the area, which was to be supported by a strong educational and awareness raising component.140 
Despite this approach and its cooperation with UNEP and the IOC, the environmental legacy of 
the Sochi Olympics seems to be mixed.141  
 
What the previous paragraphs draw out well is the inter-relationship between the host city, 
country and the transnational (IOC) level discussed above. As we can see, the IOC sets the 
framework yet it is the host city and the regional or national government whose engagement 
matters to a large extent for the final outcome. Further, their engagement also refers back to the 
transnational level. Thus, without Lillehammer’s showcase model of ‘green Games’ the IOC’s 
environmental policies might look different today. Other cities, such as Beijing, in return used 
the ‘catalyzing effect’ that the Games could provide to revamp their own environmental 
approach. Thus, in this particular case Hayes and Karamichas’s assessment seems to fit 
particularly well: 
 
Sport mega-events increasingly provide a platform for economic growth oriented approaches to 
environmental protection and amelioration. In this scenario, the IOC … functions as regulatory 
authority for the development and dissemination of environmental best practice and sustainable 
technologies, facilitating the creation and growth of new markets.142  
 
As the description of the bidding and implementation process shows the IOC is indeed playing 
the role of a regulatory authority in this case. Based on the general legal framework the IOC has 
ultimate authority. This is particularly the case at the moment when it chooses the host city but 
and also at a later level, exercised through the Coordination Commission backed by the ultimate 
possibility to withdraw the Games (although this measure of last resort has never been applied). 
The example of the Sochi Games furthermore indicates that once the Games are awarded, the 
                                                          
140  See UNEP, ‘Green Olympics in Sochi’, information available at: 
http://www.unep.org/roe/GreenOlympicsinSochi/tabid/54610/Default.aspx (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
141  ‘The Not So Sustainable Sochi Winter Olympics’ Time Magazine, 30 January 2014, available at: 
http://time.com/2828/sochi-winter-olympics-environmental-damage/ (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
142  Hayes & Karamichas, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
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IOC is also locked into the process and its own reputation very much depends on a successful 
outcome.143 
 
3.2 Cooperation between the IOC and UNEP 
 
Cooperation between UNEP and the Olympic community takes place on all levels outlined 
above. First, there is the MoU between the IOC and UNEP upon which cooperation with the 
general Movement is based. Secondly, UNEP is often involved in the preparations of the 
individual Games. This is framed by the detailed and legally binding agreements concluded 
between UNEP and the respective organising committees. Finally, cooperation can also take 
place at the local level between UNEP and one or more national committees or federations.  
 
3.2.1 Cooperation at the General Policy Level  
 
Formally, cooperation at IOC level is based on the aforementioned agreement between the IOC 
and UNEP concluded in 1994. It constitutes a broad political declaration of intent and the main 
framework document which sets out both organisations’ intentions.144 In concrete terms the MoU 
confirms that the IOC has put sustainability and environmental protection at the core of its policy 
and operation. Furthermore, it holds that UNEP has the expertise in the area of the environment 
and sustainability. Sport then is both a venue to address sustainability concerns but also a domain 
which needs to better integrate sustainability into its policies.145 
 
Based on this framework many individual projects and forms of mutual participation take place, 
often through informal mechanisms such as exchange of letters (or are simply based on 
customary practices). For example, UNEP has a fixed seat in the Sport and Environment 
Commission of the IOC. This practice is not enshrined in a particular document but is based on 
an unwritten rule concerning the composition of this body.146 Moreover, regular exchange of 
information and services between the IOC and UNEP takes place through two other departments 
                                                          
143  See ‘The Not So Sustainable Sochi Winter Olympics’ supra note 141; as well as Cantelon & Letters, supra 
note 34, at 302. 
144  See Agreement between the IOC and UNEP, supra note 65. 
145  Ibid. 
146  See Interview with Ms Katia Mascagni (IOC), 26 February 2013. 
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of the IOC: The International Cooperation and Development Department and the Department of 
Games.147 
 
Regarding the output of this cooperation at the IOC level, two projects must be named in 
particular. Firstly, it is necessary to mention Agenda 21 and subsequent documents such as the 
‘IOC Guide to Sport, Environment and Sustainable Development’ or ‘Sustainability through 
Sport: Implementing the Olympic Movement’s Agenda 21’.148 UNEP was one of the key 
contributors to the Agenda. UNEP representatives were at the forefront of the expert group 
responsible for the drafting process. As a result, UNEP had a significant impact in setting out the 
general environmental directions and policies of the Olympic Movement.  
 
The second example is the Conference on Sport and Environment which the Olympic Movement 
organises in cooperation with UNEP. UNEP thereby has visibility as one of two key organisers 
and is the only organisation apart from the IOC that has ‘branding’ in the conference. UNEP has 
also influence in the substantive content of the Conference and participates by sending speakers 
on different panels. In short, even though the initiative for the Conference originates from the 
IOC, UNEP is heavily and visibly involved both in the preparation and execution of the 
Conference.149 
 
3.2.2 The Olympics – Regulatory Cooperation in the Context of Mega Events  
 
As stated above, a central aspect of the cooperation between UNEP and the Olympic Movement 
takes place at host city level. The Olympic Games are the key deliverable of the Movement and 
are also the most visible event which carries significant potential for problematic environmental 
effects. As a result of this particular focus on the Games and their sustainability and 
environmental impact,150 cooperation with outside partners is also highly developed at this level. 
For this reason one can find detailed agreements between the organising committees and UNEP. 
In contrast to the rather general MoU between UNEP and the IOC, the agreements between 
                                                          
147  Ibid. 
148  IOC, ‘Focus Sport and Sustainability’, supra note 108. 
149  See Interview with Ms Katia Mascagni (IOC), 26 February 2013. 
150  See above at section 2.1.3.  
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UNEP and the organising committees stipulate in detail which different contractual services are 
to be provided. In this way UNEP becomes one of the experts of the committee or an external 
provider of environmental expertise. Therefore these agreements actually resemble service 
contracts with UNEP tasked with delivering a number of items within a particular timeframe. In 
return, the organising committees usually have to fulfil a number of obligations to UNEP.151  
 
The scope of each agreement varies from city to city. Depending on the host city or other 
partner’s expertise and capabilities, UNEP can be more or less involved in the planning and 
execution of the Games. In the London Olympics, for instance, UNEP’s involvement was less 
necessary as the City of London was equipped with extensive environmental expertise and 
execution abilities. In contrast, Sochi 2014 and Beijing 2012 were more dependent on outside 
assistance in their environmental agenda.152 Consequently, the Sochi Organizing Committee 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with UNEP laying out the extensive cooperation for the 
purpose of achieving green Games.153 Generally, the IOC encourages involvement of different 
environmental organisations which may be IOs such as UNEP or NGOs with international or 
local reach. However, this is never a requirement as the organising committee has the final 
decision in this regard.154 Furthermore, it is important to note that it is UNEP which often 
involves other specialised NGOs. In order to get a better understanding of the actual contribution 
UNEP provides to the host cities, it is useful to briefly outline UNEP’s involvement in the 
preparation of the last four Olympic Games in Beijing, Vancouver, London, and Sochi. 
 
3.2.2.1 Beijing 
 
The 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing were conducted in cooperation with UNEP which was 
established through a MoU signed between the Organizing Committee and UNEP in 2005.155 
UNEP’s role thereby was to help Beijing to implement the environmental goals enshrined in 
Beijing’s bidding commitments. It also helped to improve communication with environmental 
                                                          
151  See for instance the Memorandum of Understanding between the Sochi 2014 Organizing Committee and 
UNEP, 5 June 2009 (on file with the author). 
152  Interview with Ms Katia Mascagni (IOC), 26 February 2013. 
153  See MoU between Sochi 2014 and UNEP, supra note 151. 
154  Interview with Katia Mascagni (IOC), 26 February 2013. 
155  See UNEP, ‘Independent Environmental Assessment – Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, 2009’, supra note 
130, at 13. 
 187 
 
NGOs and to raise awareness among the media and the general public.156 These efforts were 
accompanied by two reports on the environmental performance of Beijing’s Organizing 
Committee: the intermediate report published in 2007 (which assessed whether Beijing was on 
track in meeting bidding commitments157) and the final report that focused on the environmental 
impact of the Games.158  
 
The intermediate report first looks at the efforts regarding green Olympic Games in a number of 
issue areas such as environmental management, the use of the venues in the post-Games era, 
energy, transport, water, waste, green building, ozone layer protection and green coverage of the 
Olympic sites amongst others.159 The second part concerns the greater impact of the Games on 
Beijing. Here air quality, transport, energy and industry, water and waste management, green 
coverage and protected areas are addressed.160 The final part of the report contains the views of 
several environmental NGOs whose inclusion in the process UNEP had advocated. Those NGOs 
are the Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences, Conservation International, the Chinese 
Environmental Protection Association, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Friends of 
Nature and Greenpeace. All of these organisations contributed to the execution of the 
environmental plan in one way or another. The reports in this section were provided by the 
NGOs themselves. They all included assessments of the different contributions the NGOs made 
to the process and some contained an evaluation of future activities, suggestions for 
improvement and a critique of current practices.161 
 
The final report assesses the impact of the Games in different environmental categories such as 
air quality, transport, energy, green coverage and protected areas, water, waste, the Olympic 
sites, climate neutrality and communication and education. Furthermore, it also addresses the 
role of the partners of the Games and again leaves room for the perspective of NGOs (even 
though in this report the feedback of the NGOs was summarised by UNEP and not simply 
                                                          
156  See ‘UNEP and the Various Olympic Events’, available at: 
http://www.unep.org/sport_env/olympics_Events.aspx (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
157  See UNEP, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games – An Environmental Review, supra note 131. 
158  See UNEP, ‘Independent Environmental Assessment’, supra note 130. 
159  See UNEP, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games – An Environmental Review, supra note 131, at 40-83 
160  Ibid at 84-144. 
161  Ibid at 145-158 note that only Greenpeace China, the World Wildlife Fund and Conservation International 
submitted reports.  
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reprinted as in the intermediate report).162 For the main part of the report, UNEP relied 
predominantly on data provided by the Municipal Government of Beijing as well as on 
information provided by the Organizing Committee. UNEP therefore had to make a disclaimer 
stating that it and its ‘team of experts [has] tried to provide objective analysis, comments and 
recommendations based on this data. It should be noted that in some instances required data was 
not available’.163 Each section contains comments and recommendations regarding the progress 
achieved during the preparation for the Games and possible improvements that could still be 
made. These recommendations extend to the general environmental situation in Beijing and 
China.  
 
3.2.2.2 Vancouver and London 
 
Both, the Vancouver and London Organizing Committees possessed a high degree of 
environmental expertise. It was therefore stated that UNEP’s input in the preparation and 
execution of these Games was lower than in others.164 UNEP however stressed that they were 
nonetheless highly involved at different levels.165 In the case of Vancouver, the Organizing 
Committee signed a MoU with UNEP on October 27th 2007. The MoU foresaw cooperation 
regarding environmental education and raising public awareness.166  
 
3.2.2.3 Sochi 
 
As stated before, Sochi 2014 was more dependent on outside environmental expertise than its 
two predecessors. Consequently UNEP’s participation was also stronger. Since the very 
beginning of the preparations UNEP was heavily involved. On June 5th 2009 the Organizing 
Committee concluded a MoU with UNEP. Later, in 2010, a broader MoU between UNEP and 
                                                          
162  See UNEP, ‘Independent Environmental Assessment’, supra note 130. 
163  Ibid, at 13. 
164  Interview with Michelle Lemaitre (IOC), 10 April 2013. 
165  Interview with Wondwosen Asnake Kibret (UNEP), 12 April 2013. 
166  See Press Release: ‘UNEP Partners with Vancouver 2010 on Environmental Initiatives for the 2010 Winter 
Games’ (29 October 2007), available at: 
http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?DocumentID=519&ArticleID=5691&l=en (last accessed 
19 December 2014). 
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the Russian Federation was developed.167 The 2009 MoU with the Organizing Committee 
foresaw several areas of cooperation. Very generally UNEP was to assist the Organizing 
Committee in the planning and delivery of the Games by providing advice on issues such as 
greenhouse gas management, ozone management, solid waste-management and other goals of 
the bidding commitments.168 Two projects were particularly pursued in this regard. First, as in 
the case of Beijing UNEP was to conduct two environmental reviews, one prior to the Games 
and a second to be conducted after the Games.169 Secondly, UNEP was to build an expert team 
which was to provide advice to the organisers upon request.170  
 
Apart from those central issues UNEP was to assist in a number of additional areas. Among 
other things, UNEP was to promote good working relations with NGOs and other 
stakeholders,171 to support awareness-raising activities,172 co-organise cultural173 and educational 
programs174 and participate in the development of joint communication projects regarding the 
environmental aspects of the Games.175  
 
3.2.3 Room for Improvement – Cooperation with Local Entities 
 
As outlined above the IOC supports cooperation on Games and advocacy and educational work 
regarding the environment among the members of the Olympic Movement. This crystallises in 
different programs to raise awareness for the need to integrate sustainability into the sporting 
agenda of the members, in education efforts by which specific tools are put at the disposal of 
local committees, and last but not least in the creation of linkages with the network of experts 
from UNEP and other organisations (through workshops and conferences for example). UNEP is 
                                                          
167  The MoU is mentioned in UNEP, ‘Report of the UNEP 2nd Expert Mission 28-30 January 2010’, available 
at: 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/PressReleases/SOCHI_2014Jan28to302010_Mission_%20ReportFinal_%2015March.pdf 
(last accessed 19 December 2014) 
168  MoU between Sochi 2014 and UNEP, supra note 151, Article 4.3. 
169  Ibid. Article 4.4. As of now none of these reports seems to be publically available. There are however, 
smaller reports on a particular issues such as UNEP, ‘Report of the UNEP 2nd Expert Mission 28-30 January 2010’, 
supra note 167. 
170  MoU between Sochi 2014 and UNEP, supra note 151, Article 4.4. 
171  Ibid Article 4.5. 
172  Ibid Article 4.5. 
173  Ibid Article 4.8. 
174  Ibid Article 4.10. 
175  Ibid Article 4.9. 
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not represented in all countries – so there may not be an office in the specific country of a NOC, 
yet when there is a specific need for expertise by a NOC then the IOC will help to set up contact 
by, for instance, having someone from the headquarters come to the committee. UNEP’s role 
would then be to train local personnel in workshops and through other events.176 
 
3.3 UNEP’s Own Sport and the Environment Program: Using Sport to Improve 
Environmental Protection 
 
UNEP, as has been described above, often uses cooperation and partnerships to foster and 
improve environmental protection in certain areas. Therefore, it is not surprising that apart from 
its cooperation with the Olympic Movement, UNEP has also created its own program that is 
designed to combine the field of sport with that of environment. After cooperation with the 
Olympic Movement began in 1994, a number of other actors in the field of sport have built ties 
with UNEP. This collaboration led to a complex program linking the two areas, though the 
cooperation with the Olympic Movement remains the most crucial.177 In 2003 the UNEP 
Governing Council developed a long term strategy for the Sports and Environment Program.178  
 
UNEP’s Sports and Environment Program has two main objectives which resemble those of the 
Olympic Movement’s Sport and Environment initiative. First, it intends to ‘[p]romote the 
integration of environmental considerations into sports’.179 This means that sporting activities 
should be planned and executed in a way that is sustainable and not environmentally harmful. In 
addition, sport events should have a positive environmental impact in the respective community 
where the event is taking place or where it is practiced. This leads to the second objective 
pursued with the Sport and the Environment Program: it aims to use ‘the popularity of sports to 
promote environmental awareness and respect for the environment among the public’.180 The 
idea behind this is that sport has significant appeal to the public and as such has significant 
                                                          
176  Interview with Ms. Katia Mascagni (IOC), 26 February 2013, and Interview with Wondwosen Asnake 
Kibret (UNEP), 12 April 2013. 
177  See ‘About UNEP, Sport and the Environment’, available at: http://www.unep.org/sport_env/about.aspx 
(last accessed 19 December 2014). 
178  Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme, Long-Term Strategy for Sport and 
Environment of the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP/GC.22/3/Add.3/Rev.1, 23 January 2003. 
179  Ibid para 2; and ‘About UNEP, Sport and the Environment’ supra note 177. 
180  Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme, Long-Term Strategy for Sport and 
Environment of the United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 178. 
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influence within society. Therefore it ‘can become a powerful agent for change’.181 Apart from 
sport’s popularity within society as a whole, another argument for making sport an advocate for 
environmental protection is that sporting organisations often have good relationships with 
government and the industry representative and may also advocate for and encourage greater 
environmental protection at this level.182 In sum, sport has grown in importance over the last 
decades, hand in hand with its increased prominence. The Sport and the Environment Program 
intents to benefit from this development by using sport’s popularity to further its goals – 
environmental protection. The sporting community on the other hand is to benefit from the 
expertise that UNEP can provide for the execution of sporting events. 
 
As stated at various stages above, the partnership between UNEP and the Olympic Movement is 
still a crucial one.183 However, UNEP also extended cooperation to general and individual sport 
associations,184 sporting events and businesses active in the area of sport. 
 
Regarding the first case, one can cite the cooperation between UNEP and the Indian Premier 
League (Cricket). This partnership is based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the 
two organisations in 2010185 and encompasses two main areas of cooperation. Firstly, UNEP is 
to provide expertise in order to improve the environmental impact of sporting events of IPL. This 
includes subjects like ‘sustainable transport, energy efficiency, waste and water management, 
green building and green procurement’.186 Secondly, the public reach that the IPL has should be 
used to promote environmental programs, protection and sustainability in general.187  
 
An example of the second area of cooperation is the cooperation of UNEP with FIFA World Cup 
events. UNEP signed agreements with the organisers of both the 2006 World Cup in Germany as 
well as the 2010 World Coup in South Africa. 2006 was the first time that a FIFA World Cup 
included environmental considerations in the preparation and execution of the event. The 
                                                          
181  ‘About UNEP, Sport and the Environment’, supra note 177.  
182  Ibid. 
183  See Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme, Long-Term Strategy for Sport and 
Environment of the United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 178, para 24 and 25. 
184  Ibid para 26 and 27. 
185  See Memorandum of Understanding between Indian Premier League and UNEP, available at:  
http://www.unep.org/sport_env/images/IPL_MoU.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2014). 
186  Ibid Article 3. 
187  Ibid Article 3 (1)-(11). 
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agreement between the organisers and UNEP particularly focused on a low-pollution and eco-
friendly competition.188 After the success of this first cooperation, a partnership between the 
Global Environment Facility, UNEP and the South African Department of Environmental Affairs 
was set up for the 2012 World Cup. This initiative had three components: ‘[r]enewable energy 
interventions in six World Cup host cities, [a]n awareness-raising drive on green tourism […] 
funded by GEF, [a]nd a UNEP programme to offset the carbon emissions of eleven World Cup 
teams’.189  
 
Finally, UNEP also cooperates with industries active in the sport sector. On its website it lists the 
example of Puma, a manufacturer of sports attire, with which it launched the ‘The Play for Life 
Campaign’ which was intended to fund conservation programs in Africa and thereby to support 
the International Year of Biodiversity in 2010.190 As has been already discussed in the previous 
chapters UNEP has set out a framework governing its cooperation with private actors which also 
applies in the sporting context. Thus, any potential cooperation project has to first undergo a due 
diligence process which depends on the type of cooperation involved. Consequently, a 
distinction is made depending on whether UNEP receives funds or makes payments to the 
partner organisation, and on how high the payments are.191  
 
Substantively, UNEP has a number of exclusionary criteria for partnerships. They depend on 
whether the partner is a for- or non-profit organisation. Partnerships either fall into category A – 
exclusionary, or B – cautionary. As such, for for-profit organisations complicity in human rights 
abuses, toleration of forced labour and child labour, the sale or manufacturing of landmines, 
active work against UN goals or violations of Security Council sanctions fall within the 
exclusionary category.192 In category B one finds a list of Global Compact-sensitive industries 
(such as weapons or tobacco producers), UNEP-sensitive industries (such as chemical or fossil 
                                                          
188  ‘Greening of the 2006 World Cup’, available at: http://www.unep.org/sport_env/2006worldcup.aspx (last 
accessed 19 December 2014). 
189  ‘2010 Green Goal in South Africa’, available at: http://www.unep.org/sport_env/Worldcup2010.aspx (last 
accessed 19 December 2014). 
190  See ‘Puma® Play for Life’, available at: http://www.unep.org/sport_env/Puma_PlayforLife.aspx (last 
accessed 19 December 2014). 
191  UNEP, Partnership Policy and Procedures, Policy Outline No.1/2011, 21 October 2011. 
192  See ibid Annex 2, at 26. 
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fuel industries) as well as a list of issues which could lead to a conflict of interest.193 
Furthermore, there is a third category (C) which lists positive criteria such participation in the 
Global Compact or GRI reporting schemes for example.  
 
For business partners there are nine such positive criteria. Meeting more than six indicates a clear 
affirmative decision for cooperation whilst less than six may require specific assessment of the 
commitment.194 For not-for-profit organisations a similar list exists which is also divided into 
three categories. In category A one finds particular exclusionary criteria that are based on the 
organisation’s status and capacities (financial, administrative and technical).195 In the B category 
one finds the list of UN policy and value related issues which are listed in the previous category 
of for-profit organisations. Examples are violations of UN Security Council sanctions or other 
UN-related obligations and responsibilities.196 Lastly in category C organisations can receive 
positive points if they possess relevant technical or strategic capacity.197 
 
In conclusion, UNEP has also has created a network of cooperation between the sport sector and 
the environmental sector. It has broadened its sport and environment campaign by partnering 
with other influential organisations (such as IPL or FIFA), even though the partnership with the 
Olympic Movement still takes a central position. In all cases the major goal is the promotion of 
environmental protection among the wider public, but also to assist organising committees in 
their efforts to create more environmental friendly events. UNEP’s partnership requirements 
constitute a framework within which cooperation can take place. However, UNEP has less 
hierarchical force and is more dependent on voluntary cooperation of interested actors.  
 
3.4 Synthesis – Cooperation, Networks and Constitutionalisation Effects in the Field of 
Sport and Environment  
 
The development of commutative forms of cooperation into broader networks which have more 
of a constitutionalising function can be well observed in this case study. It is important to point 
                                                          
193  Ibid at 26 and 27. 
194  Ibid at 27 and 28. 
195  Ibid at 30. 
196  Ibid.  
197  Ibid at 30-31. 
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out two ways in which this development takes place in this regard. First, constitutionalisation via 
cooperation requirements: As shown above, UNEP has a partnership framework in place which 
entails due diligence procedures for every instance of cooperation. Under this framework 
potential partners must be in line with certain normative standards (such as the Global Compact’s 
10 principles). Consequently, with each cooperation engaged into, UNEP promulgates these 
norms in other (private) sectors and functional issue areas. This can also be observed in the case 
of the sporting sector. 
 
However, a second way of network construction is more important in this case. This is namely 
the integration of environmental protection standards into the sporting community and through 
mega-events into territorial political spaces and broader civil society. This has happened in two 
phases, first of all through the network created between UNEP and the sporting community 
(starting with the UNEP-IOC Cooperation Agreement), which in actual fact consists of several 
interlinked networks. As such, the IOC has created a loose network whereby it brings together 
actors (sports-related organisations, public actors, and NGOs) engaged in the area of sport and 
environment.198 Equally, UNEP has started an initiative for sport and environment whereby it 
cooperates with various actors from the sporting sector, such as sporting associations (national 
and international), particular sport events and industry. This led to a constitutionalisation process 
which made environmental protection and sustainability an intrinsic part of sports governance. 
This is of course most visible in the Charta amendment by which a new paragraph was 
introduced into Rule 2. As demonstrated above, UNEP had significant input in this development 
and actively shaped particular second tier rules and regulations establishing environmental 
protection in the realm of sport.199  
 
Through mega-events environmental protection and sustainability considerations reached both 
the national and local level. In particular in developing countries, which could not build on a 
long tradition of environmental policies, such events can be a catalyst for enormous regulatory 
transformation. UNEP very straightforwardly stressed the catalyst effect as the main reason for 
engaging in cooperation.200 By providing advisory services, UNEP has the opportunity to work 
                                                          
198  The main example of this is the Conference on Sport and Environment, see above for more information.  
199  See above section 3.3.1. 
200  Interview with Wondwosen Asnake Kibret (UNEP), 12 April 2013. 
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closely with local and national governments and the industry involved. It can thus implement its 
regulatory policies into the local realm in a much more wide-ranging and direct way than it 
would be possible through pure advocacy.  
 
Furthermore, the Games are an opportunity to raise awareness with the general public, due to the 
wide coverage the Olympics enjoy. They can thus help in changing environmentally harmful 
habits and create a more sustainable culture within the region or even on a larger scale.201 
However, whether the Olympics have this catalyst effect also depends largely on the motivations 
at the local level as the different examples of Beijing and Sochi portray. Moreover, at the 
moment the ‘extended network’ is still very limited as it usually only develops in the context of 
the Games. Therefore UNEP stressed that cooperation with local sports federations is of 
particular importance for them. Those local entities usually have a broad network including 
government entities and industry (in form of sponsors, construction companies, and equipment 
providers for instance). Therefore, being able to influence policies and behaviour of local sports 
entities can have very beneficial impacts on national and local environmental policies and 
practices.  
 
An additional advantage of this cooperation is that it is not linked to one particular event, such as 
the Olympics, which takes place only on biennial basis and in one particular city. Many places in 
the world will never be able to host Olympic Games. They nonetheless have long and successful 
sport traditions and possess strong and influential NOCs and other sporting federations. Access 
to those organisations means that the message of sustainability can be spread on a much broader 
scale.202 
 
In conclusion the present case study demonstrates how cooperation, which is first engaged into 
out of necessity, turns into a broader network with constitutionalisation effects. Environmental 
protection is now an intrinsic element of sports regulation. It is widespread throughout the 
community and backed by the influential institution in place in this issue area. UNEP was able 
(and probably necessary) to shape this process. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
This aim of this work was to provide an introduction to regulatory cooperation at the 
transnational level. The goal was not only to raise awareness of the existence of regulatory 
cooperation but also to improve our understanding of the related theoretical implications for the 
global order. Cooperation links different issue areas and takes place between a wide variety of 
actors in terms of origin, composition and importance. The thesis provided two specific 
examples – the ISO 26000 process and cooperation in the intersection of sport and environment. 
However, as the different manuals international organisations have developed to govern 
cooperation with the private sector and other public institutions illustrate, cooperation is a 
common phenomenon throughout various regulatory fields.  
 
On a more theoretical level, regulatory cooperation required consideration of the debates on the 
global order and the allocation of authority beyond the state. A further achievement of the 
decision to adopt this particular approach to public private cooperation was the fact that it 
enabled us to traverse institutional and conventional boundaries. This was particularly so with 
regards to those boundaries within legal scholarship, particularly between public international 
lawyers and scholars concerned with transnational private law. The thesis attempted to integrate, 
or perhaps more accurately, to merge literature on private authority and governance with the 
broader meta-framework discussion on the global legal order found in public law scholarship.1 
 
Concretely, the thesis first looked at what was termed the commutative level of cooperation and 
attempted to provide an understanding of why regulators with different origins set out to 
cooperate within a transnational context. The argument was made that in a fragmented, 
heterarchically structured, context such as the present global realm, regulators possess 
incomplete authority. A regulator’s authority has to be understood in relational terms, or in other 
words in terms of the way it is linked to other organisations active in the same or overlapping 
areas. Those actors then have to cooperate in order to possess sufficient authority to achieve 
                                                          
1  Cf H-W Micklitz, ‘Rethinking the Public/Private Divide’, in: M Maduro, K Tuori & S Sankari (eds), 
Transnational Law – Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (CUP, 2014) 271, at 283. 
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compliance with their regulatory agendas, and consequently to operate effectively as a 
regulators. 
 
Three major themes were dealt with in Chapter 2, which arose repeatedly in the empirical 
examples of regulatory cooperation in the case studies. 
 
1. The first important issue was the blurring of expertise-driven epistemic authority and 
political authority. Given technological progress, global alignment of production chains 
and integrated markets, the need for expertise-driven authority is steadily increasing. This 
happens both at the national level and in particular also in the transnational realm.2 
However, it was also shown, based on the framework provided for by Kenneth Abbott 
and Duncan Snidal,3 that expertise is not synonymous with technical expertise. Rather, 
political and legal expertise are also of significant importance in transnational regulation. 
Furthermore, public organisations may also possess rather technical expertise which they 
can bring to a cooperative process with private actors as the example of cooperation 
between the UNEP and the IOC showed.  
 
2. At first glance a more obvious motivation for engaging in cooperation was the alignment 
of less authoritative regulators coming from highly fragmented issue areas with 
regulators which occupy a dominant position in their respective fields. This could for 
instance be observed in the sport and environment case study and also in the example of 
ISO 26000. However in the latter case study ISO actually entered the highly fragmented 
issue area of social responsibility regulation, where it did not have such a strong 
competitive advantage as it did in the more traditional technical standard setting field. 
Nonetheless, in both case studies representatives of the public organisations stressed the 
benefits of cooperating with regulators which are significantly influential within their 
respective communities. 
 
                                                          
2  In fact, some of the earlier transnational private regulatory organisations were actually bodies of experts, as 
the example of the ISO illustrates. 
3  K W Abbott & D Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of 
the State’, in: W Mattli & N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 44. 
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3. The importance of traditional legitimisation of transnational regulation was another 
central theme in Chapter 2. Although the analysis pointed to numerous ways of 
legitimising transnational regulation and to the different ways in which cooperation can 
increase legitimacy, traditional (respectively state-based) venues seem to still be of major 
importance for regulators seeking to be considered legitimate. Both private actors, the 
ISO and the IOC, were severely criticised with regard to the impact of their regulatory 
agenda in the public policy domain (either at the state level (IOC) or the international 
level (ISO)). Particularly in the 26000 process it became clear that the ISO could not 
pursue the standard setting process without crucial public actors being on board. And 
indeed, public participation went beyond mere representation. As shown in the case 
study, ISO sought to justify its special status as an ‘international standard setter’ by 
referring to its links with public actors and instruments. What seems to matter for a 
regulator in terms of being considered legitimate is therefore not only the participatory 
processes and the quality of the regulation produced, but also endorsement by actors 
which have traditionally been considered legitimate (to a greater or lesser extent) seems 
to remain an important factor.  
 
The second part of this thesis dealt with aspects of cooperation that went beyond commutative, 
exchange-based interactions. One could call it the ‘society’ level. This, however, would probably 
go too far given the absence of one single global public community or demos. Rather, in the 
present work a pluralist approach was adopted according to which authority in the transnational 
realm is fragmented with no overarching framework in place to guide interactions and to solve 
conflicts between the different realms.   
 
Cooperation among different transnational actors can, however, lead to more integrated network 
structures. Thus, for instance, when faced with severe public criticism regarding the 
environmental impact of the Olympic Games in the 1990s the IOC began cooperating with the 
United Nations Environmental Program in order to create environmental rules for the sporting 
sector. Over time this developed into a far-reaching program (Sport and the Environment) which 
encompasses a variety of actors, sports federations, local Olympic committees, public 
environmental organisations, NGOs (such as the World Wildlife Fund), corporations (such as 
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Puma), as well as states and local communities (and in particular host cities). Environmental 
rules regarding the field of sport are implemented, or at least supported, by all these actors even 
though not all actors are connected to each other (in the sense that there is no international 
environmental sports organisation under whose umbrella regulation takes place). Consequently, 
we can speak of a transnational regulatory network.  
 
The thesis claimed that networks such as the one in the areas of sport and environment are 
interesting from a legal perspective for several reasons. From a theoretical point of view 
networks raise the question of how to conceive the global order. It was shown in this thesis that a 
network approach can improve our understanding of the political and legal order beyond the 
pluralism universalism dichotomy. In networks different independent regimes achieve some 
stabilisation and unification of normative values and structural settings. This was labelled 
constitutionalisation effects. Such a network approach then offers a dialectic understanding 
which allows for a better consideration and integration of the achievements of the public sphere 
at the national level into the transnational realm. This is important since the transnational realm 
is one which is, if not dominated, at least strongly characterised by ‘private law’ structures. As 
networks are based on a cooperative framework between fairly equal participants there is no top 
down approach, but rather a bargaining process whereby the prevailing effects of this process are 
transported through the venue of individual couplings. This has implications for aspirations of 
publicness in a transnational context. A network approach does not provide for universality but 
instead ultimately accepts fragmentation and the inability to find a generally unitary framework.  
 
As mentioned at the beginning, this work has only gone so far as providing a first introduction to 
the phenomenon of regulatory cooperation. More research will undoubtedly be needed in the 
future. One dominant issue, particularly in the case study on sport and environment, was multi-
level regulatory cooperation.  Networks often link global transnational with local regulation. As 
has been pointed out in the literature on Global Experimentalist Governance and many others, 
the interaction between local and transnational level is of crucial importance.4 There is much 
                                                          
4  See for instance, G de Búrca, R O Keohane & C Sabel, ‘Global Experimentalist Governance’, 44 British 
Journal of Political Science (2014) 477. 
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more to say, especially with regard to the interplay between local level implementation and 
transnational rule setting which should be further pursued. 
  
On a more general level it is necessary to continuously improve the understanding of global 
orders and structures even in a fragmented context. In this regard regulatory cooperation will 
provide a new angle to look at some of the pressing issues. Of particular importance is of course 
the interplay between expertise-driven private authority and power with more traditional political 
authority patterns. Regulatory cooperation and ultimately regulatory networks can provide a 
venue to allow for both access to the expertise necessary and the safeguarding of public values 
enshrined and cherished in the nation state. As stated above, in this context the network approach 
is a means to allow for flexibility and can also be understood as a laboratory for experimenting 
on a new legal order. This flexibility and open-endedness however also comes with few 
normative guidelines to direct the ’experiments’. We might want to provide more concrete 
normative suggestions on what kind of interaction is preferable and which direction such 
experiments should take. As Abbott and Snidal have suggested, ‘[o]vercoming the orchestration 
deficit’ could be a way forward.5 We can also find some concrete suggestions in the practice of 
international organisations which set out manuals with requirements for transnational regulatory 
cooperation. These and other approaches provide good starting points for adding another piece of 
the complex puzzle that is understanding the global order.   
                                                          
5  K Abbott and D Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation through Transnational New Governance: 
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’, 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2009) 501. 
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